

Im Dialog mit China

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**Hanns
Seidel
Stiftung**

汉斯·赛德尔基金会

Historical Reflection and Reconciliation after World War II 二战后历史反思与和解

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Demokratie, Frieden und Entwicklung bilden das Leitmotiv der Arbeit der Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung. 1967 gegründet, ist sie als deutsche politische Stiftung selbständig, steht jedoch den Idealen der Christlich-Sozialen Union (CSU) und ihrer Schwesterpartei, der Christlich-DEMokratischen Union (CDU) nahe.

Die Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung engagiert sich weltweit in über 50 Ländern, die Beziehungen zur Volksrepublik China bestehen bereits seit 1980. Im Rahmen der entwicklungspolitischen Arbeit spielt China als Schwerpunktland eine besondere Rolle. Mit ihren Bildungs-, Beratungs- und Dialogprogrammen unterstützt die Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung vor allem den institutionellen Wandel auf nationaler und lokaler Ebene. Das übergeordnete Ziel des Regionalprojektes China ist die Unterstützung gesellschaftspolitischer Reformprozesse in Richtung Zivilgesellschaft und Rechtsstaatlichkeit. Im Mittelpunkt der Aktivitäten stehen die Bereiche Gesellschaftspolitik, Bildung und ländliche Entwicklung.

Bei der Durchführung ihrer Maßnahmen kooperiert die Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung neben ihrem Hauptpartner, dem Bildungsministerium der Volksrepublik China, auch mit der Gesellschaft des Chinesischen Volkes für Freundschaft mit dem Ausland, der Hochschule des Zentralkomitees der Kommunistischen Partei Chinas, dem Allchinesischen Frauenverband, dem Zentrum für Flurneuordnung des Ministeriums für Land und Ressourcen und dem Bildungsverband des Bauministeriums der Volksrepublik China. Bei all seinen Aktivitäten stützt sich das Regionalprojekt China der Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung auf ein in langjähriger Kooperation gewachsenes Netzwerk.



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Preface

On September 4th and 5th, 2010 the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) hosted an international conference on “Historical Reflection and the Process of Reconciliation in East Asia and Europe after World War II”. The conference explored the similarities and differences in both regions between the processes of coming to terms with the past and the rapprochement between once hostile nations. Academics from twelve countries—including China, Russia, the United States, along with East Asian, Western and Eastern European nations—participated in this event, bringing to the table a wide range of perspectives on an issue whose political impacts can be still felt today.

The two-day symposium was divided into four sections: During the opening panel Chinese and Japanese scholars discussed the Chinese-Japanese War and its implications for present-day relations. Afterwards, participants from neighboring Asian nations and the US joined in presenting their insights on the current state of historical reflection and reconciliation in East Asia and its impact on the regional security architecture. In the third panel historians from Eastern and Western European countries presented their findings on the process of reflection and reconciliation in postwar Europe, highlighting the advances made, as well as issues that remain unresolved. The closing panel, which provided fertile ground for discussion and exchange, focused on a comparison between Europe's and East Asia's differing postwar experiences, and the prospects for reconciliation in each region. This volume of the KOORD-series contains a selection of essays provided by presenters in order to offer readers a thematic overview and document the discursive range of the conference.

The symposium was organized by the CASS Institute of World History, with additional support provided by the China Association of German History, the China Association of Japanese History, and the Hanns Seidel Foundation. For us, this event was a welcome opportunity to continue the fruitful cooperation with these renowned institutions initiated in 2009 with a conference focusing on the differences in historical reflection between Germany and Japan.

As a political foundation, we see the promotion of a critical and constructive dialogue as one of the cornerstones of our work, even if the topics to be discussed are sensitive and conflict-laden. Thus we not only support academic forums and events, but also programs promoting dialogue on social and political issues. For it is only if we all remain engaged with each other and continue to exchange views—particularly on controversial issues—that mutual understanding can develop.

The critical analysis of one's own national history is a slow and often painful process, especially if it involves humanitarian disasters and crimes against humanity. But atonement, as far as such a thing is feasible, and a process of reconciliation are important elements for building close and stable relationships between nations and thus a prerequisite for peace—Europe being a vivid example of the long-term political significance of reconciliation.

Reconciliation is by no means an easy undertaking. It is a multilayered and extremely complex process that is dependant on a variety of factors. Naturally, the process of reflection, rectification and reconciliation in Asia is determined by a very different set of social, cultural, historical, religious and political parameters. Therefore experiences cannot be directly transferred from one region to the other, and the progress made in Germany and Europe is by no means a perfect blueprint for Asia. But Europe's experience can encourage all sides to face up to the challenges of working through history in their own way. To accomplish this, all of the parties involved must keep an open mind and work together to find a viable course of action for dealing with conflict-ridden historical issues. An excessive focus on past atrocities can make one a prisoner of past events and obstruct the vision of a common future, making it more difficult to create the transnational structures that are necessary in a globalized world.

Thus historical reflection—in a national as well as international context—and an open discourse pertaining thereto are not ends in themselves, but rather should be seen as essential tools for creating social peace within nations, and peaceful coexistence between them. In this context, an insistence on the correctness of one's own positions cannot serve as the basis of understanding for reconciliation, since it can impede rapprochement between the sides concerned. Insights and admissions on the other hand are often the direct outcome of learning processes, and can play a crucial role both in the redefinition of national self-image, and in reaching a more comprehensive reconciliation—not only with others, but with one's own historical past.

I would like to express my sincerest gratitude for the speakers who contributed their essays to this publication. In the name of the Hanns Seidel Foundation, I also want to thank the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and especially the Institute for World History for our successful cooperation.

Ulla Bekel

Hanns Seidel Foundation, Beijing

March, 2011

前言

2010年9月4日至5日,中国社会科学院主办了一场题为“二战后东亚和欧洲的历史反思与和解进程”的国际学术研讨会,旨在探索这两个地区在历史和解以及缓和前敌对国家关系方面的相似之处和差异。包括中国、俄罗斯、美国、东亚、西欧和东欧国家在内的12个国家的学者参加了这次会议,并对这一至今仍存在政治影响的问题广泛表达了观点和看法。

研讨会为期两天,共分四个部分。开场小组讨论会上,中日学者就中国抗日战争及其对目前中日关系的影响展开了讨论。随后,来自亚洲邻邦和美国的学者就东亚当前的历史反思、和解及其对地区安全结构的影响发表了各自的观点和看法。在第三场小组讨论会上,东欧和西欧各国的历史学者介绍了他们在战后欧洲反思与和解进程上的研究成果,突出介绍这方面的进展和尚未解决的问题。最后一场讨论会主要对欧洲和东亚进行比较,为大家提供了讨论和交流的平台。协调中心系列丛书精选出了与会者的文章,为读者提供一个专题综述并介绍本次会议的大致内容。

本次会议由中国社科院世界历史研究所组织,并得到中国德国史研究会、中国日本史研究会以及汉斯·赛德尔基金会的支持。我们与这些知名机构的合作始于2009年关于德日历史反思差异的研讨会,参与组织本次会议是我们继续与这些机构成功合作的良机。

作为一个政治性基金会,我们把推动批判性和建设性对话——即使是敏感和有争议的话题——作为我们的工作重点之一。因此,我们不仅支持学术论坛和活动,还致力于推动社会政治问题对话。因为,我们只有保持交往,不断交流——尤其是在有争议的问题上——才能增进相互了解。

批判地分析本国历史是一个缓慢且往往十分痛苦的过程,尤其当涉及人道主义灾难和反人道主义罪行的时候。但是,可行的补偿与和解进程对建立国家间密切稳定的关系十分重要,因此是实现和平的先决条件——欧洲的例子就生动的说明了这一点,其和解产生了长期的政治意义。

和解决非易事,它是一个多层面、十分复杂的过程,受多重因素的制约。亚洲的反思、补偿与和解过程自然取决于不同的社会、文化、历史、宗教和政治因素。因此,不同地区的经验不能生搬硬套,德国和欧洲的进步不能简单地当作亚洲的发展模式。但是,可以鼓励各方直面历史反思的挑战,以自己的方式解决这个问题。因此,有关各方必须开诚布公,共同寻找可行方案,解决充满冲突的历史问题。过于关注历史暴行会让我们陷入历史事件不能自拔,会阻碍我们的视野,无法看到一个共同的未来,使我们更加难于创建一个全球化需要的跨国架构。

因此,不论国内还是国际的历史反思与开诚布公的对话本身并非终极目标,而是实现国内社会和平与各国和平共存的基本手段。在这种情况下,坚持某些立场不会带来理解与和解,因为它会阻碍有关各方关系的缓和。但是,学习的过程带来的直接结果往往是深刻的理解和接纳,这种理解和接纳在重新定位国家形象、实现更加广泛的和解方面起着至关重要的作用——不仅是与别国的和解,还包括与本国历史的和解。

在此我要向各位报告人表达我最诚挚的谢意,谢谢你们将文章贡献给本书。我还要代表汉斯·赛德尔基金会为我们的成功合作感谢中国社科院,尤其是世界历史研究所!

贝乌拉

汉斯·赛德尔基金会,北京

2011年3月

Germany's Earliest Reevaluation of Nazi Totalitarianism and its Historical Legacy

Prof. Li Gongzhen

The German people's reevaluation both of the Nazi regime and of the larger sweep of German history began not after the end of the Second World War in 1945, but was in fact underway as early as 1933. This rethinking began not among German people still living in Germany, but among a group of exiled Germans who had escaped from their homeland.

On April 7th, 1933, two months after Hitler assumed the presidency, the Nazi-controlled government passed the "Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service". At the same time, the government inaugurated a campaign of cultural purification designed to eject from academia both Jewish scholars and those with "democratic tendencies". The campaign made concrete Nazism's demand for cultural homogeneity and was the first signal that the persecution of Germany's Jewish minority was underway. Thousands upon thousands of Jewish cultural elites, as well as those with democratic leanings, were forced out of German cultural life, bringing to a sudden and painful halt thousands of years of Jewish integration into Central European culture.

As the territory of the Nazi empire relentlessly expanded, so too did the area over which the Nazi campaign to "eradicate non-Aryan spirit" held sway. From 1933 to 1945, across a vast swath of central European territory encompassing Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia, over 500,000 Jewish refugees were forced into exile, among which roughly 12,000 could be considered cultural elites. Under the Nazi regime, more than 2,400 German scientists were persecuted for having democratic tendencies or Jewish ancestry. More than 1,400 of those went into exile, 1,090 of whom fled to the United States. Of those members of the academic elite that were taken in by American institutions of higher learning, more than 300 were philosophers, political scientists, sociologists, economists, or historians.¹ It was there, in American academia, that their thoroughgoing reevaluation of the tyrannical Nazi government began.

I. Origins of the reevaluation

It was not American intellectuals who took up questions of Nazism and its related issues, but the community of German academics in exile. The reasons why were not complicated. Firstly was the intense political demand produced by changes in the external situation.

¹ Horst Möller, *Exodus der Kultur, Schriftsteller, Wissenschaftler und Künstler in der Emigration nach 1933*, München: C. H. Beck Verlag, 1984, p. 47.

Isolationism's prolonged influence meant that American social scientists had not paid especially close attention to foreign politics, and, as a consequence, were almost completely ignorant of developments on the European political stage. The darkening situation in Europe during the 1920s and 1930s (culminating with the eruption of World War II), the American entry into the war, the casting off by this largest of industrialized countries of the fetters of isolationism and its plunge into world politics: all of this produced an enormous demand for specialists on foreign countries—especially on Germany—who could offer wide-ranging knowledge on Central and Western Europe. The situation proved an invaluable opportunity for German social scientists in exile. Private American foundations backed by names like Rockefeller and Carnegie as well as the memorial foundation of German-born Carl Schurz poured money into their research, while not a few of them found themselves working as trainers for the U.S. military, as members of the American intelligence apparatus, or offering advice to the relevant departments of the American government.²

These exiled German social scientists' research on Nazism owed itself not only to changes in the world around them, but, more fundamentally, to changes within the academics themselves. Few indeed were the members of this community who did not invest considerable time thinking about the reasons for their exile. With German history as a backdrop to their observations, they saw during their American exile how the western democratic system had become an isolated pocket of freedom, and they feared the threat that societal contradictions, if left unchecked, posed to this freedom. They had seen how such contradictions had already snuffed out freedom in Germany. Thus they attempted, through an analysis of their home country, to explicate the reasons for the emergence of National Socialism, and offer suggestions as to how the social conflicts that brought it about might be attenuated, or eliminated altogether.

The reasons for flight of these German philosophers, political scientists, sociologists, economists, and historians into exile were manifold. Whether it was their Jewishness, their social democratic leanings, or their liberalism, they were all labeled as enemies by the Nazi regime and forced to take refuge in the West, with the majority arriving in the United States. Few of them were forced into exile as individuals. Rather, it was as members of various strains of German academic thought that they took refuge. Upon arrival in their foreign exile, they naturally reconstituted the same intellectual circles they had occupied before their flight. For example, members of the University of Frankfurt's Institute for Social Research clustered in Columbia University, while the members of the University in Exile also found a new home within the graduate school of

² Stephen Duggan / Betty Drury, *The Rescue of Science and Learning, The Story of the Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced Foreign Scholar*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948, p. 85.

New York's New School for Social Research.³ Generally speaking, these two groups were socialist in their orientation, while the group of German scholars exiled to Turkey, and the Austrian School that took refuge in England were bound together by their liberal tendencies.

As different as the reasons for their exile were, these refugee academics shared a common focus: what to make of Germany, its history, its culture, and its present situation? This focus led them to questions regarding the social structure of Nazi Germany and the origins of Germany as an authoritarian state, questions which followed naturally from their designation of Nazi Germany as a "new form of political authoritarianism" that defined itself in opposition to liberal democracy. Once posited, this designation inevitably led them to explore the societal and historical reasons behind the development of authoritarian government in Germany, which itself led, first and foremost, to discussions of urban capitalist society.

II. The reevaluation of the Nazi regime

The first person to undertake research on the Nazi regime was the famous German political philosopher Max Horkheimer, the head of the University of Frankfurt's Institute for Social Research, later reconstituted as a part of Columbia University in New York City. A pioneer of critical social theory, his 1939 essay "The Jews and Europe" lays down the line: "He who does not wish to speak of capitalism, should also remain silent about fascism."⁴

In his comprehensive critique of Nazism as representative of fascism, Horkheimer enlisted approaches ranging from sociology to economics to ideology critique, as well as his knowledge and analysis of actual societal conditions. In the course of his research, he stated that, "At the moment when the Enlightenment rationality of the middle-class mutated into its very antithesis, it was fascism, in the form of authoritarian rule, that embodied the logical realization of tendencies which themselves were inherent to the political and economic liberalism of the middle-class. The instrumental rationality of middle-class thinking manifested itself in a rational economy and political rule. This rationality's progression resulted in the elimination of political and economic competition, as became apparent in economic monopolies and the bureaucratic centralization of party authority. Related to this was the rise of military-like discipline and a rapid development towards a mass society, resulting in the elimination of independent individual reason as a cornerstone of society, and the subsequent abolition, through totalitarian means, of the distinction between the individual and society. In this sense, the authoritarian fascist state

³ Claus-Dieter Krohn, *Wissenschaft im Exil, Deutsche Sozial- und Wirtschaftswissenschaftler in den USA und die New School for Social Research*, Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 1987, p. 77.

⁴ Max Horkheimer, 'Die Juden und Europa', *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* 8 (1939), p. 115.

is a social form made possible only through the rational structure underlying capitalist society. Once established, however, its dissolution through rational means—namely political or economic reform—is impossible. Because of this, people need a new, critical form of social theory if they are to be able to overcome the logical impasses that paved the way for fascism. The rationality of this social theory would be based on the realization of the mutual dependence between philosophy, science, society, and economy. Thus, there is no middle way: It is either barbarism or freedom.”⁵

Horkheimer’s 1941 essay “The End of Reason” contained the conclusion: “In a totalitarian mass society the economy is reshaped through centrally directed planning and pushed to a high level of efficiency. The national socialist state has proven to be stable and efficient, precluding virtually any possibility that internal contradictions will fracture the system from within. Industry, military, and a bureaucracy inseparable from the party: none of these circles can be seen as possible sources of internal resistance. As such, we can only pin our hopes on the destruction of the regime from without.”⁶

Following the 1939 publication of Horkheimer’s essay, other exiled social scientists would develop four interlocking theories meant to explain, through an examination of capitalism, the origins of totalitarian rule: one was Emil Lederer’s theory on “the transition from a class society to a mass society”, first put forth in 1940 in “The State of the Masses: The Threat of the Classless Society”; second was Friedrich Pollock’s theory of “state capitalism”, which appeared in his 1941 publication “Is National Socialism a New Order?”; third was Franz Neumann’s theory on “the alliance of industry and dictatorial political parties”, developed in the 1951 book “Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism”; fourth was Hannah Arendt’s theory, expounded in her 1951 classic “The Origins of Totalitarianism”, that totalitarianism, in its rule as well in its operation, was the “only form of dictatorial organization suited for mass society”.

Of the theories elaborated by these four scholars, it is those of Franz Neumann and Hannah Arendt that merit special attention. As Neumann wrote, “In fact, the interests of industrialists, politicians, bureaucrats, and the military overlap with and reinforce one another. The former two groups offer the key to understanding the structure of the entire system. In the midst of imperial expansion, Nazi and industrial interests coincide. Nazism seeks to glorify and stabilize its rule, while industry seeks to conquer foreign markets by exploiting its production capacity to the fullest. German industrial circles have always hoped for ample cooperation between the two. They have no love for democracy, civil rights, trade unions, or for public debate. Nazism exploits industrial leaders’ daring, knowledge, and aggressiveness, while industrial leaders

⁵ Max Horkheimer, ‘Die Juden und Europa’, *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* 8 (1939), p. 136.

⁶ Max Horkheimer, ‘The End of the Reason’, *Studies in Philosophy and Social Sciences* (1941), p. 388.

exploit the anti-democratic, anti-liberal, anti-trade union nature of the Nazi Party. Nazism has already amply developed its ability to rule and to control the masses. As for bureaucracies, they advance in step along with strength and victory, while the German military, for the first time in its history, has attained everything it ever desired.”⁷

Meanwhile, Arendt looked to alienation from modern society and to traditional western thought for the sources of totalitarian rule. She elaborated how ideological and societal changes, primarily anti-Semitism and aggressive imperialism’s development among the peoples of western European, offered fertile grounds for totalitarianism. Moreover, these anti-Semitic and imperialist tendencies became the very tools by which formless mass organizations were integrated into the totalitarian movement. In Arendt’s view, authoritarian movements and authoritarian rule were “the only form of dictatorial organization truly suited to mass society”. It was through her in-depth examination of the principles, organization, propaganda, violence, and “campaigns of assimilation” of Nazi totalitarianism that she was able to prove that “this kind of totalitarianism is a modern form of tyranny,” and, “terror is the essence of totalitarian domination.”⁸

There is little doubt that these exiled German social scientists were impressively clear-sighted and creative in their understanding of the forms of Nazi totalitarianism, the social structures it promulgated, and the campaigns by which it seized power. They not only provided the impulse for the rapid development of western political theory in the 20th Century, but also provided the Allies with a sense of legitimacy and justice in the war against fascism. Subsequent American postwar occupation policies of democratic reform were based not only upon the dismantling of Nazi authoritarianism, but also on the eradication of the conditions that allowed it to thrive.

III. The reevaluation of German history

Given that capitalism had already spread over every corner of the globe, what was it that brought about these disastrous transformations in Germany, and Germany alone? Posing these questions necessitated a close examination of the history and culture of German society. As such, in their research the exiled German academics made creative use of the concepts of “the belated nation”, and a particular German path. The result was the realization of a new critical perspective on German history, one which can be considered the intellectual foundation for Germany’s later success in overcoming the past.

The exiled expert on social history Helmuth Plessner stated unambiguously in his 1935 work “The Destiny of the German Spirit at the Dawn of the

⁷ Franz Neumann, *Behemoth, Struktur und Praxis des Nationalsozialismus, 1933-1944*, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1977, p. 361.

⁸ Hannah Arendt, *Elemente und Ursprünge totaler Herrschaft*, Frankfurt am Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1955, pp..451, 464.

Urban Age” (later renamed “The Belated Nation”) that, “there are two historical phenomena especially responsible for the emergence of a ‘particular German path’: first was the ‘regional fragmentation’ of authority within the first German empire; second was the influence of Martin Luther’s religious reforms.”

In the same work, Plessner also wrote that, “During the first German empire, the lack of a centralized political power, the weak position of an emperor dependent on the Kurfürsten⁹, the autonomy of feudal lords and city-states on the one hand, and imperial immediacy¹⁰ on the other all contributed to a fragmented coalition of federal states, bound together only loosely in an imperial alliance and through the emperor himself. As the interests of individual locales diverged, Reformation opened the chasm even further by dividing the empire into Protestant and Catholic states. This was far from Martin Luther’s sole contribution to ‘Germany’s particular path’. His doctrine of ‘external serfdom and internal freedom’ became an important factor in the ongoing development of the German-speaking world. In this world, people were obliged to obey. It was a world without justice, without fraternity, without love. Against this, Luther set the belief in an ‘inner world’ of faith freely ruled by fraternity, freedom, and the love of Christ. It is due to this perceived duality that people accepted worldly authority as a ‘necessary evil’, and, without resistance, took refuge in this ‘inner world’. Plessner went on: “Luther’s church of obligation can be seen as the origin of a sublimation whereby the impetus for a spiritual quest was transferred to the secularized terrain of science and culture, while political interference—seen as external and non-spiritual—was avoided. The pious devotion to this ‘inner world’ is said to be the reason for Germany’s middle-class’ quiescent political culture; they simply didn’t deem it necessary to defend their interests against an old political regime.”¹¹

Since Germany was not a fully formed nation-state and lacked a politically vocal urban class, reforms instead brought about a mixed result. Out of this grew the need to build a complete, integrated German nation. But instead of following the widely-known “western model”, the goal was the construction of an “organic” nation-state within a Romantic framework. These theories adhered to the principles of historicism, wherein each nationality would develop independently according to its own “historiorganic” fashion. This would open the door to an anti-western, ethnically-oriented nationalism.

As Plessner put it, “During the Second German Empire the consequences of industrial alienation left urban intellectual elites in a state of shock over a ‘crisis of the humanities’. It was not to the forms of cultural-political legitimacy traditionally favored by urban classes that they turned, but to a pan-German

⁹ Trans. note: the electoral college that elected the Holy Roman Emperor from the middle of the 16th century onwards.

¹⁰ Trans. note: a status granted to a locality by the Holy Roman Emperor placing it under the Emperor’s direct rule, as opposed to that of a feudal lord.

¹¹ Helmuth Plessner, *Die verspätete Nation*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1974, p. 65.

nationalism tinged with shades of cultural nationalism. Although this nationalism had anti-liberalism and anti-parliamentarian elements to it, it persisted due to its being perceived as the only legitimate form of patriotism. It opened the door to biological determinism and anti-Semitism on the one hand, and the ideology and policies of expansionism on the other. These tendencies only gained momentum with the 'Peace of Versailles', that was commonly seen as a 'German disaster'. As such, with the added aggravation of an economic crisis, there appeared a new kind of opposition to liberally oriented social forms, taking society further down the path towards totalitarianism."¹²

It must be admitted that the historical perspectives advanced by these German exiles marked the true beginning of the wholesale rethinking of German history that would follow. Examining the times in which they lived, one is even more impressed by the magnitude of their contributions. It is well known that for nearly twenty years following the war, German historians remained, as a group, relatively quiet. It was not until the rise of a new generation of historians untainted with the stain of the Nazi regime and unburdened by historical guilt, that a true reevaluation of German history could begin. It was these historians, guided and influenced by the intellectual treasure trove built up by German academics in exile, who were able to conduct a painstaking revision of German history. It was precisely this rethinking among academic circles that would later help bring about a profound reflection among the whole of West German society.

IV. The reevaluation of „laissez-faire“

Eventually, exiled German academics' investigation of Germany's historical development would go even further, delving into questions of the forces which brought about the decline of the Weimar republic. These were questions of critical importance to the future reconstruction of both Germany and of Europe as a whole following the defeat of Nazism. On these questions, the community of German-speaking exiles did not always speak with one voice, with the resulting discord pushing their research even further than it otherwise would have gone.

From their exile in England, the „purely liberal“ members of the Austrian School, represented by Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek, opined that, „the disasters that have befallen Europe have all come as a consequence of the socialist abolition of capitalist economic principles. Only through the re-establishment of a free market economy can these disasters be swept away.“¹³ They did not mince words in their „opposition to any form of social model that threatens the principles of laissez-faire capitalism“. They saw „any state social

¹² Helmuth Plessner, *Die verspätete Nation*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1974, p. 141.

¹³ Ludwig von Mises, *Omnipotent Government, The Rise of Total State and Total War*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944, p. 287.

policies at cross with the natural development of a capitalist economy, any attempts to organize labor in new and novel ways“ as „the beginnings of totalitarianism and collectivism“. They believed that, „all types of socialist movements seek to bring about the collapse of parliamentary democracy“. ¹⁴

German academics exiled to the United States, more social democratic in their outlook, were not long in their reply: „Was it not a purely market-oriented liberalism which, owing to a crisis of sales and unemployment, proved a hot-bed of social contradictions? Was it not Nazism that was the beneficiary of just this sort of contradiction? Was it not the Weimar Republic's spasmodic support for parliamentarism's 'rules of the game' that prevented it from engaging its enemies?“

In actual point of fact, these American-exiled, German academic proponents of social democracy were not rejecting liberalism outright. On the contrary, they took stances that were rational, liberal, and in opposition to Hitler's tyranny. Their new theories were not in conflict with a liberal thought that had as its basis natural rights and the Enlightenment liberal tradition. They did not believe that capitalism could only descend into Nazism; indeed, they saw Nazi Germany as an "exceptional phenomenon in capitalist development". This was the source of their inquiries into "Germany's particular path". In their view, the broader content of Western democratic liberalism played a far larger role than capitalism. Their research on Nazism and their exploration of "Germany's particular path" was itself an effort to protect democracy.

These exiled German social scientists could also be called the "New Liberals". They differentiated themselves from the "pure liberalism" of the Austrian School with their advocacy of a postwar policy towards defeated Nazi Germany—derived from their observations on the contradictions and the risks of a laissez-faire market economy—that would "seek to remedy the shortcomings of liberalism through active state social policy." ¹⁵ In his 1942 work "The Crisis of Modern Society", the Swiss-exiled socialist economic scholar Wilhelm Röpke wrote that, "The people of today have already seen the kind of disasters laissez-faire capitalism can inflict on a society. Because of this, any future economic framework must grant the principles of social justice and humanitarianism the same importance as individual freedom. The state must regulate the individual interest that underlies the rules of the market, so as to achieve harmony and balance for society as a whole."¹⁶ For the sake of peace and development in postwar Europe, these exiled German thinkers proposed to "establish a new, politically and economically free European postwar order"

¹⁴ Friedrich. A. von Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom*, London: Routledge, 1944, p. 174.

¹⁵ Eduard Heimann, 'The Rediscovery of Liberalism', *Social Research* 4 (1941), p. 481.

¹⁶ Wilhelm Röpke, *Gesellschaftskrisis der Gegenwart*, Zürich: Eugen Rentsch Verlag, 1942, p. 404.

within a federal framework, “to safeguard a shared and harmonious postwar development for all of Europe’s peoples, with the final aim of European unity”.¹⁷

The successful realization of a social market economy allowed the postwar Federal Republic of Germany to avoid following in the disastrous footsteps of its Weimar predecessor. It was on the basis of this newly flourishing economy that a reevaluation of German history and the crimes of the Nazi regime could truly begin among the broader mass of the FRG population. This would eventually bring about Germany’s reconciliation with its European neighbors, and cement the German people’s desire to serve as the “keystone of the European Union”. It was towards these developments that the German academics looked as they fled along their road into exile. As such, it is hardly exaggerating to say that it was through the intellectual fecundity of these exiled German scholars that the tone for the German people’s postwar reassessment of Nazi crimes was set, the adversarial relationship between German and Western civilizations was cast aside, and both German history and culture were able to find their “way home” into the realm of civilized peoples.

Closing thoughts

Nazi tyranny was a product of Germany’s particular path through history, intensified by the contradictions inherent to the structure of capitalist society. Even more so, it was born of the totalitarian Nazi movement. It embodied the union of ideological anti-modernity and radical anti-traditionalism, as well as ultra-modernity realized through movement-centric means. At Nazism’s core lay an ethnocentric world view that emphasized the individual’s obligation to submit absolutely in the face of superior authority, seeking to wipe out all liberal thinking. The means of implementation were racial violence and war, extermination of anything deemed undesirable, constant striving to secure “living space” through expansionism, underpinned by biological theories of race, and opposition to Christian traditions. Thus the establishment in 1933 of a dictatorial regime of terror marked the opening of German history’s darkest epoch.

German social scientists expelled by the Nazis for their Jewishness or their ideas of democratic progress became in exile their era’s representatives of “another Germany”. As early as the Weimar Republic, they had fashioned themselves as representatives of a German tradition of critical social science, and contributed to the creation of a “Weimar culture.” They differed from right-wing German nationalist schools of thought in that, as left-wing socialists, they also held on to the European tradition of idealist philosophy. As Germans, they sought not a narrow, parochial form of ethnic culture, but rather an open, international form. As social scientists, they sought a Germany with a fairer, more equitable economy, and more democratic politics. This reflected a basic coincidence between their values and those of Western civilization. It was because

¹⁷ Klaus Voigt (ed.), *Friedenssicherung und europäische Einigung, Ideen des deutschen Exils 1933-1945*, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1988, p. 12.

of this that they were labeled representatives of a “non-Aryan spirit”, and were forced into exile by the persecution of the Nazi regime, an exile which signaled a fissure that reached into the furthest corners of German intellectual circles.

These exiled German social scientist not only brought their German tradition of critical social science and the European tradition of idealist philosophy with them into an American society with a long tradition of immigration. As they became alive to the persistent threat to the Western world’s liberal democracies and the incessant humanitarian calamities of German aggression and expansion, they initiated, right in the heart of American academia, the very earliest reevaluation of Nazi tyranny and German history. In their discussions on urban capitalist society, they proposed new theories on the origins, forms of rule, social structures, and progression of Nazi totalitarianism. Their analysis of German history’s particular developmental path, their penetrating critiques of laissez-faire capitalism, and their vision for the postwar design of the “new order of a European union” offered new perspectives that were not only foundational, but international in their outlook. Consequently, this “critical reevaluation” was able to transcend the limited, transitory nature of momentary circumstances. The richness of their intellectual achievements not only brought about a sharp shift in western political thinking; it would also prove to be of profound importance to postwar American occupation policy, to efforts to promote democratization of the defeated Germans, to the reestablishment of the Federal Republic of Germany’s economy, and to the German people’s rethinking of their own history.

In this, there is perhaps something that speaks to the image of Japanese society as one that has not completely examined its own crimes of aggression. In prewar Japan, there were no fissures amongst the intelligentsia. There was no exile to a democratic society after expulsion at the hands of a militaristic nation. Consequently, there occurred no wartime rethinking of how this militarism had sprung from the Japanese people themselves, nor of its place in the fabric of Japanese history. As such, in questions of postwar reevaluation, Japanese society sorely lacked the invitation to reflection with which exiled German academics provided their own society. The lack of such an intellectual platform undoubtedly had a deep influence on the superficial nature of Japanese postwar reflection.

对纳粹极权主义与德国历史最早的反思

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德意志人对于纳粹暴政以及德意志历史的反思，不是在1945年第二次世界大战结束之后，而是早自1933年以来就已经开始了。只不过，它不是由当时生活在德国境内的德意志人，而是由一批逃出德国、流亡国外的德意志人开始的。

1933年4月7日，即希特勒当上德国总理两个多月后，纳粹党执掌的政府通过《重设公职人员法》在德国大学校园内开展了一场驱逐有犹太血统、有民主进步思想的知识分子的“文化清洗运动”。这场“文化清洗运动”是纳粹主义“文化同质性要求”的真实体现，也是作为对犹太少数民族大迫害的第一个信号出现的。当成千上万的有犹太血统、有民主进步思想的知识精英从纳粹德国的社会文化生活领域中被驱逐出去时，也就意味着多少世纪以来犹太民族对中欧文化的适应突然间出现了一场痛苦的终结。

随着这个纳粹帝国版图的不断扩大，这场“清除非雅利安精神”的运动也在更广阔的空间里得到了贯彻。1933—1945年间，包括原德国、奥地利、捷克斯洛伐克在内的整个纳粹德国的势力范围里，共有50万犹太难民被迫流亡海外，其中包括12000名文化知识精英。遭受驱逐的有犹太血统、有民主进步思想的科学家达2400多人，他们当中有1400多人选择了流亡，其中的1090人流亡到了美国。在这些被美国高校接纳的科学精英中，有300多人是哲学家、政治学家、社会学家、经济学家和历史学家，¹正是他们在美国学术界最早开始了一场对纳粹暴政以及德意志历史的深刻反思。

一、反思的缘由

与纳粹主义问题相关的所有研究都不是由美国本土的社会科学家发起的，而是由这些德国流亡社会科学家发起的，其原因也并不复杂，首先是客观局势的变化所导致的强烈政治需求。

由于孤立主义的长期影响，美国政治学家们过去很少关心国外政治事态的发展，以致他们对欧洲事态的发展显得相当无知。随着欧洲局势在20世纪30年代的日益紧张化，第二次世界大战的爆发，以及美国参战，这个最大的工业化国家终于摆脱了孤立主义的束缚，进入到世界政治之中，由此也出现了一种对各国专家、尤其是德国专家的巨大需求，需要他们来提供有关中欧和西欧的广泛知识，这种局势为德国流亡社会科学家的研

¹ Horst Möller, *Exodus der Kultur, Schriftsteller, Wissenschaftler und Künstler in der Emigration nach 1933*, München: C. H. Beck Verlag, 1984, p. 47.

究提供了一种极好的机会。不仅美国那些大的私人基金会,如洛克菲勒基金会、卡尔·舒尔茨纪念基金会、卡内基基金会等,向这类研究项目提供了越来越多的金钱,而且德国流亡社会科学家当中的许多人,或是作为美国军队内部的教师出现在各种培训班的课堂上,或是作为美国国家重要情报部门的研究人员在发挥作用和影响,或是经常性地为美国政府的各种相关部门提供咨询。²

这些德国流亡社会科学家之所以会发起对纳粹主义的研究,除了这种局势上的客观原因外,还有更为根本性的主观原因。这些被迫进入流亡的德国社会科学家,几乎无人不思考导致他们流亡的真正原因。而且,在德意志历史发展的背景面前,在流亡美国的经历中,他们看到了西方民主制已经成为了自由的孤岛,他们担心这种自由会由于社会矛盾的继续发展而受到威胁,而这种发展已经在德国导致了自由的末日。因此,他们力图通过对德国的分析来阐明导致纳粹暴政的原因,并为消除或调整这些矛盾提出种种建议。

这些德国哲学家、政治学家、社会学家、经济学家和历史学家被迫流亡的具体原因并不完全相同,他们或是作为犹太人、或是作为社会民主主义者,或是作为自由主义者,而被纳粹暴政视为敌人,被迫流亡西方寻求避难,最后大多都到了美国。他们中的绝大多数人并不是作为孤立的个体,而是作为德国不同思想圈子中的成员而进入流亡的。在这场向海外的流亡中,他们也很自然地再度形成了各自圈子的集团结构,例如,那些聚集在哥伦比亚大学的原法兰克福大学“社会研究所”中的成员,以及那些团结在纽约“社会研究新学院”创办的那所名为“流亡大学”的研究生院中的成员,就是如此。³ 总的来说,这两个集团都是以社会民主主义为方向的,而流亡到土耳其的那个“德意志集团”和流亡到英国的“奥地利学派”的集团,则是以自由主义思想为联系纽带的。

无论他们流亡的具体原因有多么不同,他们关心的问题则是共同的:即究竟应该如何认识德国、它的历史、文化和现实局势的问题,这些问题直接指向了纳粹德国的社会结构以及德意志极权主义国家的起源问题。这是因为,当他们将这个纳粹主义国家作为一种与自由民主制度对立的“新型的极权主义统治形式”来定位时,就不能不去探讨造成德国这种政治发展的文化史和社会史上的原因,为此,也就不能不去首先开展一场关于市民资本主义社会的讨论。

² Stephen Duggan / Betty Drury, *The Rescue of Science and Learning, The Story of the Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced Foreign Scholar*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948, p. 85.

³ Claus-Dieter Krohn, *Wissenschaft im Exil, Deutsche Sozial- und Wirtschaftswissenschaftler in den USA und die New School for Social Research*, Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 1987, p. 77.

二、对纳粹暴政的反思

最先对纳粹暴政展开研究的是流亡美国哥伦比亚大学的前法兰克福大学“社会研究所”领导人、著名政治哲学家马克斯·霍克海默(Max Horkheimer)。这位“社会批判理论”的倡导者在1939年发表的论文《犹太人与欧洲》中,首先提出了这个严肃的命题:“谁不想去谈论资本主义,谁就会对纳粹主义保持沉默。”⁴

马克斯·霍克海默从社会学、经济学、现实社会分析以及意识形态批评等角度,对以纳粹主义为代表的法西斯主义进行了综合分析研究,他提出了如下观点,“当市民启蒙运动的理性走向反面的时候,法西斯主义,带着它极权主义的统治形式,体现的正是对这些倾向的一种合乎逻辑的实现,这些倾向本身存在于市民政治和经济自由主义的逻辑中。市民阶级的工具理性,在理性的经济 and 理性的统治中体现出来,并在它连贯性的发展中,通过垄断、中央集权化政党的官僚主义,导致了一种对经济和政治竞争的排除。与之相联系的是,对人民大众实施的纪律化,以及个性化的丧失,导致了社会上个体思想独立性的消除,并因此以一种极权主义的方式和方法扫除了个体与社会之间的区别。法西斯主义的权威国家是一种社会形式,从可能性上讲,它存在于资本主义社会结构的理性中,但是,一旦当这种国家建立起来,便不再能通过理性的手段,即经济、政治改革的手段来废除了。因此,人们需要一种新的、批评式的社会理论,才能扫除这种迄今为止汇入法西斯主义发展的窘境,这种社会理论的理性是建立在反思哲学、科学、经济与社会的相互依赖性的基础上的。如此看来,野蛮或自由,这是没有选择的。”⁵

马克斯·霍克海默还在1941年发表的论文《理性的末日》中得出了这个结论:“这个极权主义的大众化社会,通过中央指令性的经济计划,使经济得以重建,并取得了更大的效率,而且它的稳固和效率,使它几乎不存在因内部矛盾而被粉碎的可能性,无论是经济界、军队、还是官僚或政党,从长远来看,都不能被视为抵抗的载体。因此,这种暴政只能寄望于外部力量来摧毁。”⁶

自马克斯·霍克海默1939年的那篇论文发表以来,在流亡社会科学家的相关论著中,产生出四种彼此有联系的,也是最有代表性的理论,他们都力图通过对资本主义社会的研究,来理解这种极权主义统治形式的

⁴ Max Horkheimer, 'Die Juden und Europa', *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* 8 (1939), p. 115.

⁵ Max Horkheimer, 'Die Juden und Europa', *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* 8 (1939), p. 136.

⁶ Max Horkheimer, 'The End of the Reason', *Studies in Philosophy and Social Sciences* (1941), p. 388.

来源：一是埃米尔·雷德勒(Emil Lederer)通过他1940年出版的著作《大众的国家,无阶级社会的威胁》,提出了关于“从阶级社会向大众化社会过渡”的理论;二是弗里德里希·波洛克(Friedrich Pollock)通过他1941年出版的著作《纳粹主义是一种新秩序吗?》,提出了关于“国家资本主义”的理论;三是弗朗茨·诺伊曼(Franz Neumann)通过他1942年出版的著作《巨兽——纳粹主义的结构与实践》,提出了关于“政党独裁与大工业界联盟”的理论;四是汉娜·阿伦特(Hannah Arendt)通过她1951年出版的著作《极权主义的因素与起源》,提出了将这种极权主义运动和统治视为“与大众化社会唯一相适应的独裁组织形式”的理论。

在这四种理论中,特别值得注意的是弗朗茨·诺伊曼的理论和汉娜·阿伦特的理论。弗朗茨·诺伊曼提出:“事实上,德国的统治阶级包括四个明显不同的集团,即大工业界、政党、官僚以及军队,这些集团的利益相互重叠又相互加强,前两者为了解这整个体系的关系提供了线索。在帝国主义扩张上,纳粹党与大工业界之间有着一致的利益。纳粹党追求它统治的荣誉和稳定化,而大工业界则充分利用它的生产能量来征服国外市场。德国工业界一直希望能达成它们之间最充分的合作,它们从来就不喜欢民主、公民权、贸易联盟以及公共讨论。纳粹党利用工业领袖们的敢做敢为、知识和侵略性,而工业领袖们则利用反民主、反自由主义和反联盟主义的纳粹党。这个纳粹党已充分发展了它控制、统治群众的技巧。官僚机构总是与胜利的力量同步前进的,而军队也在德国历史上第一次得到了它想要的一切。”⁷

汉娜·阿伦特则从现代社会出现的异化以及西方的传统思想中寻找极权主义统治的根源。她阐述了一种社会和意识形态上的发展,首先是西欧民族国家的反犹主义和侵略性的帝国主义,它们为极权主义的统治形式做好了准备,并最终成为了它的工具。这两种工具是适合于将无定形的群众组织成极权主义运动的,因此,她认为极权主义运动和统治是“唯一适合大众化社会的独裁组织形式”。她还特别通过对纳粹极权主义的原则、组织、宣传、暴力和“一体化运动”等手段的深刻论证,得出了“这种极权主义是一种现代形式的暴政”,而“恐怖就是这种极权主义统治的实质”的结论。⁸

毫无疑问,这些德国流亡社会科学家们对纳粹极权主义统治形式、社会结构及其运动发展的认识是相当深刻的,也是具有开创性的。它不仅极大地推动20世纪西方政治理论研究领域突变式的发展,同时也为世界

⁷ Franz Neumann, *Behemoth, Struktur und Praxis des Nationalsozialismus, 1933-1944*, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1977, p. 361.

⁸ Hannah Arendt, *Elemente und Ursprünge totaler Herrschaft*, Frankfurt am Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1955, pp. 451, 464.



人民的反法西斯战争提供了充分的合法性和正义性。对于美国来说,战后对德国实行的占领政策以及“民主化”的改造政策,正是建立在彻底扫除这种纳粹极权主义统治以及形成这种统治的温床的基础上的。

三、对德意志历史的反思

资本主义广泛存在于世界各国,但为什么恰恰德国发生了这种灾难性的转变呢?要回答这个问题,就必须去考察德意志的社会史和文化史,为此,德国流亡社会科学家们在他们的相关研究中,创造性地运用了“迟到的民族”和“德意志特殊道路”的概念来加以描述。在此,一种对德意志历史的新解释和新评价得到了贯彻,这种新解释和新评价是能够被视为正在开始的“克服过去”的思想基础的。

流亡社会史专家赫尔穆特·普雷斯勒(Helmuth Plessner),在他1935年出版的著作《德意志精神在它市民时代开端中的命运》(后更名为《迟到的民族》)中明确指出:“有两个历史现象是要特别对‘德意志特殊道路’负责的:一是德意志第一帝国时代特别的‘地方分裂化’统治结构,二是马丁·路德(Martin Luther)宗教改革的影响。”

赫尔穆特·普雷斯勒这样写到:“在德意志第一帝国时代,由于中央权力的缺乏,导致了一种皇帝依赖于选侯们的软弱地位,帝国诸侯和城市的独立自治,促进了邦国的‘地方分裂化’局面。在这个松散的帝国联盟中,这些邦国只是通过皇帝个人才彼此联系在一起的。这种地方利益上的区别化,由于宗教改革,被添加了一道附带性的新教与天主教邦国之间深深的鸿沟。然而,路德对这条‘德意志特殊道路’的参与份额还不仅如此。路德关于‘外在被奴役而内心自由’的学说,成为了这个德语世界进一步发展的一个重要因素。在这个世界里,人们被要求服从,而这个世界又肯定是既无公正、也无博爱、更无爱的,是与那个信仰的‘内心世界’相对立的,因为这个‘内心世界’是由对基督的爱、博爱和信仰自由来统治的。这种矛盾要归因于这一点:人们将世俗的权威作为‘必要的’祸害来接受了,在它的面前,人们毫无抵抗地躲进了‘内心世界’之中。”赫尔穆特·普雷斯勒对此还做了进一步的研究:“在路德的强制教会中,能看到那种在科学和文化的世俗精神领域里寻求宗教意义的理想化倾向,而与此同时,又避开那种被视为外在的和非精神的政治干扰。这种对‘内心世界’的虔诚正是德意志市民阶级不问政治的文化原因,而且他们对于使用暴力方式来反对一个旧政权是毫无兴趣的。”⁹

由于没有形成一个民族国家,又缺乏在政治上发出声响的市民阶级,因而导致了德意志发展的一种混合性效果,从中产生出一种需要:造就一

⁹ Helmuth Plessner, *Die verspätete Nation*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1974, p. 65.

个德意志的完整国家。但它并不是瞄准那些众所周知的西方模式的，而是在一种浪漫主义的框架内，形成了一种“有机体的”国家理论。它遵循一种“历史主义”原则，以每个民族发展中的那种“历史-有机地”成长起来的独特性方式为出发点。因此，一种反西方的、以文化民族为方向的民族主义成为了可能。

“在德意志第二帝国时代，由于工业化的异化效果，市民阶级的知识精英受到了人文主义教育价值观危机的震动。与此同时，他们所能运用的不是传统的自由主义-市民阶级的政治文化所负载的合法性公式，而是那种全德意志的、染上了文化民族色彩的民族主义，它本身带有反议会主义和反自由主义的成分，却被视为唯一的爱国主义而存留下来。这种民族主义一方面为生物学上的推理和反犹主义提供了可能性，另一方面也为‘不断膨胀的行动主义’提供了可能性，而那些在‘凡尔赛和平’中得到表达的‘德意志灾难’，仅仅在加强这些倾向。因此，在经济危机导致的矛盾激化中，这条道路便带着它对一种新的、‘亲自由主义’的社会形态的反叛，走向了极权主义的社会。”¹⁰

必须承认，这些德国流亡社会科学家们所提供的历史视角，正是对德意志历史发展进行全面反思的真正开端。尤其当人们注意到以下这一历史事实时，就更能感受到他们所作贡献的重要性了。众所周知，联邦德国的史学界曾在二战后经历过一段长达近20年的相对沉寂期，直到20世纪60年代中期，尤其当与纳粹政权完全无染而“历史清白”的新一代历史学家们成长起来后，一场对德意志历史的反思运动才真正开展起来。而战后新一代的联邦德国历史学家正是在这些德国流亡社会科学家的思想财富的指导和影响下，才开始去对德意志历史进行更为具体、更为深刻的反思的。也正是这种学术界的深刻反思，才最后带动了联邦德国整个社会的深刻反思。

四、对“自由放任主义”的反思

在德国流亡社会科学家那里，这种对德意志历史发展道路的研究并没有到此终止，他们还继续探讨了导致魏玛民主共和国没落的推动力量问题，以及使这种没落成为可能的、具有决定性意义的倾向问题，因为这些问题对于在未来战胜纳粹主义之后重建德国和欧洲来说是至关重要的。对于这些问题，流亡科学家之间在解释体系上是存在着区别的，从而使这种研究变得更为深入了。

以路德维希·冯·米瑟斯(Ludwig von Mises)、弗里德里希·A·冯·哈耶克(Friedrich A. von Hayek)为代表的、流亡英国的“奥地利学派”

¹⁰ Helmuth Plessner, *Die verspätete Nation*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1974, p. 141.

的“纯自由主义者”们认为：“所有的灾祸都是由于社会主义在欧洲废除了自由主义的经济原则才带来的，因此，只有通过重建一种自由市场经济，才能扫除所有的灾祸。”¹¹他们直言不讳地“反对任何对‘自由放任’原则为基础的模式的干扰。任何通过国家的社会政策来追求与资本主义经济发展方向相反的努力，或任何寻求对劳动者进行新的社会组织化的尝试，”都被他们视为“极权主义化和集体化的开端”。因为，他们认为，“所有色彩的社会主义运动，都会推动议会民主主义国家形式的崩溃”。¹²

流亡美国的、以社会民主主义为方向的德国社会科学家们对此迅速进行了反驳：“难道这种纯粹以市场为方向的自由主义没有由于销售危机和失业危机恰恰显示出这种社会的矛盾性吗？”“难道纳粹主义没有成为了这种矛盾性的受益者吗？”“难道魏玛共和国没有由于抽搐式地维持议会制的游戏规则而阻碍到与它的敌人作斗争吗？”

事实上，这些流亡美国的、以社会民主主义为方向的德国社会科学家们并没有拒绝自由主义，因为他们是站在一种理性、自由的，否定希特勒暴政的立场上的。他们提出的新理论也并没有与启蒙 - 自由主义的个体思想、与天赋人权为基础的自由思想相冲突。他们并不认为资本主义只能产生纳粹主义，而是将纳粹德国的发展视为一种“资本主义发展的反常现象”，这也正是他们“德意志特殊道路”命题的来源。在他们的视野里，西方民主自由主义的内涵扮演着一种远比资本主义形式大得多的角色。他们对纳粹主义的研究以及对“德意志特殊道路”的探讨，本身就是以捍卫这种民主自由为基础的。

这些德国流亡社会科学家也能被称为“新自由主义者”，他们与“奥地利学派”为代表的“纯自由主义者”的区别在于，他们看到了那种“自由放任”式的市场经济带来的矛盾和危害，因而主张在战胜纳粹暴政之后的德国，“通过一种国家积极的社会政策手段来弥补自由主义的不足”。¹³流亡瑞士的德国经济学家威廉·洛普克(Wilhelm Röpke)在他1942年出版的著作《现代社会的危机》中这样写道：“今天的人们已经看到，那种‘自由放任’式的资本主义会给社会带来了何等的灾难。因此，在未来的经济框架中，必须将社会公正、人道主义的原则置于与个人自由同等重要的地位上，国家必须对市场规则之下的个人利益进行调整，以达到整个社会的

¹¹ Ludwig von Mises, *Omnipotent Government, The Rise of Total State and Total War*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944, p. 287.

¹² Friedrich. A. von Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom*, London: Routledge, 1944, p. 174.

¹³ Eduard Heimann, 'The Rediscovery of Liberalism', *Social Research* 4 (1941), p. 481.

和谐与平衡。”¹⁴ 为了欧洲战后的和平与发展,这些德国流亡社会科学家们,还特别提出了一种在联邦制框架内“建立政治和经济上自由的欧洲战后新秩序”的设想,“以确保战后欧洲各民族之间实现和睦相处和共同发展,并最终走向欧洲统一”。¹⁵

战后联邦德国“社会市场经济理论”的成功实践,从根本上避免了战后这个新生共和国重蹈魏玛共和国覆辙的危险。也正是在这场新经济繁荣的基础上,一场对纳粹暴政和德意志历史的深刻反思才在联邦德国社会中真正开展起来。它实现了德意志人与欧洲邻居们之间的和解,并坚定了德意志人充当“欧洲联盟拱顶石”的决心,而这样的发展,正是那些当年被迫走上流亡之路的德国社会科学家们所设计和期盼的。因此,人们可以毫不夸张地说,正是通过这些德国流亡社会科学家们的思想财富,才为战后德意志民族对纳粹罪行的“反思”定下了基调,德意志文化与西方文明之间的对立才得以消除,德意志的历史发展和精神文化才在文明化的民族范围内找到了它的“回乡之路”。

结论

纳粹暴政是德意志特殊历史发展道路上的产物,是资本主义社会结构中矛盾激化的产物,更是纳粹极权主义运动的产物,它体现了意识形态上的反现代主义、激进的反传统主义以及手段上的超现代化运动三者的结合。纳粹主义以种族主义作为世界观的核心内容,它强调的是个体必须对超级权力的绝对屈从,同时以歼灭任何意义上的自由意识为目标。它贯彻的是种族化的暴力与战争,铲除根式的灭绝,“生存空间”的夺取,民族主义的生物化理论和反基督教传统。因此,这种极权独裁的恐怖暴政在1933年的建立,标志着德意志历史进入了它最为黑暗的时代。

遭受纳粹驱逐的有犹太血统、有民主进步思想的德国社会科学家是作为这个时代的“另一个德国”的代表进入流亡的。早在“魏玛共和国时代”,他们就曾作为“德国批评式的社会科学传统”的代表,参与过对“魏玛文化”的创造。与那些右翼的德意志民族主义主流派们不同的是,这些左翼的社会民主主义者同时也是一批坚持“欧洲理性主义哲学传统”的人。作为德意志人,他们追求的不是民族文化狭隘的孤立化,而是民族文化开放的国际化;作为社会科学家,他们希望造就一个经济上更为公平合理、政治上更为民主的德国,这本身反映出他们与西方文明的价值取向之

¹⁴ Wilhelm Röpke, *Gesellschaftskrisis der Gegenwart*, Zürich: Eugen Rentsch Verlag, 1942, p. 404.

¹⁵ Klaus Voigt (ed.), *Friedenssicherung und europäische Einigung, Ideen des deutschen Exils 1933-1945*, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1988, p. 12.



间是有着某种基本认同的。正因为如此,当他们被作为“非雅利安精神”的代表者,成为纳粹暴政之下的迫害对象而被迫流亡时,也就意味着德国知识界内部的一场彻底的分裂。

当这些德国社会科学家带着他们“德国批评式的社会科学传统”和“欧洲理性主义哲学传统”,流亡到有着长久移民传统和民主传统的美国社会时,当他们看到西方世界的自由民主不断受到威胁,德国的侵略扩张不断给整个人类带来灾难时,他们便在美国学术界最早开始了一场对纳粹暴政与德意志历史的深刻反思。在这场关于市民资本主义社会的讨论中,他们提出的有关纳粹极权主义的起源、统治形式、社会结构及其运动发展的新理论,他们为考察德意志特殊历史发展道路所提供的新视角,他们对“自由放任式的资本主义”的尖锐批评以及对战后“自由的欧洲联邦新秩序”的计划设想,不仅是具有开创性的,而且是具有国际性的,因而也使这场“批评式的反思”超越了现实关系的有限性和暂时性。因此,他们的思想财富不仅能带来整个西方政治理论领域的突变式发展,而且能影响到战后美国对德国的占领政策和“民主化”的改造行动,影响到联邦德国的经济重建以及整个德意志社会对自身历史的深刻反思。

在这里,也能提供一种关于战后日本社会对自身侵略罪行反思不彻底现象的解释。在战前的日本,由于没有出现一场知识界的分裂,没有一批遭受驱逐的文化知识精英从这个军国主义的国家流亡到民主社会里,因而也就没有出现一场在战争期间由日本人率先进行的对这个军国主义国家以及它的历史的系统性反思,因此,在战后的反思问题上,日本社会是明显缺乏类似于德国流亡社会科学家们所构筑的那种进行全社会深刻反思的思想平台的。这种思想平台的缺乏,无疑对战后日本社会反思的不彻底产生了影响。

National Remembrances and the Emergence of a European Memorial Culture:

The Twisted Road to Reconciliation between the Germans and their Neighbours after the Second World War

Prof. Arnd Bauerkämper

Beginning in 1945 and lasting well into the 1950s, reconciliation between Germany and its European neighbours, as well as reconciliation with the United States and the Soviet Union, seemed to be impossible. The Second World War's legacy in Europe was not only destruction and devastation, but also profound antagonism and mutual recrimination. More particularly, the crimes committed by the German National Socialists, the Italian Fascists and their willing supporters had lastingly alienated the formerly occupied states from Germany, which would shortly be partitioned in the emerging Cold War of the late 1940s.¹

Against this background, legal proceedings against collaborators and war criminals served as an effort to come to terms with the immediate past. Trials of war criminals had assumed a transnational dimension as early as the Second World War, as the foundation of the United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC) on October 30, 1943 indicates. Yet trials of German war criminals were the cornerstone of early attempts to cope with the legacy of the immediate past. In particular, the Nuremberg Trial of major war criminals, leading Nazis and the most influential representatives of the Third Reich, which was succeeded by twelve trials of particular groups such as doctors and the military, symbolized the determination of the victorious American, Soviet, British and French allies to hold the war criminals and Nazi perpetrators accountable for the atrocities that they had committed in Germany and the occupied states. With the onset of the Cold War, however, allied efforts to initiate and pursue common judicial proceedings dissipated. Separate trials were held in the various occupation zones in Germany. Likewise, other European states

¹ When capitalized, "Fascism" refers to the Italian variant, whereas "fascism" denotes the generic concept.

resorted to national jurisdiction in order to punish German war criminals and indigenous (mostly fascist) collaborators.²

However, profound controversies surrounding reconciliation between Germans and their European neighbours had an ambivalent impact on “state memory”.³ On the one hand, they led to the partition of Germany and, as a consequence, the attitude towards reconciliation differed between the two German states. Whereas the government of the Socialist Unity Party in the GDR did not accept any obligations arising from the rule of Nazism, the governments of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) officially conceived of the new democracy as a successor state of the Third Reich (primarily in order to safeguard their claims on the former East German provinces). Moreover, East Europeans were largely excluded from compensation programs that were set up for the victims of Nazi persecution and annihilation policies. Thus, the partition of Europe aggravated the “memory struggle” that thwarted early efforts for a comprehensive reconciliation. On the other hand, the Cold War triggered a gradual rapprochement between the two German states and their new alliance partners in Western and Eastern Europe, respectively. Although relations remained uneasy in the 1950s and 1960s, states like the FRG and Norway as well as the GDR and Poland had to cooperate within their respective NATO and Warsaw Pact frameworks.⁴

Moreover, bilateral treaties on issues such as reparations, compensation for victims of Nazi oppression and persecution (especially between the FRG and its neighbours in Western, Northern and Southern Europe) led to a gradual, if limited reconciliation. Negotiations on the representation of recent history in textbooks also helped lead to reconciliation between West Germans and

² Claudia Kuretsidis-Haiger / Winfried R. Garscha (eds.), *Keine “Abrechnung”. NS-Verbrechen, Justiz und Gesellschaft in Europa nach 1945*, Leipzig, 1998; Herd Hankel / Gerhard Stuby, ‘Die Aufarbeitung von Verbrechen durch internationale Strafgerichte’, Petra Bock / Edgar Wolfrum (eds.), *Umkämpfte Vergangenheit*, Göttingen, 1999. For a comparative perspective, cf. Patricia Heberer / Jürgen Matthäus (eds.), *Atrocities on Trial. Historical Perspectives on the Politics of Prosecuting War Crimes*, Lincoln, 2008.

³ “State memory” is a “discourse, which is not exactly an ideology or a doctrine, but rather a flexible policy, where the past is used for present political purposes, while present decisions remain dependent upon past examples”. See: Rolf Hugoson, ‘History and Memory in Support of Neutrality: The Case of Sweden’, Kerstin von Lingen (ed.), *Kriegserfahrung und nationale Identität in Europa nach 1945*, Paderborn, 2009, pp. 206-224, at p. 206.

⁴ Bill Niven, ‘Introduction: German Victimhood at the Turn of the Millenium’, idem (ed.), *Germans as Victims. Remembering the Past in Contemporary Germany*, Houndmills, 2006, pp. 1-25, at p. 21 (quote). Also see: Richard Ned Lebow, ‘The Memory of Politics in Postwar Europe’, idem. / Wulf Kansteiner / Claudio Fugo (eds.), *The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe*, London, 2006, pp. 1-39; Tony Judt, ‘The Past Is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe’, István Deák / Jan T. Gross / Tony Judt (eds.), *The Politics of Retribution in Europe. World War II and Its Aftermath*, Princeton, 2000, pp. 293-323.

those Europeans that had been occupied by the Third Reich in the Second World War. Yet a more comprehensive reconciliation has only been initiated since the end of the Cold War. In particular, East European states were no longer excluded from these efforts. As bilateral agreements have given way to a multilateral approach to reconciliation, a convergence of national memorial cultures in Europe has emerged. Nevertheless, the ongoing process of reconciliation has by no means been free from conflicts. Thus, the central role of the Holocaust has met opposition in the east European states that have joined NATO and the European Union (EU) from 1999 onwards. In these states, the experience of Soviet occupation has erased memories of the annihilation of the Jews. Altogether, memories of Nazism, Fascism, the Second World War and the Holocaust are contested, protracted, twisted and frequently painful. Reconciliation is therefore to be conceived as a process characterised by interactions between various, often competing, political and social actors and groups.⁵

This contribution will start with an overview of the bilateral approach to reconciliation and take as an example negotiations over compensations for non-German victims of Nazi atrocities. This will be followed by deliberations on the emergence of “negative memory”⁶ that no longer excluded unwanted, unpleasant or compromising aspects of the past, and no longer glorified resistance or took refuge in self-victimization. A self-critical “negative memory” that emerged in the FRG in the 1960s has led Europeans to confront not only German crimes but also their own complicity in the policies of the Third Reich. Europeans have not completely come to terms with the past, but they are approaching a common “culture of contrition”. Yet this self-critical reevaluation has been contested in various countries. Moreover, it has tended to neglect

⁵ Stefan Troebst, ‘Jalta versus Stalingrad, Gulag versus Holocaust. Konfligierende Erinnerungskulturen im größeren Europa’, Bernd Faulenbach / Franz-Josef Jelinek (eds.), *“Transformationen” der Erinnerungskulturen in Europa nach 1989*, Essen, 2006, pp. 23-49; idem, “Was für ein Teppich?” Postkommunistische Erinnerungskulturen in Ost(mittel)europa’, Volkhard Knigge / Ulrich Mähler (eds.), *Der Kommunismus im Museum. Formen der Auseinandersetzung in Deutschland und Ostmitteleuropa*, Cologne, 2005, pp. 31-54; Cecilie Felicia Stokholm Banke, ‘Remembering Europe’s Heart of Darkness. Legacies of the Holocaust in Post-War European Societies’, Małgorzata Pakier / Bo Stråth (eds.), *A European Memory? Contested Histories and Politics of Remembrance*, New York, 2010, pp. 163-174.

⁶ Reinhart Koselleck, ‘Formen und Traditionen des negativen Gedächtnisses’, Volkhard Knigge / Norbert Frei (eds.), *Verbrechen erinnern. Die Auseinandersetzung mit Holocaust und Völkermord*, Munich, 2002, pp. 21-32; Heidemarie Uhl, ‘Die Transformation des “österreichischen Gedächtnisses” in der Erinnerungskultur der Zweiten Republik’, *Geschichte und Region* 13 (2004), No. 2, pp. 23-54, at p. 25.

different historical contexts in favour of a moral condemnation of oppression, persecution and the Holocaust.⁷

I. Restitution: The limits of reconciliation through bilateral negotiations

Contrary to the GDR, the elites of the West German state generally had to accept the principle of compensating the victims of the Nazi dictatorship for their material losses, their physical as well as psychological damage, and their often prodigious suffering. Successive treaties with the Israeli government and the Western Allies as well as with the governments of the states occupied by Germany during the Second World War were drawn up to meet the legitimate demands of the victims. Yet negotiations about these treaties led to conflicts between the Federal Republic of Germany and its neighbours over the interpretation of categories like “Nazi crimes”, administrative procedures, payments and which individuals would be counted as “victims” and therefore compensated for their losses. In essence, these debates reflected material interests and conflicting memories, but also issues of honor and respect. Ultimately, these clashes as well as the negotiations’ irresistible fixation on financial compensation prevented a multilateral approach to restitution and compensation. In fact, bilateral negotiations between the West German government and individual states continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s.⁸

West German attempts to achieve reconciliation through restitution and compensation started in 1952-53, when the Western Allies as well as the Soviet Union officially declared that they would terminate their reparation policies towards Germany. West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer signed the Luxembourg Accord with Israel as early as September 1952. The treaty obliged the Federal Republic of Germany to pay the state of Israel and the Jewish Claim Conference three billion Deutschmarks (DM) and 450 million DM, respectively. In the next few years, legislation on the compensation of non-Jewish victims was passed, too. However, the Federal Supplementary Law (*Bundesergänzungsgesetz*) of July 1953 and the Federal Compensation Law (*Bundesentschädigungsgesetz*) of June 1956 applied exclusively to victims who had lived in the Third Reich (in the borders of 1937). Moreover they were required to have taken up residence in western states (outside the Communist bloc) by the end of 1952. The “territorial principle” excluded most for-

⁷ David Art, *The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria*, New York, 2006, pp. 49f. (quote); Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life*, New York, 1999. Also see: Moshe Zimmermann, ‘Die transnationale Holocaust-Erinnerung’, Gunilla Budde / Sebastian Conrad / Oliver Janz (eds.), *Transnationale Geschichte. Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien*, Göttingen, 2006, pp. 202-216.

⁸ Benno Nietzel, ‘Business finished? Transnationale Wiedergutmachung historischen Unrechts in Europa seit 1989’, *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 57 (2009), pp. 26-50, at p. 49.

eign victims from payments. Not least, compensation was restricted to victims of repression and persecution for specific reasons, among them political enmity, ideology and faith.⁹

In June 1956, eight European states (France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Britain, Norway, Denmark and Greece) decided to join their efforts in order to demand extended regulations for compensation from the FRG. Yet the United States refused to support the initiative. Moreover, some states like Norway, where comparatively few citizens had been executed, wounded or dispossessed, were disinterested in the common initiative. Due to their fears of being disadvantaged by nations where the German occupiers had enforced their policy far more rigorously, these minor states preferred bilateral negotiations. This approach suited well a West German government that concluded bilateral treaties with eleven European states from 1959 to 1964.¹⁰

However, conflicting interpretations and memories that partially reflected specific material interests marred the negotiations between the West German government and its neighbours from the beginning. In particular, the West German authorities were split on the issue of the motivations of resistance fighters. Whereas the Finance Ministry refused to acknowledge any ideological driving force on the part of the former resistance fighters in various European states, the Foreign Office was keen to appease public opinion in West Germany's European neighbour states. In the end, however, the German delegates disclaimed the political motivation of former resistance fighters and therefore called the legitimacy of their combat into question. In the negotiations with Italy and Norway, in particular, the West German delegates refused to mention resistance fighters in the treaties, but left decisions over the distribution of payments to their partners. When news on financial transfers to members of the Italian Resistenza was broken by West German newspapers in 1964, politicians were bombarded with protests from angry citizens, who were clearly of the view that resistance fighters had been illegal partisans or even criminals. All in all, the conflict of memory and material interests prevented a comprehensive reconciliation through bilateral negotiations. Moreover, the West German government continuously rejected demands from citizens of European states that had been occupied by the Third Reich. Up to now, the official treaties

⁹ Hans Günter Hockerts, 'Die Entschädigung für NS-Verfolgte in West- und Osteuropa. Eine einführende Skizze', idem. / Claudia Moisel / Tobias Winstel (eds.), *Grenzen der Wiedergutmachung. Die Entschädigung für NS-Verfolgte in West- und Osteuropa 1945-2000*, Göttingen, 2006, pp. 7-58, at pp. 14-26.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 26-29.

between the governments are used by German authorities to protect state authorities and citizens from individual claims.¹¹

II. “Negative Memory” and the path towards comprehensive reconciliation

It was only after guilt and responsibility for Nazi crimes had been acknowledged in Germany and—to an understandably lesser degree—in European states that a more comprehensive reconciliation could be achieved. Whereas the communist regime of the GDR placed responsibility for Nazi repression, persecution and terror on the “capitalists” (big industrialists, financiers and large landowners) and even attempted to discredit the West German state by charging it with a new brand of “fascism”, the governments of the Federal Republic were unable and unwilling to easily escape from the legacy of the recent past. Yet West German political, social and economical elites tended to associate the Nazi dictatorship with communist regimes in the 1950s. They also delegated responsibility to universal movements like the Enlightenment and placed the blame on foreign powers that had burdened Germany with the Versailles Treaty of 1919. Not least, West Germans portrayed themselves as victims of the Second World War rather than perpetrators. Thus, they tended to belittle the crimes that the army had committed during the war. Whereas the SS units were demonized, the millions of regular troops from the *Wehrmacht* were exempted from guilt and responsibility. Although it stuck to a Marxist structuralist theory of “fascism” that neglected individual agency and guilt as much as the Holocaust, the student and protest movement of the 1960s finally urged West Germans to critically review their involvement with national socialist rule and oppression. When Chancellor Willy Brandt, who also promoted détente with Germany’s East European neighbours, fell to his knees during his visit to the Warsaw Ghetto in December 1970, this was hailed as a symbol of West Germany’s willingness to achieve a genuine reconciliation. As the silence about German atrocities was broken and self-victimization receded, a reconsideration of the past and self-criticism became the hallmarks of the new “negative memory” that accepted Germany’s burdens and guilt vis-à-vis its European neighbours. The latter, in turn, have accepted their (smaller) share

¹¹ Filippo Focardi / Lutz Klinkhammer, ‘Wiedergutmachung für Partisanen? Das deutsch-italienische Globalabkommen von 1961’, Hockerts / Moisel / Winstel (eds.), *Grenzen*, pp. 458–512, at pp. 471, 486, 491, 493 f., 503 f., 506; Hans Otto Frøland, ‘Wiedergutmachung und Normalisierung. Das bundesdeutsche Entschädigungsabkommen von 1959 zugunsten norwegischer Opfer von nationalsozialistischen Verfolgungsmaßnahmen’, *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht* 56 (2005), pp. 299–307; Dirk Levsen, ‘Erspart uns Speidel – zur Entwicklung der politischen Beziehungen zwischen Norwegen und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949 bis 1966’, Robert Bohn et al. (eds.), *Deutsch-skandinavische Beziehungen nach 1945*, Stuttgart, 2000, pp. 67–82, at p. 70.

of guilt and responsibility. In this context, obligations to European victims were increasingly accepted.¹²

In the seventies, this sense of guilt and responsibility was heightened by the emerging public memories of the Holocaust. The miniseries "Holocaust" that shocked many West Germans in early 1979 gave rise to feelings of shame and guilt vis-à-vis the Jewish victims. As the series was broadcast in almost all West European states in 1979, it also raised questions of the share of responsibility that non-Germans had to take. It was no coincidence, then, that the dual memory politics of resistance versus collaboration gradually broke up in states like France, Norway, Italy and Austria in the course of the 1980s and 1990s. Influential politicians of these states came to acknowledge that some of their citizens had sympathized with or even assisted in Nazi policies of repression, persecution, terror and annihilation in these countries.¹³

Under the conditions of occupation, fellow travellers and supporters of the national socialists had participated in Nazi crimes. Politicians of various European states therefore asked Jewish victims for pardon in the 1990s. In 1993, for instance, Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitzky abandoned the established view that Austrians had been exclusively victims of the Third Reich. In fact, he acknowledged guilt and responsibility during his state visit to Israel. Similarly, French President Jacques Chirac conceded that the German occupation authorities had been assisted in the deportation of Jews by policemen of the Vichy regime. On January 1, 2000, Norwegian Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik even asked Norwegian children of the war to pardon the discrimination and stigmatization and marginalisation that had been enforced on them since the Second World War. This apology was a landmark in that reconciliation was no longer restricted to crimes committed under the Nazi dictatorship, fascist rule or occupation regimes during the Second World War, but also included citizens that had been repressed and often severely punished after the Second World War.¹⁴

In the last twenty years, this "negative memory" has given rise to increasingly comprehensive reconciliation between Germany and its Europeans

¹² Philipp Gassert / Alan Steinweis (ed.), *Coping with the Nazi Past. West German Debates on Nazism and Generational Conflict, 1955-1975*, New York, 2006; Wilfried Mausbach, 'Wende um 360 Grad? Nationalsozialismus und Judenvernichtung in der „zweiten Gründungsphase“ der Bundesrepublik', Christina von Hodenberg / Detlef Siegfried (eds.), *Wo „1968“ liegt. Reform und Revolte in der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik*, Göttingen, 2006, pp. 15-47.

¹³ Oliver Marchart / Vrååth Öhner / Heidemarie Uhl, 'Holocaust revisited – Lesarten eines Medienereignisses zwischen globaler Erinnerungskultur und nationaler Vergangenheitsbewältigung', *Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte* 31 (2003), pp. 307-334.

¹⁴ Kåre Olsen, 'Under the Care of Lebensborn: Norwegian War Children and their Mothers', Kjersti Ericsson / Eva Simonsen (eds.), *Children of World War II. The Hidden Enemy Legacy*, New York 2004, pp. 15-34; Uhl, 'Transformation', p. 48.

neighbours. Due to generational change and the end of the Cold War, Europeans have come to accept their own responsibility for Nazi and fascist rule as well as crimes under occupation and discrimination after 1945. Moreover, long-lasting taboos have been broken. Children of the war, for example, have not only made enquiries about their German fathers (soldiers during the Second World War), but also acquired dual citizenship in Germany and met their relatives in that country. Not least, these victims have established transnational organisations that testify to the growing strength of civil society activities in the cross-border convergence of memorial cultures and processes of reconciliation.¹⁵

In particular, however, the Holocaust has emerged as a universal reference point for reconciliation. Thus, the “Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust” of January 2000 passed a resolution that emphasized the unique place of the annihilation of Jews in recent European history. In the resolution of the conference, the assembled European statesmen committed themselves “to remember the victims who perished, respect the survivors still with us, and reaffirm humanity’s common aspiration for mutual understanding and justice”. A commitment to openly condemn genocide has unofficially become part of the *acquis communautaire* (i.e. the rules of accession). On April 4, 2009, the European Parliament even decided to officially designate August 23rd as an annual day of commemoration for the victims of totalitarian and authoritarian dictatorships. Although this resolution has been controversial because of its tendency to lump together victims of Nazi, fascist and Communist rule, it testifies to the need to critically self-evaluate and recognize guilt and responsibility for political crimes as a precondition of a genuine reconciliation between the Germans and their offspring on the one hand, and their European neighbours on the other.¹⁶

Yet at least three pitfalls of the “Europeanization” of memories of the Nazi and Fascist dictatorships, the Holocaust and the Second World War should be avoided. First, recent discussions about genocides (for instance against the

¹⁵ For background information, see the contributions to: Ingvill C. Mochmann / Sabine Lee / Barbara Stelzl-Marx (eds.), ‘Children Born of War: Second World War and Beyond’, *Historical Social Research* 34, No. 129 (2009); Ericsson / Simonsen (eds.), *Children of World War II – the hidden enemy legacy*, Oxford / New York, 2005.

¹⁶ Quote taken from: Birgit Schwellung, ‘Auf dem Weg zu europäischen Erinnerungsorten? Gemeinsame und trennende Erinnerungen in Europa’, Benoît Majerus et al. (eds.), *Nationale Erinnerungsorte hinterfragt. Methodologische Innovationen, vergleichende Annäherungen, transnationale Lektüren*, Brüssel, 2009, pp. 175-188, at p. 183. For detailed accounts, see: Jens Kroh, *Transnationale Erinnerung. Der Holocaust im Fokus geschichtspolitischer Initiativen*, Frankfurt am Main, 2006; idem, ‘Europäische Innenpolitik? Die Stockholmer “Holocaust-Konferenz” und die diplomatischen Maßnahmen der “EU der 14” gegen Österreich’, Katrin Hammerstein et al. (eds.), *Aufarbeitung der Diktatur – Diktat der Aufarbeitung?*, Göttingen, 2009, pp. 204-214; Jan-Werner Müller, ‘On “European Memory”. Some Conceptual and Normative Remarks’, Pakier / Stråth (eds.), *A European Memory?*, Oxford / New York, 2010, pp. 25-37, at p. 31.

Armenian people in 1915) have tended to universalise the annihilation of the Jews and detach it from its specific historical context. Second, the particular responsibility of the Germans and—to a lesser degree—Austrians and Italians for war crimes, atrocities and the Holocaust needs to be emphasised in order to avoid a levelling of important differences between Europeans. Third, a transnational memorial framework may serve to legitimise the unification of Europe. This process, however, cannot be underpinned by “negative memory”.¹⁷

III. Conclusion: From bilateral to multilateral approaches to reconciliation

The reconciliation between Germans and their European neighbours over the Second World War has been a protracted process. Bilateral negotiations about issues such as restitution, reparations, compensation and representations of the recent past in textbooks and monuments have undoubtedly contributed to the reconciliation that had been achieved by the 1970s. However, it was common membership in international organisations—in particular NATO and the European Economic Community—that tied Germany and its western neighbours together. However, relations with the states of the Warsaw Pact remained troubled. Their citizens were excluded from restitution and compensation. Although some efforts like the Polish-German committee on history textbooks inaugurated in 1972, the exchange of selected files on German war crimes committed during the Second World War and economic support built up some trust between Germans and their East European neighbours, these efforts did not achieve a comprehensive reconciliation. Moreover, it was the common enemy of the Cold War that primarily tied the Federal Republic of Germany and its western alliance partners together. Anti-Communism as glue, however, was bound to have a limited impact on reconciliation. Not least, the partition of Germany that reflected and fuelled the Cold War ensured that the political rapprochement between that country and its neighbouring states would remain only partial up to the late 1980s.

Although the ground for reconciliation had been prepared by détente and the ensuing bilateral talks between states like the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland in the 1970s, it has been the turn to “negative memory” and multilateral efforts to openly confront a haunting past that has finally brought Europeans closer together. In the last two decades national remembrances that had previously highlighted heroic resistance and martyrdom have gradually been overcome in favour of a more transnational memorial culture. This self-critical “negative memory”, which has emphasised shared guilt and responsibility and accentuated the role of the Holocaust as a singularly disruptive genocide, is based on universalistic rather than nationalistic principles and convictions. Some observers have even claimed that a European memorial

¹⁷ Konrad H. Jarausch, ‘Conclusion: Nightmares or Daydreams? A Postscript on the Europeanisation of Memories’, *idem* (eds.), *A European Memory?*, pp. 309–320, at pp. 311f., 314, 316–318.

culture is on the horizon. Initiatives taken by the European Union and some other supranational institutions since the late 1990s evidence that this ongoing process has been tied to generational change.

Processes of remembering Nazism, Fascism, occupation, and the Holocaust have been negotiated between specific social and political groups and actors. Yet they have usually been asymmetrical and shaped by political power. In fact, party politicians as well as leaders and members of political associations have harboured and proposed different memories of the recent past. Even veterans of resistance groups have disagreed on the merits and achievements of their respective struggles against Nazism, Fascism, and occupation. Investigations of political differences and debates that highlight conflicting memories will therefore provide important findings on and insights into the mechanisms of reconciliation in Europe and beyond. However, in dictatorships as well as in democracies, remembrances of National Socialism, Fascism, occupation and the Holocaust in small groups like families and civic associations has frequently differed from dominant narratives proposed by governments and leading politicians. Moreover, concepts like “resistance”, “collaboration” and “treason” have not only been contested in the political realm, but also within and between European societies. In fact, controversies over the diverse modes of behaviour under Fascism, National Socialism and occupation regimes have continually insisted on the inclusion and exclusion of specific individual and collective actors.¹⁸

Japan and its neighbouring states—in particular China and Korea—must also deal with these issues. In East Asia, the devastating impact of the war’s destruction, mass killings and forced prostitution have left acrimony and lasting hostility. The reverence of leading Japanese politicians for convicted war criminals at the Yasukuni shrine in Tokyo, and education policies that have aimed to expunge information on war atrocities from Japanese textbooks have repeatedly led to protests, not only in China and Korea, but also in the international community. Japan and China have been separated by the past, but also by different political, economic and social systems. Moreover, the early termination of purges in post-war Japan and the specifically Japanese code of honour have prevented even a bilateral reconciliation. Yet the rise of “negative memory” as a transnational, though contradictory, process leaves hope for a rapprochement beyond bilateral negotiations. Thus, Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan publicly apologised for crimes committed during the occupation of Korea. A century after Japanese imperialism had subjugated the Korean peninsula, Kan’s declaration on August 10, 2010 seems to signal a change, even though the Japanese head of government did not mention the victims of forced labour and prostitution. If East Asian states unite their efforts to achieve an understanding, they have the chance to create a multilateral reconciliation in an early stage of transition. These efforts can rely on earlier

¹⁸ Małgorzata Pakier / Bo Stråth, ‘A European Memory?’, idem (eds.), *A European Memory?*, pp. 1-20, at p. 15; Heidemarie Uhl, ‘Culture, Politics, Palimpsest. Theses in Memory and Society’, *ibid.*, pp. 79-86, at p. 84.

attempts to achieve pan-Asian solidarity like the “Asian Solidarity Society” that was founded in Tokyo in 1907 in order to unite various peoples and nations and to promote friendship and understanding with the hope of shedding the shackles of colonial rule. Although conditions are different in present-day Asia and reconciliation cannot be achieved without the consent and support of the United States, historical precedents as well as recent developments (including generational change) and the role of contingency in history leave some room for hope for reconciliation. Yet the European example clearly demonstrates that the process will remain protracted, contested, painful and incomplete.¹⁹

¹⁹ Cf. Rebecca E. Carl, ‘Asien erschaffen: China in der Welt zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts’, Sebastian Conrad / Andreas Eckert / Ulrike Freitag (eds.), *Globalgeschichte. Theorien, Ansätze, Themen*, Frankfurt am Main 2007, pp. 248-281, at pp. 270-275. Also see: Uwe Makino, ‘Terror als Eroberungs- und Herrschaftstechnik. Zu den japanischen Verbrechen in Nanking 1937/38’, Wolfram Wette / Gerd R. Ueberschär (eds.), *Kriegsverbrechen im 20. Jahrhundert*, Darmstadt, 2001, pp. 343-355. On recent relations between China and Japan, cf. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 83, April 10, 2010, p. 7.

民族记忆和欧洲纪念文化的产生：二战后德国与邻国曲折的和解之路

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1945年,甚至20世纪50年代,德国与欧洲邻邦、美国以及苏联之间的和解似乎都是不可能的事情。二战不仅给欧洲造成了毁灭和破坏,还挑起了国家间强烈的敌对情绪和相互指责。尤其德国社会党和意大利法西斯及其支持者、刽子手所犯下的罪行,使得前被占领国长期以来一直与德国(20世纪40年代末冷战开始时被分区占领)保持着隔阂。

在此背景之下,审判战犯及其同伙成为各国努力试图就刚刚过去的历史达成和解的方式。早在二战时期,对战犯的审判就按照跨国犯罪的性质处理,这也正是1943年10月30日联合国战争罪委员会成立时所声明的。不过,对德国战犯的审判才是早期处理二战历史遗留问题的基石。尤其是针对重要战犯、纳粹头目及第三帝国最有影响力代表人物的纽伦堡大审判以及随后举行的12轮针对军人和医生等特殊群体的审判,显示了获胜的美国、苏联和英法同盟让战犯和纳粹罪犯对其在德国和占领国的暴行负责的决心。然而,随着冷战的开始,联合诉诸共同司法程序的行动涣散起来,变成了在德国各占领区进行单独审判。欧洲各国也纷纷诉诸国家司法程序惩治德国战犯及其本国帮凶(多为法西斯分子)。¹

但是,德国与欧洲邻邦在和解方面的争议和矛盾给“国家记忆”带来了双重影响。²一方面,它造成德国分裂,由此又导致东德和西德对和解也持有不同见解。民主德国统一社会党政府拒绝承担纳粹统治产生的任何责任,而联邦德国政府则认为新的民主德国是第三帝国的延续——主要为捍卫他们对前东德省份的所有权。而且在针对纳粹迫害和种族灭绝政策的受害者的赔偿方案方面大部分东欧国家被排除在外。因而,欧洲的

¹ Claudia Kuretsidis-Haiger / Winfried R. Garscha (eds.), *Keine "Abrechnung". NS-Verbrechen, Justiz und Gesellschaft in Europa nach 1945*, Leipzig, 1998; Herd Hankel / Gerhard Stuby, 'Die Aufarbeitung von Verbrechen durch internationale Strafgerichte', Petra Bock / Edgar Wolfrum (eds.), *Umkämpfte Vergangenheit*, Göttingen, 1999. For a comparative perspective, cf. Patricia Heberer / Jürgen Matthäus (eds.), *Atrocities on Trial. Historical Perspectives on the Politics of Prosecuting War Crimes*, Lincoln, 2008.

² “国家记忆”是一个“话题,确切地说,不是一种思想或教义,而是一种灵活的政策,在这种政策中,历史为当前的政治所用,当前决定取决于历史先例”。参见: Rolf Hugoson, 'History and Memory in Support of Neutrality: The Case of Sweden', Kerstin von Lingen (ed.), *Kriegserfahrung und nationale Identität in Europa nach 1945*, Paderborn, 2009, pp. 206-224, at p. 206.

分裂加剧了“记忆挣扎”，破坏了早期为实现全面和解所做的努力。但另一方面，冷战的紧张局势也促使东、西德及其东、西欧盟友逐渐恢复友好关系。20世纪50年代和60年代，尽管国家间关系仍然紧张，但联邦德国与挪威、民主德国与波兰等国家都分别需要在各自所在的北约组织和华沙条约组织框架内开展合作。³

随着有关赔偿和补偿受纳粹迫害的受害者等问题的双边条约的签订，特别是在联邦德国及西欧、北欧和南欧邻国之间，和解工作逐步展开，虽然范围有限。此外，关于如何撰写近代历史教科书的多边谈判也推动了西德和其它二战时期被第三帝国占领的欧洲国家的和解。但是，更加全面的和解是在冷战结束以后才开始的，而且此前被排除在外的东欧各国也参与进来。双边协议的签订打开了走向多边和解的大门，此时欧洲国家纪念文化开始融合。但是，和解之路并非一帆风顺。例如，1999年以后加入北约和欧盟的东欧国家反对将大屠杀置于核心地位。在这些国家中，被苏联占领的记忆抹去了灭绝犹太人的记忆。总的来说，关于纳粹主义、法西斯主义、第二次世界大战和大屠杀的记忆不断引起争议、被拉长、被扭曲并常常使人痛苦。因此，和解其实是各种常常相互竞争的政治家、社会人士和团体间相互影响的过程。⁴

文章开篇将概述双边和解，并以就赔偿德国以外的纳粹暴行受害方进行的谈判为例。接下来，将详述“负面记忆”⁵的产生。这些“负面记忆”

³ Bill Niven, 'Introduction: German Victimhood at the Turn of the Millenium', idem (ed.), *Germans as Victims. Remembering the Past in Contemporary Germany*, Houndmills, 2006, pp. 1-25, at p. 21 (quote). Also see: Richard Ned Lebow, 'The Memory of Politics in Postwar Europe', idem. / Wulf Kansteiner / Claudio Fugo (eds.), *The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe*, London, 2006, pp. 1-39; Tony Judt, 'The Past Is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe', István Deák / Jan T. Gross / Tony Judt (eds.), *The Politics of Retribution in Europe. World War II and Its Aftermath*, Princeton, 2000, pp. 293-323.

⁴ Stefan Troebst, 'Jalta versus Stalingrad, GULag versus Holocaust. Konfligierende Erinnerungskulturen im größeren Europa', Bernd Faulenbach / Franz-Josef Jelich (eds.), *"Transformationen" der Erinnerungskulturen in Europa nach 1989*, Essen, 2006, pp. 23-49; idem, "Was für ein Teppich?" Postkommunistische Erinnerungskulturen in Ost(mittel)europa', Volkhard Knigge / Ulrich Mähler (eds.), *Der Kommunismus im Museum. Formen der Auseinandersetzung in Deutschland und Ostmitteleuropa*, Cologne, 2005, pp. 31-54; Cecilie Felicia Stokholm Banke, 'Remembering Europe's Heart of Darkness. Legacies of the Holocaust in Post-War European Societies', Małgorzata Pakier / Bo Stråth (eds.), *A European Memory? Contested Histories and Politics of Remembrance*, New York, 2010, pp. 163-174.

⁵ Reinhart Koselleck, 'Formen und Traditionen des negativen Gedächtnisses', Volkhard Knigge / Norbert Frei (eds.), *Verbrechen erinnern. Die Auseinandersetzung mit Holocaust und Völkermord*, Munich, 2002, pp. 21-32; Heidemarie Uhl, 'Die Transformation des "österreichischen Gedächtnisses" in der Erinnerungskultur der Zweiten Republik', *Geschichte und Region* 13 (2004), No. 2, pp. 23-54, at p. 25.

不再排斥那些不受欢迎、不愉快甚至妥协的历史,不再歌颂抵抗或用自我牺牲进行搪塞。20世纪60年代在联邦德国出现的这种自我批评式的“负面记忆”让欧洲人不仅面对德国的罪行,还要面对自己对第三帝国政策的帮凶行为。尽管欧洲人没完全接受这段历史,但他们正在形成共同的“悔悟文化”。不过,自我批评式的反思在许多国家也引起了争议。此外,虽然共同的“悔悟文化”有利于对压迫、迫害和大屠杀进行道义上的谴责,但是往往会忽略不同的历史背景。⁶

I. 赔偿: 通过双边谈判实现和解的局限性

与民主德国相反,西德上层人士通常不得不同意赔偿纳粹独裁受害者的物质损失,补偿其身心所受的伤害以及常常伴随他们的巨大痛苦。西德先后与以色列政府、西方盟国以及第二次世界大战期间被德国占领的国家拟定了条约,以满足受害者的合理要求。但是,条约谈判过程中,联邦德国与邻国在界定“纳粹罪行”、行政程序、付款和哪些是“受害人”并可获得损失赔偿等问题上发生了意见冲突。本质上,这些争论反映了物质利益和具有争议的记忆,同时也反映了荣誉和尊重的问题。最终,由于这些冲突以及谈判中对经济补偿与财产返还过度重视,阻碍了就财产返还与赔偿达成多边和解。实际上,20世纪50年代和60年代西德一直在与个别国家进行双边谈判。⁷

1952年至1953年,西方盟国和苏联正式宣布将终止对德国的战争赔偿政策时,西德开始试图通过财产返还和赔偿工作实现和解。西德总理阿登纳早在1952年9月就与以色列签订了《卢森堡协议》。根据协议,联邦德国分别向以色列国和犹太人要求赔偿联合会支付30亿马克和4.5亿马克。随后几年,对非犹太受害者赔偿的立法也获得通过。然而,1953年7月旨在赔偿战争受害者的《联邦补充法》和1956年6月的《联邦赔偿法》却只针对居住在第三帝国(在1937年边境内)的受害者。而且,还要求到1952年底他们具有在西方国家(共产主义集团除外)的合法居住资格。这种“属地原则”把大部分外国受害者排除在赔偿名单以外。不仅如此,赔偿还仅限于

⁶ David Art, *The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria*, New York, 2006, pp. 49f. (quote); Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life*, New York, 1999. Also see: Moshe Zimmermann, 'Die transnationale Holocaust-Erinnerung', Gunilla Budde / Sebastian Conrad / Oliver Janz (eds.), *Transnationale Geschichte. Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien*, Göttingen, 2006, pp. 202-216.

⁷ Benno Nietzel, 'Business finished? Transnationale Wiedergutmachung historischen Unrechts in Europa seit 1989', *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 57 (2009), pp. 26-50, at p. 49.

由于特定原因(政治敌意、意识形态和信仰等)受到镇压和迫害的受害人。⁸

1956年6月,八个欧洲国家(法国、比利时、荷兰、卢森堡、英国、挪威、丹麦和希腊)决定联合起来,要求联邦德国扩充赔偿规定。但是,美国拒绝支持该项提议。而且,挪威等国由于受到杀害、伤害和驱逐的居民为数不多,所以对共同倡议不感兴趣。由于担心自身实力远不如那些被德国实施更为残酷的占领政策的国家,这些小国更愿意选择双边谈判。这种方式非常适合西德政府,从1959年到1964年,西德与十一个欧洲国家签署了双边协定。⁹

其实,对历史认识和记忆的争议及其在一定程度上反映的具体物质利益从一开始就对西德政府和邻邦的谈判造成了伤害。尤其是西德政府在抵抗运动成员的动机问题上意见不一。财政部拒绝承认欧洲各国前抵抗运动成员受到任何思想意识的驱动,外交部却急于安抚西德欧洲邻邦的公共舆论。但是,最终德国代表还是否认了前抵抗运动成员的政治动机,并且对抵抗战斗的合理性表示质疑。尤其是在与意大利、挪威的谈判过程中,虽然西德代表拒绝在协定中提及抵抗运动成员,但是允许谈判对象决定如何分配赔款。1964年,西德报纸爆出了资金转移给意大利抵抗运动成员的新闻,愤怒的民众纷纷抗议政治家,他们坚定地认为,抵抗运动成员就是非法游击队甚至罪犯。总之,记忆和物质利益的冲突阻碍了通过双边谈判实现全面和解。另外,西德政府一直拒绝满足被第三帝国占领的欧洲国家民众提出的要求。直到现在,德国政府还使用政府间官方协定保护德国政府和民众不受个人索赔的困扰。¹⁰

⁸ Hans Günter Hockerts, 'Die Entschädigung für NS-Verfolgte in West- und Osteuropa. Eine einführende Skizze', idem. / Claudia Moisel / Tobias Winstel (eds.), *Grenzen der Wiedergutmachung. Die Entschädigung für NS-Verfolgte in West- und Osteuropa 1945-2000*, Göttingen, 2006, pp. 7-58, at pp. 14-26.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 26-29.

¹⁰ Philippo Focardi / Lutz Klinkhammer, 'Wiedergutmachung für Partisanen? Das deutsch-italienische Globalabkommen von 1961', Hockerts / Moisel / Winstel (eds.), *Grenzen*, pp. 458-512, at pp. 471, 486, 491, 493 f., 503 f., 506; Hans Otto Frøland, 'Wiedergutmachung und Normalisierung. Das bundesdeutsche Entschädigungsabkommen von 1959 zugunsten norwegischer Opfer von nationalsozialistischen Verfolgungsmaßnahmen', *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht* 56 (2005), pp. 299-307; Dirk Levsen, 'Erspar uns Speidel – zur Entwicklung der politischen Beziehungen zwischen Norwegen und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949 bis 1966', Robert Bohn et al. (eds.), *Deutsch-skandinavische Beziehungen nach 1945*, Stuttgart, 2000, pp. 67-82, at p. 70.



II. “负面记忆”与全面和解之路

只有德国承认纳粹罪行及责任——欧洲国家在可理解的较低程度上承认其纳粹罪行和责任,才能实现较为全面的和解。鉴于民主德国的共产党政权把纳粹镇压、迫害和实行恐怖的责任推到“资本家”(大工业家、金融家和大土地所有者)的头上,甚至企图抹黑西德,指控西德是新型“法西斯主义”,联邦德国政府就更不能也不愿轻松摆脱近代历史遗留问题。但是,西德的政治、社会和经济上层人士也往往把纳粹独裁跟20世纪50年代的共产党政权联系在一起。他们还把责任推到启蒙运动等国际运动上,指责别国1919年跟德国签订的《凡尔赛和约》拖累了德国。此外,西德认为他们才是二战受害方,而不是罪犯。所以,他们往往看轻部队在二战期间的罪行。尽管党卫军被妖魔化,但德国国防军(正规军)中数百万战士得以被免除罪行和责任。虽然西德坚持一种来自于结构主义的马克思主义的“法西斯主义”理论,因而忽略个人行为 and 罪责以及大屠杀,但是,20世纪60年代的学生运动和抗议运动最终还是迫使西德人严格自我反思自己参与过的、与国家社会主义统治和压迫有关的行为。德国总理维利·勃兰特也推动了德国与其东欧邻国关系的缓和,1970年12月他访问华沙犹太人区的时候双膝跪倒在纪念碑前,这标志着西德愿意实现真正的和解。对于德国暴行的缄默不语被打破,自我受害的声音渐渐减弱,反思过去与自我批评标志着新的“负面记忆”的出现,即面对欧洲邻邦承认德国的责任和罪行。而欧洲邻邦随后也承认了自己那部分较小的罪行和责任。在此背景之下,有关各方也渐渐承认了对全欧洲受害者负有责任。¹¹

20世纪70年代,对大屠杀的民众记忆的出现增强了这种负罪感和责任感。1979年初,电视连续剧《大屠杀》震惊了许多西德人,面对犹太受害者,他们感到羞耻和内疚。当1979年几乎所有西欧国家都在播出这部电视剧的时候,人们也提出了这样的看法:除德国人以外的其他人也要承担责任。因此说,20世纪80年代和90年代抵抗运动对垒勾结纳粹的双重记忆政策在法国、挪威、意大利和奥地利等国逐渐产生并非偶然。这些国家中一些有影响力的政治家开始坦言,其国内一些公民在本国内曾经同情甚至协同实施镇压、迫害、恐怖和灭绝的纳粹政策。¹²

¹¹ Philipp Gassert / Alan Steinweis (ed.), *Coping with the Nazi Past. West German Debates on Nazism and Generational Conflict, 1955-1975*, New York, 2006; Wilfried Mausbach, 'Wende um 360 Grad? Nationalsozialismus und Judenvernichtung in der „zweiten Gründungsphase“ der Bundesrepublik', Christina von Hodenberg / Detlef Siegfried (eds.), *Wo „1968“ liegt. Reform und Revolte in der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik*, Göttingen, 2006, pp. 15-47.

¹² Oliver Marchart / Vrääth Öhner / Heidemarie Uhl, 'Holocaust revisited – Lesarten eines Medienereignisses zwischen globaler Erinnerungskultur und nationaler Vergangenheitsbewältigung', *Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte* 31 (2003), pp. 307-334.

在国家被德国占领的时候,纳粹的同路人和支持者参与了纳粹罪行。因此,20世纪90年代,这些欧洲国家的政治家请求犹太受害者宽恕。如,1993年奥地利总理弗朗茨·弗拉里茨基(Franz Vranitzky)摒弃原有观点,不再认为奥地利人完全是第三帝国的受害者。事实上,在对以色列进行国事访问的时候,他承认了奥地利的罪行和责任。同样,法国总统雅克·希拉克承认,维希政权警察曾协助德国占领当局驱逐犹太人。2000年1月1日,挪威首相谢尔·马格纳·邦德维克(Kjell Magne Bondevik)甚至请求挪威“战争儿童”(二战中挪威妇女与德国士兵所生子女)原谅自二战以来所受到的歧视、耻辱和边缘化。这个道歉是一个里程碑,从此和解不再局限于二战期间纳粹独裁、法西斯统治或占领政权下的罪行,还涉及二战后受到镇压,而且经常受到严厉惩罚的公民。¹³

过去20年里,“负面记忆”让德国加速与欧洲邻邦的全面和解。由于世代交替和冷战结束,欧洲人开始承担他们对于纳粹和法西斯统治出现、在占领时期所犯的罪行以及在1945年后搞歧视的责任。长期以来的禁忌也被打破,例如,战争儿童不仅询问他们的德国父亲(二战士兵),还获得了德国双重国籍,并看望他们在德国的亲人。此外,这些受害人还建立了跨国组织,证明在纪念文化跨国融合与和解过程中,民间社会活动的力量在不断壮大。¹⁴

和解中最常谈到的话题则是大屠杀。2000年1月的“斯德哥尔摩大屠杀国际论坛”通过了一项决议,突出了犹太灭绝在欧洲近期历史上的独特地位。会议决议中,与会欧洲政治家们承诺“铭记死去的受害者,尊重仍在世的幸存者,并重申了人类渴望相互理解和正义的共同心愿”。公开谴责种族灭绝已内定为欧盟既有法规的一部分(即申请加入欧盟必须符合的规定)。2009年4月4日欧洲议会决定,正式指定8月23日为极权和专制独裁受害者纪念日。虽然该决议一直饱受争议,因为它把纳粹受害者、法西斯和共产主义统治混为一谈,但是它证明,需要进行自我批判式的反思并承

¹³ Kåre Olsen, 'Under the Care of Lebensborn: Norwegian War Children and their Mothers', Kjersti Ericsson / Eva Simonsen (eds.), *Children of World War II. The Hidden Enemy Legacy*, New York 2004, pp. 15-34; Uhl, 'Transformation', p. 48.

¹⁴ 更多背景信息,请参考以下著作: Ingvill C. Mochmann / Sabine Lee / Barbara Stelzl-Marx (eds.), 'Children Born of War: Second World War and Beyond', *Historical Social Research* 34, No. 129 (2009); Ericsson / Simonsen (eds.), *Children of World War II – the hidden enemy legacy*, Oxford / New York, 2005.

认为政治罪行承担罪责,这是实现德国人与其后代真正和解,也是实现德国及欧洲邻邦真正和解的前提。¹⁵

但是,应避免“欧化”纳粹和法西斯独裁、大屠杀和二战这三种记忆的陷阱。首先,近来对种族灭绝(例如1915年土耳其屠杀亚美尼亚人)的讨论倾向于普遍化犹太种族灭绝并脱离具体的历史背景。其二,需要强调德国人以及——较低程度上——奥地利人和意大利人对战争罪行、暴行和大屠杀的特定责任,以避免抹平欧洲人之间的重大差异。其三,虽然跨国纪念框架可能会有利于使欧洲统一合理化,但不能将“负面记忆”当作欧洲统一的手段。¹⁶

III. 结论: 从双边和解到多边和解

德国及其欧洲邻邦在二战问题上的和解是一个漫长的过程。关于财产返还、赔款、补偿、撰写近代历史教科书以及墓碑等问题的双边协商无疑推动了20世纪70年代的和解。但更重要的是,国际组织,尤其北约和欧洲经济共同体的共同成员身份把德国及其西方邻邦联结在了一起。不过,德国与华沙条约组织国家的关系仍然紧张,因为华约国家的公民被排除在财产返还和补偿之外。尽管1972年成立了波兰—德国历史教科书委员会,交换二战德国所犯战争罪行指定资料以及德国提供经济支持的这些努力,建立了德国与其东欧邻邦间的部分信任,但并没实现全面和解。而且,是冷战期间共同的敌人让联邦德国与西方盟国走到了一起。虽然反共产主义在和解方面起了纽带作用,但其影响注定是有限的。此外,德国的分裂是冷战的表现,同时也加剧了冷战,它决定了德国及其邻邦的政治友好关系直到20世纪80年代末都是不完整的。

尽管20世纪70年代国际关系的缓和与联邦德国和波兰等国间的双边谈判为和解奠定了基础,但最终还是“负面记忆”的出现和各国坦率面对

¹⁵ 引文来自于: Birgit Schwellung, 'Auf dem Weg zu europäischen Erinnerungsorten? Gemeinsame und trennende Erinnerungen in Europa', Benoît Majerus et al. (eds.), *Nationale Erinnerungsorte hinterfragt. Methodologische Innovationen, vergleichende Annäherungen, transnationale Lektüren*, Brüssel, 2009, pp. 175-188, at p. 183. For detailed accounts, see: Jens Kroh, *Transnationale Erinnerung. Der Holocaust im Fokus geschichtspolitischer Initiativen*, Frankfurt am Main, 2006; idem, 'Europäische Innenpolitik? Die Stockholmer "Holocaust-Konferenz" und die diplomatischen Maßnahmen der "EU der 14" gegen Österreich', Katrin Hammerstein et al. (eds.), *Aufarbeitung der Diktatur – Diktat der Aufarbeitung?*, Göttingen, 2009, pp. 204-214; Jan-Werner Müller, 'On "European Memory". Some Conceptual and Normative Remarks', Pakier / Stråth (eds.), *A European Memory?*, Oxford / New York, 2010, pp. 25-37, at p. 31.

¹⁶ Konrad H. Jarausch, 'Conclusion: Nightmares or Daydreams? A Postscript on the Europeanisation of Memories', idem (eds.), *A European Memory?*, pp. 309-320, at pp. 311f., 314, 316-318.

可怕过去才让欧洲人更加紧密地联系在了一起。过去二十年,强调英勇抵抗和牺牲的国家记忆逐渐被更加超越国界的纪念文化所取代。这种自我批评式“负面记忆”强调共同承担罪行和责任,并突出大屠杀是极具破坏性的种族灭绝的行为,而且“负面记忆”是建立在普遍的而非民族主义的原则和信念的基础上。有观察人士甚至认为,共同的欧洲纪念文化即将产生。此外,欧盟等超国家机构自20世纪90年代末以来所采取的举措证实,这种持续的过程与世代更替有密切的联系。

纳粹主义、法西斯主义、占领和大屠杀的记忆是由各社会、政治团体和人士协商而来。但这些记忆往往是不对称的,受到政治权力的左右。事实上,各党派政治家以及政治团体的领导人和成员对近代历史都提出了不同记忆,甚至抵抗运动的老兵对他们反纳粹主义、法西斯主义和占领的功绩都持有不同见解。因此,对记忆争议的政治分歧和辩论进行调查将为我们提供重要发现,从而深入了解欧洲内外的和解机制。但是,在独裁国家和民主国家一样,家庭和公民协会等小团体对国家社会主义、法西斯主义、占领和大屠杀的记忆经常有别于政府和重要政治人物主导的叙述。此外,像“抵抗”、“通敌”和“叛国”这类概念不仅在政治界存在争议,在欧洲各国国内和各国之间也存在争议。事实上,对法西斯主义、国家社会主义和占领政权下各种行为的争议主要在于包含还是排除特定个人和集体。¹⁷

日本及其邻国,尤其中韩两国,也必须处理这些问题。在东亚,战争破坏、大规模屠杀和慰安妇的破坏性影响已带来怨愤和持久敌意。日本重要政客参拜东京靖国神社中被定罪的战犯以及从日本教科书上抹去战争暴行的教育政策,不仅屡次激起中韩两国的抗议,也引起国际社会的抗议。中日两国的隔阂不仅仅源于历史,还源于不同的政治、经济和社会制度。此外,战后日本早期终止整肃纳粹分子的行为和日本的荣誉准则甚至阻止了双边和解。但是,“负面记忆”的产生——作为一个引发争议却超越国界的过程,能够让有关各方看到,除双边谈判以外,还可以通过其它途径恢复友好关系。例如,日本首相菅直人为占领朝鲜期间所犯下的罪行做出公开道歉。日本帝国主义征服朝鲜半岛一个世纪后,菅直人在2010年8月10日做出的声明似乎预示着转变,即使日本政府首脑没提到强制劳工和慰安妇受害者。如果东亚国家共同努力达成共识,就有可能早日实现多边和解。例如1907年在东京成立的“亚洲团结协会”,就是为了团结各民族和国家的人民,促进友谊和理解,挣脱殖民统治的枷锁,这些早期努力现在仍可进行以实现泛亚团结。尽管今天亚洲的形势不同,没有美国的同意和支持不可能实现和解,但是历史先例、近期发展(包括世代交替)和历史

¹⁷ Małgorzata Pakier / Bo Stråth, 'A European Memory?', idem (eds.), *A European Memory?*, pp. 1-20, at p. 15; Heidemarie Uhl, 'Culture, Politics, Palimpsest. Theses in Memory and Society', *ibid.*, pp. 79-86, at p. 84.



中的偶然事件都给和解创造了机会。但是，欧洲的例子明确说明，和解将是一个漫长的、充满争议和痛苦且不完整的过程。¹⁸

¹⁸ Cf. Rebecca E. Carl, 'Asien erschaffen: China in der Welt zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts', Sebastian Conrad / Andreas Eckert / Ulrike Freitag (eds.), *Globalgeschichte. Theorien, Ansätze, Themen*, Frankfurt am Main 2007, pp. 248-281, at pp. 270-275. Also see: Uwe Makino, 'Terror als Eroberungs- und Herrschaftstechnik. Zu den japanischen Verbrechen in Nanking 1937/38', Wolfram Wette / Gerd R. Ueberschär (eds.), *Kriegsverbrechen im 20. Jahrhundert*, Darmstadt, 2001, pp. 343-355. On recent relations between China and Japan, cf. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 83, April 10, 2010, p. 7.

France and Germany: A Policy of Reconciliation?

Prof. Olivier Wiewiorka

Memory is certainly still a hotly debated issue in both Europe and Asia¹ and the legacy of World War II has played—and still plays—an important part in international relations and the inner political life of both regions. This legacy is certainly ambivalent. Memory can be used to strengthen nationalism and widen the gap between nations. Such has been the case in modern France, from the defeat of 1870 onwards. The loss of the *provinces perdues* (i.e. the areas of Alsace and Lorraine, given back to Germany) certainly endangered German-French relations on more than one occasion. This loss has fed a strong popular resentment towards Berlin; it has equally obliged French leaders to adopt a diplomacy that aims to neutralize and to deter Germany rather than to foster reconciliation between the two former foes. On another level, the defeat of 1918 has never been accepted by the Germans, for obvious reasons. Their troops remained apparently unvanquished and upon their return home they were greeted by enormous crowds that considered them the victors. German territory remained unoccupied. Thus the Versailles treaty, signed in June 1919, appeared to be totally unfair. Its Article 231 lay responsibility for the war at Germany's feet and obliged it to pay a huge indemnity to the winners. Germany never accepted these provisions, and spent the entire interwar period trying to bargain for the revision of the Versailles Treaty. From this point of view, the memory of WWI certainly fostered the birth and the growth of Nazism. It can equally be said to have played a large role in the coming of WWII, despite the appeasement policy followed by Paris and London up and through the Munich conference of 1938.

In comparison to WWI, the legacy of WWII in Europe could not be more different. Germany recognized its total defeat, accepting the unconditional surrender demanded by Roosevelt in January 1943. Allied troops remained present on its territory until 1990, which was both a way to guarantee Allied rights, and to protect East and West Germany in the context of the Cold War. German authorities, at last, have indemnified the victims (Jews, forced labourers, political deportees)² and made some symbolic gestures. Everybody in Europe remembers December 7, 1970, when Willy Brandt knelt on the steps of the Warsaw memorial dedicated to the Jewish victims of Nazism. This meaningful act certainly helped the German Chancellor in obtaining the Nobel Prize for

¹ For a good example of instrumentalisation, cf Rana Mitter, 'Le Massacre de Nankin: Mémoire et oubli en Chine et au Japon.' (translated by Bruno Poncharal) *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire* n° 94 (April - June 2007), pp. 11-23.

² A long and difficult process, however. The 1953 law was passed thanks to the help of the SPD and despite the reluctance of some CDU/CSU parliamentarians.

Peace in 1971. The German authorities, on the whole, have accepted their country's Nazi past, trying to heal the wounds inherited from WWII. Recall, however, that the German Democratic Republic did not follow the same path. Trying to build a socialist state, which was in fact a totalitarian state, it maintained that the new Germany had no link with its Nazi past, and hence refused to accept responsibility for crimes it never perpetrated.

The facts show clearly that Germany has pursued a policy of memory. In fact, a state has many means at its disposal in pursuit of such a policy. It controls, first of all, the calendar, and can choose to celebrate (or to forget) important events. Equally, it can organize (or not organize) commemorations and ceremonies. It is able to build museums and memorials: the Nanjing Memorial in China or the Australian War Memorial at Canberra both have very important symbolic meanings.³ The state plays an equally important part in education by defining the curriculum to be followed in primary and secondary schools, even if in Germany this power belongs to the federal states and not to the central government. Finally, the state can indemnify (or not indemnify) the victims of past crimes, a symbolic but also a material gesture.

All these elements can define a "policy of memory". They do not mean, however, that this policy works. Some policies are effective and genuinely shape public perception; others fail, because societies do not believe or do not stick to the message delivered by the state. A state cannot shape public opinion at a whim: the "rape of the crowds" is a much more complicated issue than the top-down process suggested by Wilhelm Reich. Masses can, of course, believe propaganda, but only if propaganda confirms, or, at the very least, does not contradict their feelings. That is to say that a policy of memory, even enforced by powerful public means, is never bound to succeed. It can fail when it goes against public feelings, quite an important element to recall.

This paper, however, does not aim to describe the policy of memory followed by Western Germany between 1949 and 1989. It rather focuses on the French side, trying to see how the French state has, in terms of memory, viewed its foreign relations with Germany

I. Hard times (1945-1950)

The French memory of WWII is a rather complicated topic, because the French had, during the dark years, three different main experiences. Firstly, they faced war, but one of limited duration, waged during a few months in 1940 (May-June) and in 1944-1945 (between the Normandy landing in June, 1944, and the liberation of Alsace in February, 1945). On another level, they submitted to a harsh German occupation which, in its first phase until No-

³ On the part played by Gallipoli in the emergence of Australia as a Nation, cf Elizabeth Rechniewski, 'Quand l'Australie invente et réinvente une tradition. L'exemple du débarquement de Gallipoli (avril 1915)', *Vingtième siècle. Revue d'histoire* n°101, (Januar - March 2009), pp. 123-132.

vember 1942, concerned only the northern zone of the country, but expanded to the whole country between November, 1942 and 1945. Finally, they spent four years under a dictatorship, with Philippe Pétain governing the country as Wang Jingwei did on the Chinese side.⁴ This context created a huge difference between France and countries which escaped such ordeals. Great Britain, Australia and the United States avoided a harsh occupation; they were not defeated; their democratic ways were preserved. For all these reasons, their memory of WWII is a consensual rather than a conflict-ridden one. It is above all a memory of war, focused on the memories of warriors and their battles. But in France, as in other defeated and occupied countries (e.g. Belgium, Italy, Greece), memory of the war has three components (despite the differences in national experiences): war, occupation and dictatorship. That means, in the case of France as well as in other countries, that the role of Germany was—and still is—just one part of a more global problem of memory. One example confirms this statement. Between 1969 and 1995, public attention certainly centred more on Vichy⁵ than on the German role, despite the importance of French-German relations. But the same statement applies to Belgium, where the questions about the King deeply unsettled the political life of the country in the early 1950s.⁶

Clearly, relations between France and Germany are just part of a more general picture, one which changed profoundly between 1945 and 2010. At the very beginning, France was not seeking reconciliation. The country remembered the harsh occupation of the dark years, a period characterized by rationing, forced labour, repression and slaughter. Many elements combined to make this memory vivid. Oradour-sur-Glane became a symbol of Nazi cruelty after the small village saw 642 of its inhabitants killed on June 10, 1944, many of them burnt alive in the village church. The ruins were immediately preserved and designated as a national monument in 1945, despite the reservations of the French state, which considered Oradour to have no artistic value.⁷ In the same way, the French authorities were quite reluctant to come to a global agreement with Germany. The country had to be punished for its crimes and Paris recommended following a harsh policy towards it. It was suggested, for example, that Germany be dismantled into three or four states. As the French writer François Mauriac pleasantly remarked: “I like Germany so much that I would like to have many German states”.

⁴ For a broad picture of the French policy of memory, cf Olivier Wieviorka, *La Mémoire désunie. Le souvenir politique des années sombres de la libération à nos jours*, Paris, Le Seuil, 2010 (to be published by Stanford University Press, 2011).

⁵ For a broad analysis concerning the memory of Vichy, cf Henry Rousso, *Le Syndrome de Vichy, de 1944 à nos jours*, Paris, Le Seuil, 1990.

⁶ The comparative approach between France, Netherlands and Belgium has been successfully made by: Pieter Lagrou, *Mémoires patriotiques et Occupation nazie*, Bruxelles, Complexe, 2003.

⁷ Sarah Farmer, *Oradour: arrêt sur mémoire*, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1994, pp. 100, 84.

It was, however, impossible to stick to this policy because of the Cold War. Taking into account the Soviet danger, the Allies began to view the USSR as a greater danger than Germany, an evolution endorsed by Washington after 1946, with London and Paris lending their support to the vision in 1948. Germany had been a foe; but it soon became an ally, especially after the Berlin blockade ordered by Stalin between June, 1948, and May, 1949. Paris therefore accepted the consolidation of its occupation zone with the British and American zones, and backed the creation of Western Germany in October 1949. But this diplomatic recognition did not mean that France was eager to forgive. This step would not be reached until the 1950s.

II. A new vision (1950-1981)

In fact, many French leaders, eager to avoid a new war, wanted a true reconciliation with Germany. Since 1870, France had fought Germany three times. Many French political leaders were hence keen to avoid a new conflict with such a dangerous neighbour. From this point of view, the European idea seemed to pave the way for a sincere cooperation between France and Germany. This idea was especially supported, on the French side, by Christian-Democrats such as Robert Schuman, Pierre-Henri Teitgen and Georges Bidault, who led the Mouvement Républicain Populaire; it was equally backed by Jean Monnet. All these men had been—albeit to different degrees—involved in the French resistance during WWII, which meant that they could not be suspected of a troubling nostalgia towards the Vichy regime or Nazism. The European idea was equally popular among some former resistance fighters and even some deportees, who were eager to foster reconciliation between French and Germans.⁸ The European project thus began in 1950, when Robert Schuman launched the idea of a pooling of coal and steel—two very symbolic materials; it reached a new step in 1957, with the Treaty of Rome defining a common market. It however failed in 1954, unable to create a common European army (Communauté européenne de Défense, CED) which would have included German forces.

The CED quarrel, which roiled French political life between 1950 and 1954, clearly reveals that not all French were ready to consider Western Germany a friend.⁹ In fact, the Gaullists and the Communists both rejected the idea of a European army, for opposite reasons. De Gaulle thought that a European army threatened French sovereignty because it would have depended upon a European command, while the Communists considered it an unfriendly gesture di-

⁸ Walter Lippgens, 'Le rôle des associations d'anciens combattants et victimes de guerre dans le mouvement européen', Alfred Wahl (ed.), *Mémoire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale*, Metz, Centre de recherche histoire et civilisation de l'université de Metz, 1984, p. 101.

⁹ For a good summary of this quarrel, cf René Rémond, 'Quand la CED divisait les Français', *L'Histoire, Etudes sur la France de 1939 à nos jours*, Paris, Le Seuil, 1985, pp. 220-233.

rected against the Soviet Union. It is above all important to mention that these two parties mobilized strong germanophobic arguments to debunk the idea of a European army. The Communists maintained, for example, that the CED was the path towards the rebirth of a Nazi force, and made explicit references to the Oradour slaughter.¹⁰ These kinds of arguments clearly show that the French public opinion was certainly not ready to reconcile itself with Germany. The idea was perhaps popular among the establishment; it was certainly not with the average citizen on the street.

A new step, however, was taken during the presidency of De Gaulle (1958-1969). De Gaulle was certainly not blinded by a passionate love for Germany, even if he appreciated German culture. But he acted with a cold pragmatism. To exist in a Cold War context, France had to back the European idea. Germany was a perfect partner, because it was an economic giant and a diplomatic dwarf. A close alliance with Bonn would hence help Paris to exert strong leadership on a European Community deprived of Great Britain. Great Britain was, in fact, considered an American Trojan horse; hence De Gaulle refused twice its accession to the European Economic Community (EEC).

Reconciliation between France and Germany had to be popularized among the French, who remained sceptical. From this point of view, memory offered a fertile ground for the French president. On September 14, 1958, De Gaulle received Konrad Adenauer at his private home in Colombey-les-deux-Eglises, a very warm gesture. In the same way, the French authorities encouraged German and French towns to create "sister city" relationships. In fact, this policy was not really new. A first agreement had been signed between Ludwigsburg and Montbéliard in 1950. But this kind of partnership remained rare, encompassing a mere 25 towns between 1950 and 1957. But by 1969, more than 400 agreements had been concluded. By 1981 there would be a thousand. German-French pairings were obviously dominant: they amounted to 69% of the sister cities relationships created in 1967.¹¹ Equally important to mention was the first monument to German-French reconciliation. On May 27, 1962, a monument was unveiled at Stonne, in the Ardennes. The monument was a cross made of concrete, in the shape of two shaking hands. This initiative, however, was not so popular. The oak which had been planted for the occasion was uprooted six times.

This policy, however, did not mean that France was forgetting the past. De Gaulle, on the contrary, was anxious to celebrate WWII in all its dimensions. He stressed the importance of the French resistance; he ordered the construction of four museums and memory sites, including a monument devoted to the deportation of French citizens to concentration camps (Mémorial de l'île de la

¹⁰ For an example of such divisions inside the socialist party, cf Noëlline Castagnez, *Socialistes en République. Les parlementaires SFIO de la IV^e République*, Rennes, Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2004, p. 299.

¹¹ Corinne Defrance, 'Les jumelages franco-allemands', Jean-Luc Leleu et alii (dir.), *La France pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale*, Fayard, 2010, p. 284.

Cité). He himself donated a large amount towards the preservation of the only concentration camp located in France, the Struthof. He likewise fought to obtain a fair war indemnity. In 1953, Germany had agreed to indemnify some victims of National-Socialism, especially the Jews. But Bonn had always refused to extend indemnity to resistance fighters. The German authorities considered the Resistance a French internal problem; therefore, they refused to give German money to people who had fought against German soldiers. However, an agreement was signed on July 15, 1960. Bonn gave France 400 million francs, which were mainly given to deportees. 27,472 former deportees claimed indemnification, a result which surprised even the French veterans' ministry.¹² Finally, in 1963, the Elysée Treaty symbolised French-German reconciliation by encouraging cultural cooperation between the two states.

De Gaulle, however, made also some concessions of his own. He first took up the problem of German war cemeteries, which had remained unsolved for years. The agreement reached on July 19, 1966, offered Germany concessions for cemeteries located in France, 240 in total. In the same way, De Gaulle discretely freed Karl Oberg and Helmut Knochen in 1962. These two officers were responsible for the deportation of thousands of Jews during WWII, and their release was considered an important concession to the German authorities, who were quite reluctant to prosecute former Nazis, especially before 1963.

On the whole, De Gaulle used the memory of WWII to support a diplomacy clearly aimed at pursuing French leadership in continental Western Europe. The legacy of the dark years could have endangered this policy. De Gaulle brushed aside this risk by popularising the German-French reconciliation. But nothing suggests that this policy was actually popular, even if no protests occurred, a key difference with the policies of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing.

In fact, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing has led a policy of contested memory. In 1975, the new President refused to commemorate VE Day (May 8th, 1945). According to him, the celebration of German defeat undermined German-French reconciliation. Yet this date had never been popular in France, even nowadays. French are keen to commemorate their liberation, but the 1945 victory is not considered a French victory. This certainly explains why De Gaulle was able, in 1959, to change the date from a National Feast (i.e. a work holiday) into a National Day (celebrated as an important event, but not a day off of work). This act incited strong protests. French Deputies and Senators tried to pass 13 laws aiming to re-establish May 8th as a National Feast, but in vain.¹³ The French people, however, were more divided. 48% of them were against the change, while 43% supported it. This awkward gesture, however, obliged Valéry Giscard d'Estaing to choose a less dangerous ground to symbolize the German-

¹² Ministry of Veterans, Caen, box "accord franco-allemand".

¹³ Serge Barcellini, 'Les journées commémoratives nationales en proie à l'inflation', Jean-Pierre Rioux (dir.), *Nos embarras de mémoire. La France en souffrance*, Limoges, Lavauzelle, 2008, p. 150.

French friendship: the First World War. In 1974, for example, both German ambassadors were invited to commemorate the Armistice Day (November 11th, 1918). But despite his close links with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing never took spectacular measures to strengthen the German-French relationship on the basis of WWII memories.

III. The roots of reconciliation

In comparison, François Mitterrand (1981-1995) and Jacques Chirac (1995-2002) were much more active supporters of German-French reconciliation. Both of them have tried, at first, to make a clear distinction between Germans and Nazis. This distinction was not new. Many resistance fighters, during the dark years, were keen to point out that Nazism did not embody the true Germany. In their minds, there was a distinction between Goethe, Heine and Beethoven's Germany, and Hitler's Nazi Germany. But this distinction was only partially reflected on French monuments. While recalling crimes and slaughters, many monuments preferred to evoke and thus referred to, for example, "the Germans" or "the German barbarism", rather than Nazi cruelty. A number of monuments, however, were modified during the 1980s and 1990s, replacing the term "Germans" with "Nazis".

François Mitterrand and Jacques Chirac tried, on another level, to involve Germans in commemoration of the war. François Mitterrand, for example, invited Chancellor Helmut Kohl to commemorate WWI in Verdun on September 22, 1984. During the ceremony, the French president took the hand of his German counterpart, in a symbolic and much-popularized gesture. In 1994, the French president asked a German unit to parade on the Champs-Élysées—a parade they had not made since 1944. In 2001, a German delegation was invited to rekindle the flame burning upon the Unknown Soldier's grave—without any opposition.

In the same way, a joint German-French textbook project was initiated in 2004, to further better understanding between the two nations. A team of historians from both banks of the Rhine wrote three volumes, for use in high schools, which aimed to expunge national prejudices.¹⁴ This enterprise was so successful that it has inspired Korea, China and Japan. It could be mentioned that, surprisingly, WWII was not a problematic issue. Instead questions surrounding WWI and the relationship with the United States between 1945 and 1989 proved to be more contentious.

The commemoration of the D-Day landings soon became the strongest symbol of German-French reconciliation. Until 1984, the commemoration was first of all an Anglo-American celebration. The French authorities did not attend the ceremonies, because Overlord had been above all an Allied operation where French troops had played only a minor part. For this reason, De Gaulle

¹⁴ Etienne François, 'Le manuel franco-allemand d'histoire. Une entreprise inédite', *Vingtième siècle. Revue d'histoire* n° 94, (April - June 2007), pp. 73-86.

had always refused to attend the ceremonies, which were organized in part as a way to impress the Russians. The 6th of June clearly aimed to stake the claim that WWII was won not only on the Eastern front, but in the Western theatre of operations as well. It was equally a means to exalt the strength of the Anglo-American alliance in the context of the Cold War. In 1984, however, François Mitterrand changed the rules. First of all, he invited heads of state to France, as opposed to the customary American or British generals, which forced a demilitarization of the ceremonies. The presence of distinguished leaders such as Ronald Reagan or Elizabeth II equally increased the prestige of the celebration. The D-Day commemorations, moreover, inspired a new discourse. Overlord was reconsidered as an operation which had paved the way for peace, a peace which was guaranteed by the European Union.

At the very beginning, the German leaders were reluctant to endorse such an interpretation. In 1984, Helmut Kohl refused to attend the ceremonies, considering that he had “no reason to commemorate a defeat”. By 1994, however, he regretted the decision, claiming that a good opportunity to celebrate the reconciliation of former foes had been lost. In 2004, the Germans were finally re-invited, and Gerhard Schroeder totally remade the traditional German perception of the Normandy landings.¹⁵ Until 2004, Overlord was considered both an invasion and a German defeat. Schroeder gave up this interpretation. “The Allies victory was not a victory against Germany, but a victory for Germany”, he declared. Germany has since become wholly associated with the commemoration of WWII, a marked contrast with the First World War.

Concluding remarks

To conclude, we should propose five main remarks:

French-German reconciliation is, in terms of memory, a vivid reality. However, we should certainly not overestimate this fact, as reconciliation remains to a large extent formal and official. But we should not underestimate it either. Memory is still a burning issue between Poland and Russia, between the Baltic States and Moscow, and Berlin has not yet succeeded in promoting a true reconciliation with Poland. From this point of view, the policy of memory led by the French and the Germans can be considered as a success.

This policy, on the other hand, has not been pursued for sentimental reasons. It has been a means to build a European framework and can be considered, from this point of view, as a toll paid for the construction of the European edifice. The legacy of WWII has been an obstacle along the road to a European union. French and German leaders have preferred to break down this barrier to construction of a common Europe, rather than to recall German atrocities.

This policy has been successful, because the Western German authorities have totally recognized their responsibilities. They have recognized Germa-

¹⁵ Moïra Blandot, ‘Les cérémonies commémoratives du 6 juin 1944, de 1945 à 2002’, *Mémoire de DEA*, Paris X Nanterre, 2003.

ny's Nazi past, and agreed to indemnify the victims. We should not, however, idealize the German attitude. Konrad Adenauer was not anxious to prosecute former Nazis. The hunt for Eichmann was successful despite the Germans, certainly not thanks to them. Eichmann's case was not unique. A number of war criminals were protected by German authorities for many years. We need, therefore, to make a careful distinction between foreign policy, which has clearly endorsed the Nazi crimes, and domestic policy, which has been less clear.

Furthermore, this policy of memory has broadened the gap between history and memory. The D-Day landings were planned not to build a new Europe but to crush the Third Reich. The Allies made war not to serve the peace, but to get rid of Adolf Hitler. The Allies helped Germany after 1946 to contain the Soviet Union, but certainly not because Germany embodied the ideal of freedom. A huge gulf, in other words, separates memory (as it is built by governments) from history (as it is studied by historians).

Last but not least, this policy has been to a large extent effective. Today, the legacy of WWII is certainly not a burning issue between France and Germany, in sharp contrast with Japan and its neighbours. This policy has been successful because it was matched by a strong political commitment and a social demand. State policy has, in fact, been magnified by associations and local powers which have greatly contributed to ground the German-French relationship on a very solid foundation—through sister city pairings, for example. Is this policy, however, popular? This question is quite difficult to answer. A variety of indicators suggest that many people in France have never forgotten the dark years and do not consider Germans friends. This clearly proves the limits of a policy which has nonetheless tried to move past the cruel legacy of the harsh German occupation.

法国与德国：和解政策？

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历史记忆在欧洲与亚洲同样不是一个冷静的问题。¹ 第二次世界大战遗留的问题一直并仍然对国际关系和国内政治生活产生着重要影响。这些问题显然是双刃剑。历史记忆能够激化民族主义，加深各国之间的隔阂。1870年战败后的现代法国就是这样的一例。对“失去的两省”（即归还给德国的阿尔萨斯和洛林）的记忆多次危及到法德关系。这笔损失既使法国人对柏林生出一股强烈且广泛的怨恨，也同样迫使法国领导人持续不变地奉行旨在遏制和防范德国的外交政策，而不是推动这两个宿敌达成和解。从另一方面来说，德国人从没有承认过1918年的战败，原因不言而喻。对德国人来说，德国军队依旧是一支不败之师，当军队败退回国时，成群的民众前来欢迎，把他们当成了凯旋的胜利者，因为德国的领土并未被占领。在德国人看来，1919年6月签署的《凡尔赛和约》全无公平可言。其中的第231条将战争罪责推给德国，强迫它向战胜国支付巨额赔偿。在两次世界大战期间，德国从未认可过这些处置措施，而是极力讨价还价，企图修改《凡尔赛和约》。从这点上来看，对第一次世界大战的记忆无疑助长了纳粹主义的滋生和壮大。同样，它也引发了第二次世界大战，虽然到1938年慕尼黑会议时，巴黎和伦敦还是一直提议对德国奉行绥靖政策。

在这方面，第二次世界大战在欧洲的遗留问题完全不同于第一次世界大战。二战之后，德国彻底承认了自己的战败，接受了罗斯福在1943年1月提出的无条件投降的要求。驻扎在德国领土的盟军直到1990年才撤走。在冷战的背景下，此举既能保障同盟国权利，又可为东德或是西德提供保护。最终，德国政府向战争受害者（犹太人、强制劳工、由于政治原因被驱逐者）¹ 支付了赔偿，并做出了具有象征意义的表态。所有的欧洲人都会记得，1970年12月7日那一天，德国总理维利·勃兰特在华沙的受纳粹迫害犹太人纪念碑前双膝跪倒。这个动作虽然引发了争议，但却意味深长，它还帮助这位德国总理获得了1971年的诺贝尔和平奖。总体说来，德国政府都能承认本国有一段纳粹历史，并一直努力弥补二战留下的创伤。但是不要忘记，民主德国却从未沿袭与此相同的路线，而是步入了歧途。它在试图建立一个社会主义国家（事实上，却建成了一个极权主义政体）时，总是宣称这个新生的德国与纳粹历史毫不相干，因此拒绝为自己从未犯过的罪行承担责任。

¹ 但这却是一个漫长而艰难的过程。1953年赔偿法的通过多亏了德国社会民主党（SPD）的促进，同时也克服了基民盟（CDU）和基社盟（CSU）一些议员的阻挠。

事实清楚地表明,德国奉行的是一种记忆政策。实际上,一国政府完全有能力奉行这样一种政策,因为它可以借助诸多的手段。首先,它可以掌控日程安排,对于一些重要事件,可以选择庆祝(或是遗忘)。同样,它可以(不)组织纪念仪式或庆典。它可以修建博物馆和纪念碑:无论是中国的南京大屠杀纪念馆,还是位于堪培拉的澳大利亚战争纪念碑,都具备了极其重要的象征意义。² 另外,国家在教育领域也发挥着重要作用,它负责制定中小学的教学计划——虽然在德国,这一权限是归各州政府所有,而不属于联邦政府。最后,国家还可以对受害者进行赔偿或者不赔偿。赔偿受害者既是象征性地承认了自己犯下的罪行,同时也是一种实质性的认罪。

所有上述元素可以构成一种“记忆政策”,但并不意味着这种记忆政策就能奏效。实际上,有些政策是卓有成效的,真正形成了公共纪念;相反,另外一些政策却遭遇了失败,因为社会各界并不相信或并不执着于政府所发布的信息。政府无法随心所欲地营造公共舆论:“强奸民意”可是一个比威廉·赖希(Wilhelm Reich)所主张的自上而下统治要复杂得多的问题。当然,大众有可能听信国家宣传,但也只是在宣传符合或者最终没有与他们的情感发生抵触的情况下。这正说明,即便是受到有力的公共手段的推动,记忆政策也绝不会一定取得成功。如果它背离了公众的情感时,它就会失败——要牢记公众情感是一个十分重要的元素。

不过,本文目的不在描述西德在1949年至1989年间所奉行的历史记忆政策,而是着眼于法国方面,试图探讨法国政府是如何从记忆角度来考虑它与德国的外交关系。

一、艰难时期(1945-1950)

法国人对第二次世界大战的历史记忆是一个相当复杂的话题。这是因为,在那个黑暗的年代,法国人亲身经历过三种重大体验。起先,他们遭遇了战争,但战争只是一段非常短暂的体验,为期仅仅几个月,即1940年的五、六月份和1944年至1945年间几个月(1944年6月诺曼底登陆和1945年2月阿尔萨斯解放之间的那段时期)。其次,他们遭到了德国的无情占领。德国第一步只是占领了法国北部地区(1942年11月以前),继而在1942年11月到1945年期间占领了整个法国,对法国进行了为期四年的独裁统治。当时当政的菲利普·贝当(Philippe Pétain)的所作所为一如中国的汪

² 关于一战期间的加里波利战役对于澳大利亚民族形成所起的作用,可参见:Elizabeth Rechniewski, 'Quand l'Australie invente et réinvente une tradition. L'exemple du débarquement de Gallipoli (avril 1915)', *Vingtième siècle. Revue d'histoire* n°101, (Januar - March 2009), pp. 123-132.

精卫。³ 这一背景使法国与其它一些逃脱了此类苦难的国家形成了巨大的差异。英国、澳大利亚和美国就避免了严酷的国土沦陷,他们没有被击败,国内的民主生活也始终得以维持。基于所有这些原因,这些国家的人对于二战的记忆只是一种对于战争的记忆,聚焦于一场场战役和一个个勇士留下的纪念,是一种共识性的,不会引发争议的记忆。与此相反,在法国,在其它战败国和被占领国(比利时、意大利、希腊等国),对于战争的记忆却总是牵扯到三个部分——战争、占领和独裁,尽管各国的命运各自不同。就法国的情况而言,德国的所作所为一直只是一个更广泛、更复杂的历史记忆问题的一部分,今天仍然如此。有个例子可以证实这一说法。1969年至1995年间,尽管法德关系依旧是个重要问题,但公众注意力无疑更多地投放到了维希政权⁴而不是德国的所作所为。此外,比利时也同样如此,国王参与纳粹统治的问题深深扰乱了50年代早期的政治生活。⁵

因此,法国和德国的关系只是更大环境中的一部分。从1945年到2010年,法德关系同样持续经历了深刻的变化。最初的时候,法国显然无意寻求和解。实际上,这个国家对于那黑暗年代里的无情占领记忆犹新:定量配给、强制劳工、镇压和杀戮。有许多元素令这种记忆依然鲜活。格拉讷河畔的奥拉杜尔(Oradour-sur-Glane)是一个小村,在1944年6月10日遭到摧毁,642人惨遭杀害,其中许多人在教堂里被活活烧死。不久,这个小村便成为了纳粹暴行的一个象征。虽然法国政府方面认为奥拉杜尔没什么艺术价值可言,但是,此处遗迹还是迅速得以保存,于1945年成为一处国家纪念地。⁶ 另外,法国政府非常不情愿寻求与德国达成总体和解协定,认为德国必须因其所犯的罪行受到惩罚,并主张对德国采取严厉惩处的政策,比如,建议把德国拆分为三、四个国家。正如法国作家弗朗索瓦·莫里亚克(François Mauriac)诙谐地调侃:“我太喜欢德国了,以至乐意看见好多个德国。”

然而,冷战的出现使坚持这种严厉惩罚政策成为泡影。考虑到苏联这个危险因素,同盟国阵营渐渐将苏联看作比德国更大的威胁。1946年以后

³ 关于法国历史记忆政策的总体情况,可参见:Olivier Wieviorka, *La Mémoire désunie. Le souvenir politique des années sombres de la libération à nos jours*, Paris, Le Seuil, 2010 (to be published by Stanford University Press, 2011).

⁴ 关于对维希政权历史记忆的全面分析,可参见:Henry Rousso, *Le Syndrome de Vichy, de 1944 à nos jours*, Paris, Le Seuil, 1990. 译者注:维希政权是第二次世界大战期间,德国占领下的法国傀儡政府,政府所在地迁至法国中部的维希(Vichy),故名。

⁵ 对法国、荷兰和比利时三国进行过成功的比较,参见:Pieter Lagrou, *Mémoires patriotiques et Occupation nazie*, Bruxelles, Complexe, 2003

⁶ Sarah Farmer, *Oradour: arrêt sur mémoire*, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1994, pp. 100, 84.

这种变化得到了美国的认同,1948年英国和法国也对此表示支持。德国一直是同盟国的对手,但它却很快成为了其盟友,尤其是1948年6月到1949年5月斯大林下令实施柏林封锁之后。法国由此同意将其占领区与英国和美国占领区合为一体,并对1949年10月西德成立给予了支持。不过,这种外交上的承认并不意味着法国想谅解德国,而是50年代才走到这一步。

二、新的构想(1950-1981)

事实上,许多法国领导人都想跟德国实现真正的和解,这主要是为了避免新的战争。从1870年以来,法国跟德国打了三场战争,有鉴于此,许多法国政治领导人渴望避免跟这样一个危险的邻国再发生新的冲突。从这个角度来说,欧洲观念(即欧洲一体化)似乎能为法德之间的真诚合作铺平道路。这一观念尤其受到法国基督教民主党人的推崇,比如罗伯特·舒曼(Robert Schuman)、皮埃尔·亨利·泰让(Pierre-Henri Teitgen)以及领导了“人民共和运动”的乔治·皮杜尔(Georges Bidault)。同样,它也得到了让·莫内(Jean Monnet)的力挺。上述所有人士都曾在二战期间或多或少地投身于法国抵抗运动,这就意味着,虽然他们支持法德缓和关系,但绝不可能是追念维希政权或是纳粹主义。除了他们之外,在一些抵抗人士乃至一些被驱逐出境者当中,欧洲观念同样广受欢迎,他们渴望推动法国与德国和解。⁷于是,1950年便开始了欧洲建设。当时,法国外交部长罗伯特·舒曼推出一个构想,将两种极具象征意义的资源煤和钢置于两国共同参与管理的联合机构之下。虽然1954年组建欧洲军队即欧洲防卫共同体(本可以将部分德国军队纳入其中)的计划失败了,但是,随着1957年《罗马条约》做出建立共同市场的规定,欧洲建设迈出了新的一步。

1950年至1954年间,围绕建立欧洲防卫共同体发生的争吵严重干扰了法国的政治生活。这显然表明,不是所有法国人都愿意把西德看做朋友。⁸事实上,戴高乐主义者和共产主义者都反对组建欧洲军队的构想,但双方所持的理由却截然相反。戴高乐认为,欧洲军队会威胁到法国主权,因为它将听命于整个欧洲。共产主义者则觉得此举旨在对抗苏联,是一种不友好的姿态。其中最值得一提的是,这两股力量为了拆欧洲军队的台,都拿出了足以让人“恐德”的证据。比如,共产主义者阐释说,欧洲防卫共同体乃是一条使纳粹军队重生的凶途,并举出奥拉杜尔村大屠杀的例

⁷ Walter Lippgens, 'Le rôle des associations d'anciens combattants et victimes de guerre dans le mouvement européen', Alfred Wahl (ed.), *Mémoire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale*, Metz, Centre de recherche histoire et civilisation de l'université de Metz, 1984, p. 101.

⁸ 关于对这一争吵的概述,可参见: René Rémond, 'Quand la CED divisait les Français', *L'Histoire, Etudes sur la France de 1939 à nos jours*, Paris, Le Seuil, 1985, pp. 220-233.



子。⁹ 这显然说明,法国的公众舆论当时肯定还不打算同意法国与德国和解。或许在法国政府部门中和解的想法比较普遍,但肯定没有得到民众的支持。

但是,在戴高乐担任总统期间(1958-1969年),法国终于迈出了新的一步。戴高乐固然欣赏德国文化,却也肯定不会因为对德国的热爱而变得盲目起来。反而,他的行动所遵循的是一种冷静的实用主义。在冷战的环境下,法国必须支持欧洲观念。德国是个绝好的伙伴,因为它是经济巨人,却是外交侏儒。因此,与德国结成紧密的同盟将有助于法国在抛开了英国的欧洲共同体内发挥强有力的领导作用。实际上,法国一直把英国看成是美国安插在欧洲的一只特洛伊木马,因此,戴高乐才两度拒绝让英国加入欧洲经济共同体。

尽管如此,法国和德国的和解还必须得到法国人的普遍赞同,而法国人此时仍然对此怀有疑虑。因此,戴高乐总统尽可能地利用历史记忆所提供的肥沃土壤。1958年9月14日戴高乐在科隆贝双教堂村(Colombey-les-deux-Eglises)自己的家里接待了德国总理阿登纳,表示出了极大的热情。而且法国政府还鼓励法德两国的城市缔结友好关系。实际上这种政策已经不算新鲜事。1950年时德国路德维希堡市(Ludwigsburg)与法国蒙贝利亚乐市(Montbéliard)就签署了第一份友好城市协定。只不过这类伙伴关系此后一直比较少见,从1950到1957年只涉及到25个城市。然而,到了1969年,签署的友好城市协定就已经超过了400份,到1981年总数更是达到1000份。在此类协定中,德法友好城市协定明显占多数,达到了1967年协定签署总数的69%。¹⁰ 同样值得一提的是,此间庆祝法德和解的第一块纪念碑建成了。1962年5月27日,在法国北部阿登高地的斯通尼(Stonne)举行了纪念碑揭幕仪式。它用混凝土制成的十字造型,展示的是两只紧紧相握的手。不过,这个创举却不太受欢迎,因为种在纪念场地上的橡树曾经被人拔掉了六次。

上述政策的实行并不意味着法国人正在忘记过去。相反地,戴高乐急欲全方位地开展二战纪念活动。他再三强调法国抵抗运动的重要意义,下令建造了四家博物馆和纪念馆,其中包括一座为集中营中被残害的犹太人而建的纪念碑(纪念碑位于西岱岛)。他还拨出一大笔资金用来维护位于法国境内唯一的一座集中营——斯特鲁托夫集中营。同样,他也力争拿到合理的战争赔款。1953年德国同意向一些受纳粹迫害的人支付赔偿金,其中主要是犹太人。不过,德国一直拒绝考虑赔偿那些抵抗运动人士。德

⁹ 关于法国社会党内部观点分歧的例证,可参见:Noëlline Castagnez, *Socialistes en République. Les parlementaires SFIO de la IV^e République*, Rennes, Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2004, p. 299.

¹⁰ Corinne Defrance, 'Les jumelages franco-allemands', Jean-Luc Leleu et alii (dir.), *La France pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale*, Fayard, 2010, p. 284.

国政府认为,抵抗运动是法国内政问题,因而,他们拒绝把德国的钱付给那些曾经对阵德国士兵的人。尽管如此,1960年7月15日德法两国仍然签署了一项协定,德国向法国支付4亿法郎,主要付给那些被驱逐者。有27,472名前被驱逐者声明自己获得了赔偿。对于这个结果,就连法国退役军人事务部都大感意外。¹¹ 1963年法德两国签订《爱丽舍条约》,鼓励两国开展文化合作,这也标志着法德的和解。

对此戴高乐也做出了一些让步。他先是解决了仍存于法国境内的德军阵亡士兵公墓这一多年悬而未决的难题。1966年7月19日签署的协定中规定,法国将对位于法国境内的240座德国战争公墓实行免费优待。戴高乐还在1962年先后释放了卡尔·奥贝格(Karl Oberg)和赫尔穆特·克诺亨(Helmut Knochen)这两名在二战杀害了成千上万名犹太人的德国军官。他们的获释被看作法国对德国政府做出的一次重要让步。后者那时很不情愿依法起诉那些前纳粹党人,尤其是在1963年以前。

总体说来,戴高乐利用人们对于二战的历史记忆来推行外交政策,旨在为法国赢得西欧大陆领导地位。虽然那个黑暗年代的残留影响原本有可能危及这一政策,但是,戴高乐通过推广、普及法德和解扫除了这一危险。虽然对此法国没有出现什么抗议活动,也绝对不能说明这一政策真正地深入人心了。后来的法国总统瓦勒里·季斯卡·德斯坦(Valéry Giscard d'Estaing)所主导的政策就与此存在重大的分歧。

其实,德斯坦总统引领的是有争议的历史记忆。1975年,这位新总统拒绝庆祝欧洲胜利日(1945年5月8日)。他认为,庆祝德国战败会削弱德法和解——虽然这个纪念日从未在法国流行起来。法国人渴望庆祝自己的解放,但却肯定不会把1945年那场胜利看成是法国的胜利。这就是为什么1959年戴高乐得以把这个全国性节假日(即放假一天)降格成全国庆祝日(会作为一个重要事件得到庆祝,但是人们还得上班)。虽然如此,这一作法还是引发了强烈的抗议。法国议员和参议员们试图通过13项法规,将5月8日这一天重新改成一个全国性节日,但却徒劳无功。¹² 法国人在这件事上分化得很厉害,48%的人反对戴高乐的这种强制作法,而43%的人表示支持。迫于这种颇为棘手的态势,德斯坦总统只得选择第一次世界大战这个风险较小的主题来昭示德法友谊。比如,1974年德国驻法国大使应邀参加了法国庆祝休战纪念日(1918年11月11日)的活动。虽然德斯坦总统与德国总理赫尔穆特·施密特(Helmut Schmidt)保持着密切联系,但却从未就二战的记忆对加强德法关系采取特别的措施。

¹¹ 法国退伍军人部,卡昂,文件盒名为“accord franco-allemand”。

¹² Serge Barcellini, 'Les journées commémoratives nationales en proie à l'inflation', Jean-Pierre Rioux (dir.), *Nos embarras de mémoire. La France en souffrance*, Limoges, Lavauzelle, 2008, p. 150.



三、 扎下和解之根

与德斯坦总统不同的是,弗朗索瓦·密特朗总统(François Mitterrand, 1981-1995年在任)和雅克·希拉克总统(Jacques Chirac, 1995-2002年在任)在德法和解方面表现得更加积极。起先,他们两人都试图把德国人和纳粹划清界限。这种划界并非新鲜事。早在那个黑暗年代,许多抵抗运动人士就曾热切地提醒人们,纳粹主义并不代表真正的德国。因此,他们把歌德、海涅和贝多芬所在的德国与希特勒统治下的纳粹德国对立起来。然而,这种划界并未在法国的各个纪念场所得到的清晰的展示。举个例子,在回顾以往罪责和屠杀的时候,许多注释牌更多的是提到“德国人”或“德国人的暴行”,而不是纳粹的暴行。但是,到了八十年代和九十年代,有许多注释牌得到了修改,用“纳粹”取代了“德国人”这个字眼。

另外,密特朗总统和希拉克总统还努力把德国人吸纳到许多纪念活动当中。比如,1984年9月22日,密特朗总统邀请德国总理赫尔穆特·科尔(Helmut Kohl)前往凡尔登参加第一次世界大战纪念仪式。在仪式当中,这位法国总统与他的德国同行携起了手,这一姿势极具象征意义且在公众中产生了很大影响。1994年密特朗总统邀请一支德军队伍参加在香榭丽舍大街举行的阅兵式——从1944年以来德国军队就再没有在此举办过阅兵式。2001年一个德国代表团受邀参加无名士兵墓的点燃火炬仪式,此事没有遭到任何抵制。

为推动德法两国更好的相互理解,2004年两国开始共同编写一本德法教科书。由来自莱茵河两岸的历史学家组成的写作团队撰写了足足三卷本,供两国的中学用作教材,目的是消除民族偏见。¹³ 这一壮举取得了很大的成功,甚至令韩国、中国和日本深受启发。但有一点令人非常惊讶,在教科书编纂过程中二战并不是疑难问题,反而是一战以及1945年至1989年期间法国与美国的关系引发了专家之间的争论。

不久之后,诺曼底登陆纪念仪式成为了德法和解的最重要的标志。1984年之前这个纪念仪式主要是英美的节日,法国政府不愿意参加纪念仪式,因为,这场代号“霸王行动”的战役是同盟国的一次军事行动,法国军队在其中发挥的作用微不足道。出于这个原因,戴高乐始终拒绝参加纪念活动,而且组织这个纪念仪式其实也是为了给俄国人以深刻印象。6月6日的这一纪念活动显然意在证明,不只是东欧苏联战场打赢了二战,同盟国在西欧第二战场也取得了胜利。在冷战的背景下,这也同样是在炫耀英美盟军实力的一个手段。然而,1984年密特朗总统却改变了这种成规,第一次邀请同盟国的国家元首们来到法国。往年的纪念仪式一般是由某位美国或英国将军主持,充满军事色彩,今年的活动却开创了非军事化的

¹³ Etienne François, 'Le manuel franco-allemand d'histoire. Une entreprise inédite', *Vingtième siècle. Revue d'histoire* n° 94, (April - June 2007), pp. 73-86..

先河。一些著名领导人如罗纳德·里根(Ronald Reagan)或伊丽莎白二世(Elizabeth II)的莅临,也提升了此次纪念活动的声望,使之在很大程度上成为了媒体报道的中心。而且诺曼底登陆这一行动引发了一种新说法的产生,被认为奠定了和平之路,而这一和平后来由欧盟来保障。

最初,德国领导人不太愿意认同这种看法。1984年科尔总理曾拒绝参加这个纪念仪式,他觉得“没有理由纪念本国的战败”。但到了1994年,他却后悔当年被排除在活动之外,声称丧失了一个可以庆祝与宿敌和解的好机会。2004年德国领导人终于受到邀请,施罗德总理彻底扭转了德国人对于诺曼底登陆的传统看法。¹⁴ 在此之前,“霸王行动”是被德国人当作一次侵犯,当作德国的一次战败。施罗德抛弃了这种理解方式,他说,“盟军的胜利不是打败德国而是拯救德国”。就这样,德国逐渐地、却完全地融入到了二战的纪念活动当中,这与一战后的情况形成了巨大的反差。

结束语

在结语处,我们应注意以下五个方面:

从历史记忆的角度来说,法德和解是一种鲜活的现实。虽然我们不必对它过度赞誉,因为这在很大程度上仍然是官方性和礼节性的,但是,我们也不能低估它。在波兰和俄罗斯之间,在波罗的海国家和俄罗斯之间,历史记忆依然是一个被热议的问题。而且德国在推动与波兰达成真正和解方面至今仍然未能取得成功。在这点上,法国和德国所采取的历史记忆政策可以说是成功的。

但是,从另一方面来说,采取这种政策并不是出于情感上的原因。它其实是构建欧盟框架的一个手段,也可以看作是法德两国为欧洲建设付出的代价。二战遗留的问题原本有可能成为建立欧洲联盟的一道障碍,但是法国和德国领导人选择铲除它而不是铭记德国的暴行。

这种政策是成功的,因为西德政府完全承认自己的历史责任,承认德国的纳粹历史,并同意为受害者支付赔偿。然而,我们不能把德国的态度理想化。康拉德·阿登纳总理并不想起诉前纳粹分子。尽管没有德国人的帮助,纳粹党卫队头子艾希曼(Eichmann)还是被成功抓捕归案,因此也不必感谢德国方面。这并不是个案,还有一大批二战战犯多年来一直受到德国政府的庇护。因此,我们必须认清,德国虽然在外交政策上明确承认纳粹罪行,但在国内政策中却显得比较含糊。

此外,这种历史记忆政策扩大了历史与记忆之间的鸿沟。诺曼底登陆的目的从来不是为了建立一个新欧洲,而是志在摧毁第三帝国。发动这场

¹⁴ Moïra Blandot, 'Les cérémonies commémoratives du 6 juin 1944, de 1945 à 2002', *Mémoire de DEA*, Paris X Nanterre, 2003.



战役从来不是为了和平,而是意欲铲除希特勒。1946年后同盟国之所以帮助德国是为了遏制苏联,而不是因为德国体现了自由的理想。换句话说,记忆(各国政府所营造的记忆)与历史(历史学家们所研究的历史史实)之间存在着巨大的反差。

最后,这种政策在很大程度上是卓有成效的。如今二战遗留的问题已不再是法国和德国之间的争议焦点,这种情况跟日本与其邻国的关系形成了鲜明的对照。这种政策之所以会取得成功,是因为它与强烈的政治义务与社会需求相得益彰。事实上,国家政策一直是由协会团体和地方政府来推行的,他们以非常具体的方式令德法和解扎下根,从而为实现和解做出了很大贡献,比如,缔结友好城市关系等等。但这种政策是否被普遍接受了?这个问题很难回答。不过,有许多迹象显示,在法国有许多人从未遗忘那个黑暗年代,也并不把德国人当成朋友。这证明,和解政策虽然试图取代那个被德国无情占领年代留下的残酷记忆,但它还是存在局限。

Czech–German Reconciliation Incomplete

Ass. Prof. Antonie Doležalová

Introduction

The end of WWII in 1945 is undoubtedly an important milestone in modern world history. It influenced the fates of many countries, the Czech Republic being no exception. In Czechoslovakia it caused the loss of more than 300,000 lives.¹ After the war, the country's international relations, ethnic composition, political system, as well as its economic situation all changed. How has the Czech society reconciled itself with this uneasy legacy and national discontinuity? A whole 65 years after the war, this may seem like a purely academic question, but it is not—the process of Czech reconciliation with WWII is yet to be completed. Within this process, Czech (Czechoslovak) society and historiography have passed through three distinct phases:

- The period 1945–1948, when Czechoslovakia searched for a path to socialism
- The period 1948–1989, when Czechoslovakia was ruled by the Communist Party
- The period 1989–present, when Czechoslovakia tried to define its place within Europe, with the Czech and Slovak Republics taking different paths post-1993

The political milestones which define these phases complicate both reconciliation and our reflection on it. In each of these three periods there were different approaches to dealing with the consequences of WWII. We can identify them as:

- The specifics of Czech history, which is defined by a complicated relationship between Czechs and Germans, but also between Czechs and Slovaks, Czechs and Hungarians
- The destruction of interwar Czechoslovakia
- The occupation of Czechoslovakia by Nazi Germany
- The collaboration of Czech Germans and Czechs with the Nazi occupational government
- The anti-fascist resistance

¹ Czechoslovak Jews account for the largest proportion of the lives lost – estimates range from two-hundred sixty to two-hundred seventy-two thousand. Further details in: Pavel Škorpil, *Cesta do katastrof*, Prague, 1993.

- The postwar transfer of Germans (as well as Hungarians and Poles) from Czechoslovakia
- The question of postwar reparations

Firstly, the wider context must be considered, in terms of both time and space. There were the migrations and emigrations of the 20th century, the Versailles Agreement, and the coalitions during WWII. There were also the Russian Revolution of 1917, social tensions that followed both world wars, land reforms after 1919, redistribution of property in the descendant countries of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the Great Depression.

Secondly, it needs to be said that any reflection on these experiences remains trapped in causality—as if the history of Czech-German relations were nothing but a series of injustices. For Czech (Czechoslovak) society and historiography, any kind of reconciliation is tainted by the Munich betrayal, the active role of Czech Germans in the disintegration of Czechoslovakia, and by the persecution of the Czechs during the war. On the German and Austrian side, collective memory is tarnished by experiences of Sudeten Germans, and also by the personal ambitions of leaders of Sudeten associations in Germany. The prevailing stereotype of Czech-German coexistence during the whole of the 19th century is one of conflict.

In my paper I will first try to explain to what extent the Czechs may have reconciled themselves with the war, and then to formulate which factors hindered reconciliation and why. I shall employ the classic historical method—address the matter chronologically, in reverse order. Günter Grass, recipient of the Nobel Prize in literature, titled his novel in which he reconciles himself with his own past “Peeling the Onion” (*Häuten der Zwiebel*). Like him, I will attempt to peel back at least some of the layers of the 65-year-old process of the Czech nation’s reconciliation with its history, its neighbours, its former fellow citizens and its former enemies. Over the years, some subject matters have been purposely downplayed by political leaders, by actors of the day, and by their descendants, the Czechs of today. This paper is supposed to be a brief overview of how far the Czech Republic has come along the path towards reconciliation. The questions asked are: Who are the actors behind this process? What exactly does the term ‘reconciliation’ mean? Do these questions pose any potential dangers?

I. Post-1989

The subject of reconciliation with the war was essentially broached in Czech public discourse only in the context of defending the so-called “Beneš’ Decrees”. On the Czech side of the matter, Czech-German relations appear to be defined by only two events: the Munich Agreement and Beneš’ decrees, i.e. the disintegration of Czechoslovakia and the transfer of the Sudeten Germans. The timing and the course of the discussion demonstrate what a handy tool history can be in legitimizing or de-legitimizing politics. The discussion

took place in 1992, when Czechoslovakia began its attempts to join the EU. Germany and Austria were willing to support Czechoslovakia only if Beneš' decrees were declared null and void. What was left undefined was whether all the decrees or only some of them should be nullified (or perhaps only some of their passages), if they should be declared void *ex tunc* (from the moment they were signed) or *ex nunc* (from the moment of Czechoslovak EU accession).² In negotiations with Czechoslovakia, Germany dealt with two sides of the same problem: compensation for the victims of Nazism, and the question of the Sudeten Germans. Although the German public had never disputed the former, it could not be resolved while the Cold War persisted. The latter was, for a long time, regarded by the Germans as a regional, Bavarian problem, which would disappear with the passing away of the transferred generation. The vast majority of Czech lawyers and historians of law believe that the decrees conform with European legislation, thanks to the adoption of the European Human Rights Act. Moreover, the question of whether the transfer of the Sudeten Germans was legitimate or legal is not inevitably linked with Beneš' decrees. The transfer occurred in accordance with the laws of the time and with the support of the international community. The Czech Republic's response to any debate on the topic is unyielding, and returns always to the issue of the Munich Agreement. This is because for the Czech Republic the non-validity of the Munich Agreement is in part what determines its right to execute sovereignty over its current territory. According to this legal interpretation, any doubt over absolute nullity of the agreement would inevitably evoke the possibility of territorial and proprietary claims by neighbouring countries.³

In 1989, the issue of reconciliation presents itself in a different light from the one we are familiar with. Rather than the fall of Communism, it concerns mainly the end of major ideological systems together with their interpretative frameworks. In the Czech Republic, however, stereotypical interpretations in public discourse of the 20th century's key events have changed very little.⁴ The war, started by Nazi Germany, tends to be blamed for all damages and changes in the situation. The Czech side refuses to engage in any kind of discussion with the Sudeten Germans, seeing them as the parties responsible

² In total, 98 decrees were published between April and October, 1945. They applied to changes in the constitution, public administration, citizenship, the wealth of German and Hungarian minorities, the restoration and reform of national economy, state finances, the punishment of war crimes, collaborators and traitors. Jan Kuklík, *Benešovy dekrety z právně-historické perspektivy*, Blave / Mink (eds.) *Benešovy dekrety. Budoucnost Evropy a vyrovnávání se s minulostí*. Prague: Cefres, 2003, p. 55.

³ Jan Kuklík, 'Spory o platnost mnichovské dohody'. *Kauza: tzv. Benešovy dekrety. Historické kořeny a souvislosti. Tři české hlasy v diskusi*, Prague: HÚ AV ČR, 1999, p. 37.

⁴ In regard to the question of why this did not occur, for example, in Poland, where a large German minority was also expelled, it is often pointed out that alongside Communist ideology, the Church was always very strong in Poland and that it was Polish bishops who initiated the dialogue with West Germany in 1965.

for breaking up Czechoslovakia. The idea that the culprits for the tragic events of the war and its aftermath could be found beyond Nazi Germany, as well as within it, is literally revolutionary. It is also becoming apparent that there are still people on both sides of the long-gone conflict who are sensitive about any mention of WWII. Whether they are actual witnesses or their descendants, they look upon the war with a sense that they have been wronged.

As early as December 1989, only three days after being elected President, Václav Havel apologised in his speech in Berlin to the Sudeten Germans who were forced out of Czechoslovakia in 1945–46. In doing so, he acknowledged the outcome of the dissident debate of the 1970s about the moral dimension of the transfer. His statement outraged public opinion in Czechoslovakia. Unfortunately, it coincided with the hurried process of German unification and thus did not receive the expected reception in Germany. Both the Czechoslovak-German agreement of 1992 and the Czech-German agreement of 1997 aimed to nullify Beneš' decrees. The latter consistently condemned their consequences, which were in conflict with human rights, but the Czech Republic has never agreed to actually declare the decrees void. From the moment Václav Klaus became the second Czech president, he called for a separate agreement with the EU before the Czech Republic's accession, so as to spare it from any potential legal actions by those expelled in 1945–46. He secured it at the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.

II. 1948–1989

Apart from the loss of life caused by the war, Czechoslovakia calculated the cost of direct and indirect damages suffered and filed a claim for US\$11.5 billion at the Paris Reparation Conference. This amount was later raised to US\$19.5 billion.⁵ But Czechoslovakia received only US\$91.3 million from the Brussels Reparation Bureau. The Cold War slowed down or completely stopped further financial compensation. Ironically, dealings proved to be more complicated with the allies than with Germany. Confiscations had targeted only German and Hungarian properties, and while allied wealth was affected by nationalization as well, Czechoslovakia was entitled to do so only in exchange for compensation—in accordance with valid international laws. From 1945 to 1982, Czechoslovakia carried out negotiations with Great Britain, the United States, Austria, Switzerland, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden and Italy, and concluded 168 compensation agreements.⁶

⁵ All according to the exchange rate between US\$ and Crown in 1938. Indirect damages include war expenses, the loss of workforce, increased cost of medical care, as well as increased numbers of disabled and those rendered incapable of working.

⁶ Reconciliation with Great Britain was complicated by the cost of Britain's loan to post-Munich Czechoslovakia, because of the exile government in London, and by the fate of Czechoslovak gold reserves. The Czech restitution laws reopened the issue after 1989. Further details in: Stanislav Motl, *Kam zmizel zlatý poklad republiky*, Prague, 2003; Jan Kuklík, *Do poslední pence*, Prague, 2007.

The post-war chapter in Czech-German relations, however, bears the mark of the transfer of the Sudeten Germans. The transfer of Germans from Czech and Slovak land after WWII involved 2.6–2.7 million people, about a quarter of all Germans displaced from their homes in Europe at the time. A vast majority of the German refugees from Czechoslovakia headed for Germany, as Austria rejected them as troublemakers and ex-Nazis.⁷ Legislatively, the transfer rested on several out of the 143 decrees published by Edvard Beneš, the prime minister of the temporary government. On the Czechoslovak side, it was not the legality as much as the legitimacy (entitlement) of the transfer which was discussed. The Czechoslovak legal stance was that the transfer was the result of the negotiations of the Potsdam Conference, which made it, first and foremost, an international legal matter. But even before Potsdam, 600,000 Germans had already been chaotically transferred, of which twenty to forty thousand were victims of violent acts.⁸ The so-called Amnesty Law⁹ was adopted as early as 1946, granting amnesty for criminal acts in the first months after the war. Even prior to this, the future first Communist president Klement Gottwald expressed an opinion that crimes committed against Germans (and Hungarians) should not be investigated and, if possible, should be kept secret.¹⁰

However, the “Sudeten question” goes beyond the post-war transfer of the Germans. It is invariably connected to the Munich Agreement as, to the Czechs, these are two sides of the same coin.

This is demonstrated clearly in how Czechoslovakia built relations between both East and West Germany: despite the different political frameworks, both the transfer and Munich were key questions. East Germany admitted as early as 1950 and again in 1967 that the Munich Agreement was signed under duress, and that it was part of the Nazi conspiracy against peace. As such, the agreement should be regarded as non-binding from the very beginning,

⁷ Oliver Rathkolb, ‘Potlačování a instrumentalizace vyhnání sudetských Němců a jeho opožděná recepce v Rakousku’, Bláha / Mink (eds.), *Benešovy dekrety. Budoucnost Evropy a vyrovnávání se s minulostí*, Prague: Cefres, 2003, p. 98. Before the Austrian-Czech border was closed (mainly thanks to the Soviet Union), around 151,000 Sudeten Germans were transferred to Austria, which was slow in granting them citizenship. Until the early 1950s, the Austrian government was counting on passing the expelled from Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania, Hungary and Poland onto Germany. Gaining citizenship was simplified only after 1954.

⁸ The first estimates by a Czech-German historical committee of the number of the dead were twenty to forty thousand. Also see: Jaroslav Kučera, *Odsunové ztráty sudetoněmeckého obyvatelstva. Problémy jejich přesného vyčíslení*, Prague, 1992; *Konfliktní společenství, katastrofa, uvolnění*, Prague - Munich, 1997.

⁹ Law number 115/1946 Sb. on the legality of the conduct during the struggle to regain Czech and Slovak freedom.

¹⁰ Jan Kuklík, ‘Tzv. Benešovy dekrety z právně-historické perspektivy’, Bláha / Mink (eds.), *Benešovy dekrety. Budoucnost Evropy a vyrovnávání se s minulostí*. Prague: Cefres, 2003, p. 71.

with all the consequences entailed.¹¹ West Germany joined the debate in the 1970s, willing to distance itself from Munich on moral, political and historical grounds, but not on legal ones. In the end, the agreement was declared void in 1973 and both states resolved controversial legal issues concerning citizenship and acting in good faith on questions of property.

At the time, the transfer did not become a topic of academic or public debate in Germany or Austria. The transfer was only discussed in the Czechoslovak dissident community of the 1980s, with a focus on the moral dimension of the transfer.

For the sake of completeness, it is worth mentioning that after 1945 Czechoslovakia also addressed the issue of its relations with other neighbours, Hungary and Poland. There were three approaches to dealing with population of these nationalities: Beneš' decrees, international agreements, or by the application of the principle of collective guilt. The second of these approaches meant that 6,000 Polish nationals and 30,000 Hungarians, who moved to Czechoslovakia after the Munich Agreement was signed, were expelled. 400,000 Hungarians were transferred from Czechoslovakia on the basis of international agreements on the exchange of citizens. In this respect, Hungary demanded, in vain, a transfer of land as well, given that there were 600,000 Hungarians in Slovakia, but only 60,000 Slovaks in Hungary. The principle of collective guilt led to the Polish and the Hungarians being identified as Germanized nationalistic collaborators. All the above steps were undertaken in the name of national purity, rectifying the wrongs inflicted by the Munich Agreement, and of restoring pre-Munich Czechoslovakia. The fact that Czechoslovakia wanted to satisfy a proportion of its reparation demands undoubtedly played a role as well.

Conclusion

The issue of reconciliation presents the so-called Velvet Revolution of 1989 in a different light from the one we are familiar with. Rather than viewing the events through the lens of the fall of Communism, we can see them in the context of the end of major ideological systems together with their interpretative frameworks. In Czech public discourse, however, the stereotypical interpretations of the 20th century's key events remain nearly unchanged. The war, started by Nazi Germany, tends to be blamed for all damages and changes in the situation. The Czech side refuses to engage in any kind of discussion with

¹¹ Jan Kuklík, 'Spory o platnost mnichovské dohody', *Kauza: tzv. Benešovy dekrety. Historické kořeny a souvislosti. Tři české hlasy v diskusi*, Prague: HÚ AV ČR, 1999, p. 36. Contracts with other Soviet satellite states, i.e. Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania, also contained similar articles. After the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the allied armies of the Warsaw Pact countries, the same article was incorporated even into the Czechoslovak-Soviet agreement. From the point of view of legal theory, the Czechoslovak standpoint was reinforced by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in 1969.

the Sudeten Germans, seeing them as the parties responsible for breaking up Czechoslovakia. The idea that the culprits for the tragic events of the war and its aftermath could be found beyond Nazi Germany, as well as within it, is literally revolutionary. It is also becoming apparent that there are still people on both sides of the long-gone conflict who are sensitive about any mention of WWII.

Who are the actors behind the process of reconciliation with WWII, exactly what does the term “reconciliation” mean, and what dangers do these questions pose?

1. If we take into account that the process of reconciliation involves dealing with political, moral, economic, but also individual (civil) issues, we have to acknowledge that the political ones are decisive in their importance. Even after 65 years the issue of reconciliation still remains in the hands of political representatives. Economic and civic issues are almost completely absent from any discussion of these historical events, but without them the picture of Czech-German relations is incomplete, if not impossible to comprehend. In public discourse the whole of WWII history has been narrowed down to the “Munich betrayal” and Beneš’ decrees.
2. The process of reconciliation is defined by two factors: Communist ideology and the nature of the Czechoslovak regime in 1945-1948.

Through media and educational organs, Communist propaganda explained the transfer as a necessary and just step—from a moral as well as legal point of view. It was presented as revenge for Munich, revenge for the hardships of the war, and the only solution to the “German” problem in Czechoslovakia. In their speeches immediately after the war, all Czechoslovak politicians made references not to war but to fascism. They did not speak about the consequences of the war, nor about reconciliation with those consequences, but about the “national and democratic”, or social revolution. The phrase “social and national revolution” gradually became very popular. Communist ideology made use of it for the next 40 years.

Czechoslovakia’s experiences post-1945 show clearly what a double-edged sword democracy can be. The first tragedy of the Czechoslovak democracy after 1945 was that it became the people’s democracy; people’s in the sense of “for the people”. Not only is this clearly nonsensical—translating as “people’s power of the people”, it also invariably evoked the idea that the previous democracy had served only a part of society. This pleonasm fitted perfectly with the Communist interpretation framework, just as, initially, political democracy stemmed from the struggle against feudalism, now democracy fought against capitalism and, as such, it must necessarily evolve into a people’s democracy. The second tragedy of Czechoslovak democracy was that the word “liberal” came to mean “fascist”.

Thus, the process of Czech-German reconciliation should rather be understood, without exaggeration, as Czech society’s reconciliation with itself and



its own past. Society's point of view will not change until Czech school books and public discussions contain, at the very least, a description of these post-war events (i.e. the transfer of Germans, Poles and Hungarians) alongside the Munich Agreement and the horrors of the Nazi occupation. It will also not change until the legal and political aspects of the transfer are accompanied by a discussion of economic factors and the issue of lost civil solidarity. Until then, reconciliation cannot take place, as the majority of the Czech nation is convinced that there is no need for it.

Therefore, reconciliation with the war is primarily a question of the use and/or misuse of historical memory. It is not about reconciling oneself with others but with oneself, with one's own historical memory, with collective consciousness and/or collective unconscious.

捷克与德国尚待完成的和解

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前言

1945年二战结束,这无疑是世界现代史的一个重要里程碑。它影响了许多国家的命运,包括捷克共和国。这场战争夺去了30多万捷克斯洛伐克人的生命。¹二战后,国家的对外关系、民族构成、政治体制及经济形势都发生了变化。捷克社会如何与这些令人不安的遗留问题与国家解体问题达成和解?战争已结束了整整65年,65年后的今天,这似乎是一个纯学术性问题,但事实并非如此——捷克并没有与二战完全和解。在这个过程中,捷克(捷克斯洛伐克)社会和史学经历了三个不同的阶段:

- 1945-1948年,捷克斯洛伐克探索社会主义道路
- 1948-1989年,共产党在捷克斯洛伐克执政
- 1989年至今,捷克斯洛伐克寻找在欧洲的定位;1993后,捷克和斯洛伐克共和国选择了不同的发展道路。

这几个阶段中的一些里程碑式政治事件让和解与我们的反思更为复杂。每个阶段处理二战遗留问题都采用了不同的方法,这些问题我们可以概括如下:

- 捷克历史具有特殊性,这段历史不仅包括捷克人和德国人的复杂关系,还包括捷克人和斯洛伐克人的关系,捷克人和匈牙利人的关系
- 两次战争期间,捷克斯洛伐克遭到破坏
- 纳粹德国占领捷克斯洛伐克
- 捷克的德意志民族和捷克民族都有人与纳粹占领政府之间狼狈为奸
- 反法西斯抵抗运动
- 战后德意志民族(还有匈牙利民族和波兰民族)被驱逐出捷克斯洛伐克
- 战后赔偿问题

¹ 捷克斯洛伐克的犹太人死亡人数最多——约为26万到27.2万。更多详细内容可参见: Pavel Škorpiš, *Cesta do katastrof*, Prague, 1993.

首先,必须考虑更广泛的时间和空间背景,这不仅包括20世纪的移民活动、《凡尔赛条约》和二战期间的各种联盟,还包括1917年的俄国革命、两次世界大战结束后的社会冲突、1919年后的土地改革、奥匈帝国解体后国家的财产重新分配以及大萧条。

其次,需要指出,对这些事件的反思仍然纠结于因果关系之中——似乎捷克与德国关系的历史就只是一系列不公正的事件。就捷克(捷克斯洛伐克)社会与史学来说,任何形式的和解都受到出卖捷克的《慕尼黑协定》、捷克的德意志民族在捷克斯洛伐克解体中的积极作用及捷克人在战争期间受到迫害的负面影响。对德国人和奥地利人来说,他们的集体记忆已经被苏台德地区德意志族人的经历以及德国苏台德协会领导人的个人野心所扭曲了。整个19世纪,捷克人和德国人的共存都充满着矛盾。

在本文中,我将首先解释捷克人与战争的和解程度,然后阐述阻碍和解的因素和原因。我将使用经典的历史研究方法——按时间顺序,以倒序的形式讲述。诺贝尔文学奖得主君特·格拉斯在他的小说《剥洋葱》中与自己的过去达成了和解,和他一样,我将至少剥开捷克和历史、邻邦、原同胞以及原敌国65年来的部分和解过程。这些年来,一些政治领导人、当时的行为主体及其后代、今天的捷克人有意对其中的部分话题轻描淡写。本文将概述捷克共和国的和解之路,并涉及以下问题:谁参与了和解过程?“和解”的确切含义是什么?这些问题有无潜在危险?

I. 1989年后

在捍卫所谓的《贝奈斯法令》的背景下,与战争和解才成为捷克的公众话题。对捷克来说,在捷克-德国的关系上似乎只有两件重要的事情:《慕尼黑协定》和《贝奈斯法令》,即捷克斯洛伐克解体和驱逐苏台德地区德意志族人。讨论的时间和过程说明,历史是使政治活动合法或不合法的一个简易工具。讨论发生在1992年,当时捷克斯洛伐克开始为加入欧盟而努力。德国和奥地利表示,只有宣告《贝奈斯法令》无效,他们才愿意支持捷克斯洛伐克,但却并没有明确表示,应该宣告所有法令还是部分法令(或者也可能是部分条款)无效。另外,对于该法令应该从签署之日起无效还是从捷克斯洛伐克加入欧盟的时候起无效也没有得以明确。² 在与捷克斯洛伐克谈判的过程中,德国面对着一个问题的两个方面:补偿纳粹受害者,苏台德地区德意志族人的问题。虽然德国大众对前者毫无异议,

² 1945年4月到10月,共发布98条法令:适用于修改宪法、公共管理、公民身份、德意志和匈牙利少数民族的财产、恢复和改革国民经济、国家财政、惩罚战争罪行、帮凶和叛徒。Jan Kuklík, Benešovy dekrety z právně-historické perspektivy, Blave / Mink (eds.) Benešovy dekrety. Budoucnost Evropy a vyrovnávání se s minulostí. Prague: Cefres, 2003, p. 55.

但是由于冷战的持续,这个问题没有得到解决。对于后者,很久以来德国人一直认为是个地区性的、巴伐利亚的问题,会随着被驱逐的那代人的逝去而化解。绝大多数捷克律师和史学家认为,由于随后实施了《欧洲人权公约》(在二法并存的期间无人提出《法令》违反《公约》的异议),因此《贝奈斯法令》符合欧洲法律法规。而且,驱逐苏台德地区德意志族人是否合理合法与《贝奈斯法令》不存在必然联系,驱逐活动符合当时的法律而且受到国际社会的支持。捷克共和国对这方面的任何辩论都采取了坚定的态度,并且总是绕回到《慕尼黑协定》的问题上。这是因为,对捷克共和国来说,《慕尼黑协定》无效是决定它有权对自己当前的领土行使主权的主要条件之一。按这种合理解释,怀疑《慕尼黑协定》绝对无效必定会引发邻国对领土和财产索赔的问题。³

在和解的背景下,我们可以从新的角度看待1989年的事件。不仅共产主义垮台,更主要的是导致主要意识形态体系及其解释框架的终结。但是(与其他发生剧变的东欧国家不同),在捷克共和国,公众在谈论20世纪主要事件时的老一套观点却基本没变化。⁴他们坚持认为,由纳粹德国发起的这场战争要为所有损失和捷克后来发生的问题负责。捷克方面拒绝和苏台德地区德意志族人展开任何讨论,而是认为他们应当为捷克斯洛伐克的解体负责。不仅在纳粹德国国内,在其他国家也能找到造成这场悲惨战事及其后果的犯罪者,这种理论在当时确实是革命性的。而且显然,虽然冲突早已过去,但是冲突双方仍有人一提起二战就敏感。不管是亲历战争的人还是他们的后代,他们都认为(只有他们)在这场战争中受到了不公正对待。

早在1989年12月,瓦茨拉夫·哈维尔(Václav Havel)当选总统仅三日,就在他的柏林演讲中,向在1945-46年被驱逐出捷克斯洛伐克的苏台德地区德意志族人道歉。这表明,他认可了20世纪70年代异见人士关于驱逐行为的道德维度问题辩论的结果。他的讲话在捷克斯洛伐克激起众怒。但不幸的是,德国时值匆忙的统一过程,所以在德国没有收到预期的反应。1992年签署的捷克斯洛伐克—德国和解协议和1997年的捷克—德国和解协议目的都是废除《贝奈斯法令》。后者一贯谴责法令造成的后果,谴责其与人权相冲突,但捷克共和国始终不同意真正废除法令。从瓦茨拉夫·克劳斯(Václav Klaus)担任捷克第二任总统开始,他就呼吁,捷克共和

³ Jan Kuklík, 'Spory o platnost mnichovské dohody'. *Kauza: tzv. Benešovy dekrety. Historické kořeny a souvislosti. Tři české hlasy v diskusi*, Prague: HÚ AV ČR, 1999, p. 37.

⁴ 在波兰也有大批德意志族人被驱逐,但是为什么波兰看待此类问题的观点却发生了变化(而不像捷克没有变化),在这个问题上,通常有这样的观点:在共产主义思想存在的同时,教堂在波兰的势力一直很强大,并且是波兰主教于1965年发起了同西德的对话。

国在加入欧盟前与欧盟另外签署一个协议,这样,不管1945-1946年被驱逐的人们采取什么法律行动,捷克共和国都不会因此受到影响。2009年,随着《里斯本条约》的签署,他的想法得到了实现。

II. 1948-1989年

除了战争造成的人员死亡,捷克斯洛伐克计算了战争造成的直接和间接损失,在巴黎赔偿会议上提出115亿美元的赔偿要求,后来这个数目又提高到195亿美元。⁵但是,捷克斯洛伐克从布鲁塞尔赔偿部只收到9130万美元。冷战放慢并彻底终止了进一步的经济赔偿。具有讽刺意味的是,和盟国打交道要比和德国打交道复杂的多。当时只有德意志族人和匈牙利人的财产和土地被没收。与此相反,虽然盟国的土地和财产也受到国有化的影响,但是,按照有效的国际法律,捷克斯洛伐克只有提供相应的赔偿才有权这么做。从1945年到1982年,捷克斯洛伐克和大不列颠、美国、奥地利、瑞士、法国、比利时、荷兰、瑞典和意大利展开了谈判,签署了168个赔偿协议。⁶

但是,捷克-德国战后关系的突出问题是驱逐苏台德地区德意志族人的问题。二战后约有260-270万德意志族人从捷克和斯洛伐克迁出,约占当时从欧洲家园迁移的德国人的四分之一。从捷克斯洛伐克迁出的德意志族难民中,绝大部分都到了德国,因为奥地利认为他们是闹事者,是前纳粹分子,所以拒绝接受。⁷从立法上看,驱逐活动符合当时临时政府总理爱德华·贝奈斯(Edvard Beneš)颁布的143条法令中的若干条。捷克斯洛伐克认为,要讨论的不是驱逐的合理性和合法性问题。捷克斯洛伐克的法律立场是,这件事首先是一个国际法律问题,因为它是波茨坦会议谈判的结果。但是,在波茨坦会议之前,就已经有60万德国人被混乱地驱逐出

⁵ 都依据1938年美元对克朗的汇率。间接损失包括战争费用、人才流失、增加的医疗成本,增加的失去工作能力的人员数量和残疾人数量。

⁶ 由于流亡伦敦的捷克斯洛伐克政府的关系,捷克与英国的和解因为其给签订《慕尼黑协定》后的捷克斯洛伐克的贷款以及捷克斯洛伐克的黄金储备而复杂化。1989年后,捷克赔偿法再度提出这个问题。更多详细内容可参见:Stanislav Motl, *Kam zmizel zlatý poklad republiky*, Prague, 2003; Jan Kuklík, *Do poslední pence*, Prague, 2007.

⁷ Oliver Rathkolb, 'Potlačování a instrumentalizace vyhnání sudetských Němců a jeho opožděná recepce v Rakousku', Bláve / Mink (eds.), *Benešovy dekrety. Budoucnost Evropy a vyrovnávání se s minulostí*, Prague: Cefres, 2003, p. 98. 奥地利-捷克边境关闭前(主要因为苏联),约15.1万苏台德地区德意志族人迁到奥地利,但获得奥地利公民身份的过程很缓慢。直到20世纪50年代早期,奥地利政府打算把这些从捷克斯洛伐克、南斯拉夫、罗马尼亚、匈牙利和波兰驱逐的人员送往德国。1954年后,获得公民身份的手续才被简化。

境,其中有2万到4万人成了暴行的牺牲品。⁸ 早在1946年捷克通过了所谓的《赦免法》⁹,赦免二战后最初几个月的犯罪行为。甚至在此之前,后来的首任共产党主席克莱门特·哥特瓦尔德(Klement Gottwald)就表示,不应当调查对德意志族人(和匈牙利人)犯下的罪行,并且,如果可能的话,还应当对这些罪行保密。¹⁰

但是,“苏台德地区问题”不仅仅是二战后驱逐德意志族人的问题,它始终和《慕尼黑协定》联系在一起,因为,对捷克人来说,这些都是一个问题的两个方面。

捷克斯洛伐克如何建立与东、西德之间的关系就明确说明了这一点:尽管存在政治制度上的差异,但驱逐德意志族人和《慕尼黑协定》都是关键问题。东德早在1950年就承认《慕尼黑协定》是捷克在被胁迫的情况下签署的,1967年再度承认,它是纳粹反和平阴谋的一部分。因此,协定及其推论应当从一开始就被认为是没有约束力的。¹¹ 20世纪70年代西德加入辩论,希望在道德、政治和历史层面上与《慕尼黑协定》划清界限,但不是在法律层面上。最后,《慕尼黑协定》在1973年被宣告无效,两国解决了有关公民身份的争议性法律问题,并本着诚信的态度解决了土地与财产问题。

同时,驱逐德意志族人在德国或奥地利并没有成为学术讨论或公开辩论的主题。只在20世纪80年代,捷克斯洛伐克持不同政见者团体主要从道德层面上讨论过驱逐德意志族人的问题。

从整体上看,还值得一提的是,1945年后,捷克斯洛伐克也面对同匈牙利和波兰等邻国关系的问题。捷克斯洛伐克曾采用三种方式驱逐这些民族的人:《贝奈斯法令》、国际协定或采用集体归罪原则。第二种方式是指,《慕尼黑协定》签署后迁往捷克斯洛伐克的6000名波兰人和3万名匈

⁸ 捷克-德国历史委员会首次估算的死亡人数为2万到4万。可参见:Jaroslav Kučera, *Odsunové ztráty sudetoněmeckého obyvatelstva. Problémy jejich přesného vyčíslení*, Prague, 1992; *Konfliktní společenství, katastrofa, uvolnění*, Prague - Mních, 1997.

⁹ 法律编号115/1946 Sb. 关于捷克和斯洛伐克重获自由期间的行为合法性。

¹⁰ Jan Kuklík, 'Tzv. Benešovy dekrety z právně-historické perspektivy', Blave / Mink (eds.), *Benešovy dekrety. Budoucnost Evropy a vyrovnávání se s minulostí*. Prague: Cefres, 2003, p. 71..

¹¹ Jan Kuklík, 'Spory o platnost mnichovské dohody', *Kauza: tzv. Benešovy dekrety. Historické kořeny a souvislosti. Tři české hlasy v diskusi*, Prague: HÚ AV ČR, 1999, p. 36. 和其他苏联卫星国(即,波兰、匈牙利、保加利亚和罗马尼亚)的合约也包含类似条款。华沙条约国家的盟军占领捷克斯洛伐克以后,同一条款也纳入了捷克斯洛伐克-苏联协定。从法律理论上,1969年《维也纳条约法公约》加强了捷克斯洛伐克的立场。

牙利族人被驱逐出境。根据公民相互来往的国际协定,40万匈牙利族人被驱逐出捷克斯洛伐克。在这方面,考虑到在斯洛伐克有60万匈牙利人,而匈牙利只有6万名斯洛伐克人,匈牙利曾要求也转让土地,但是没有结果。集体问罪原则的采用使波兰人和匈牙利人被认为是德国化的民族主义帮凶。上述所有步骤都是以国家纯化、纠正《慕尼黑协定》的错误和恢复《慕尼黑协定》签署前的捷克斯洛伐克的名义实施的。捷克斯洛伐克想满足自己的部分赔偿要求无疑也是原因之一。

结论

在和解的背景下,我们可以从新的角度看待1989年所谓的天鹅绒革命。不仅要透过共产主义垮台观察事情,更主要的是要在主要意识形态体系及其解释框架崩溃的背景下看待这些事情。但是,在捷克的公众讨论中,对20世纪主要事件的解释几乎没有变化。纳粹德国发起的这场战争要为所有损失和捷克以后发生的问题负责。捷克方面拒绝和苏台德地区的德意志族人进行任何讨论,并认为他们应当为捷克斯洛伐克的解体负责。不仅在纳粹德国国内,甚至在其他国家也能找到造成这场悲惨战事及其后果的犯罪者,这种理论在当时确实是革命性的。而且显然,虽然冲突早已过去,但冲突双方仍有人一提到二战就敏感。

谁参与了和解过程?“和解”的确切含义是什么?这些问题有无潜在危险?

1. 如果考虑到和解过程包括处理政治、道德、经济还有个人(公民)问题,我们就必须承认,政治问题的重要性具有决定性意义。即使时间已经过去了65年,但和解问题仍为政治代表人物所掌握。经济和公民问题几乎完全缺失,但是不面对这些问题,我们对于捷克-德国关系的了解就是不完整的,甚至无法理解。在公共话题中,整个二战历史已缩微到“慕尼黑背叛”和《贝奈斯法令》上。
2. 和解过程包括两个重要因素:1945-48年的共产主义思想和捷克斯洛伐克政权的性质。

通过媒体和教育机构,共产党在宣传中把驱逐德意志族人解释为一个在道德和法律上必要且公正的步骤。这是共产党政权对慕尼黑的报复,对战争苦难的报复,也是解决捷克斯洛伐克境内“德国人”问题的唯一方式。战后不久,所有捷克斯洛伐克政治家在演讲中提到的不是战争而是法西斯主义。他们不谈战争后果,也不谈相关和解,而是强调“民族和民主”革命或社会革命。“社会和民族革命”这种说法逐渐流行起来。此后40年共产主义一直在使用这种说法。

捷克斯洛伐克1945年后的经历明确说明了民主可以成为双刃剑。1945年后,捷克斯洛伐克民主的第一个悲剧就是变成了所谓的人民的民主;“人民的”意指“为人民”。人民的民主被解释成“人民的人民权利”不仅非常荒谬,而且不可避免地引发一个想法,即原来的民主只服务于部分社会。这种冗语非常适合共产党的解释框架,就像最初,政治民主起源于反封建斗争一样,现在,民主反资本主义,因此,民主必然发展为人民的民主。捷克斯洛伐克民主的第二个悲剧是“自由主义”一词开始表示“法西斯主义”。

因此,毫不夸张的说,捷克-德国和解过程应理解为捷克社会与自身及其过去的和解。捷克只有在做到以下两点时,整个社会观点才会发生转变:首先当捷克在学校教科书和公众讨论中描述《慕尼黑协定》和纳粹恐怖占领时,至少也应该阐述这些战后事件,即驱逐德意志、波兰和匈牙利族人;其次当在我们法律和政治层面上讨论驱逐问题的同时,也应该提到当时的经济动机和在驱逐过程中丧失的公民团结。到那时,可能不会再有和解这一说法,因为大部分捷克国民认为不需要这样做了。

因此,战争和解主要是一个利用和/或误用历史记忆的问题。和解不是自身与他人的和解,而是与自身的和解,与自己历史记忆的和解,与集体有意识和/或集体无意识的和解。



Where was a Brandt in post-war Japan?

- The International Environment for Reconciliation in Asia in Comparison with that in Europe

Prof. Takenaka Toru

The aim of this conference was to consider the process of international reconciliation in Asia after World War II in comparison with the circumstances in Europe. The organizer sees that reconciliation in Asia, unlike that in Europe, has not yet made significant progress, even now, 65 years after the end of the war. In his view, the difference has arisen first of all from the different behavior of Japan and Germany, the two countries responsible for the catastrophe in each region, in the post-war period. At this conference, one of the focal points of the discussion was therefore the question of where this difference came from. It is well known that in West Germany Willy Brandt greatly promoted reconciliation in Europe. Thanks to his epoch-making *Ostpolitik*, the tension between West and East were eased substantially in the early 1970s. Meanwhile, no foreign policymakers of post-war Japan are usually compared with the German chancellor. This cannot be simply explained away as accidental. Japan could well have produced a statesman to equal Brandt. Both defeated nations had the common diplomatic challenge of normalizing relationships with their neighbors, and finding their way back into the international community. In fact, their pace on the road back to normalcy was similar. It was for example in September 1955 that West Germany resumed diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union, while the Japanese-Soviet Joint Declaration was issued one year later on the occasion of Premier Hatoyama Ichirō's visit to Moscow. The challenge was tackled by Brandt in West Germany, so why did he have no Japanese counterpart? I would therefore like to rephrase the issue as follows, hoping to shed light on the difference in the two countries' foreign policy: Where was post-war Japan's Brandt?

Of course, there is surely no single cause. Of various determinants, I will focus on the international environment around Japan and West Germany. What situation did both find themselves in respectively? How did the surroundings promote or impede the actions of the two countries on the international stage? It is strange that hardly any attention has been paid to the question despite its significance. It is true that historians have done a great deal of work in the field of Japanese-German comparative research, as both countries are often seen to have taken a similar historical course from the 19th century onwards. But their interest basically centers on the era before World War II, and has left the post-war period almost untouched. Concerning the political and diplomatic aspect in particular, there is hardly any literature, with the exception of investigations by M. Kōsaka and H. Ōtake, both of whom compared Japan's

and Germany's immediate post-war leaders, Yoshida Shigeru and Konrad Adenauer.¹ Naturally, I cannot fill the gap in research fully with my presentation, which will provide only an outline. Given this state of research, however, I hope it will make sense to first draw an overall, if quite rough, picture in order to give a new impetus.

The point of German *Ostpolitik* was, as it is well known, to break with the hostile policy against the Eastern block of the Adenauer administration and carry forward détente by accepting the reality of division in Europe. Brandt concluded the Moscow Treaty with the Soviet Union in 1970 to acknowledge the post-war status quo. Four months later, West Germany signed a treaty with Poland and committed itself to the controversial Oder-Neiße border. Finally, West Germany held talks with East Germany, whose existence Bonn had not even accepted up until then, and effectively acknowledged the latter as a state in the Basic Treaty of 1972. *Ostpolitik* paved the way for reconciliation with Germany's neighbors by dealing squarely with the tremendous burden of the past caused by the Nazis, and made a great contribution to stability in Europe. Brandt's kneeling down in apology in front of the ghetto monument in Warsaw was often seen to symbolize his policy. No matter how impressive his act might be, however, it is not appropriate to grasp *Ostpolitik* only from the angle of reconciliation. The aim of Brandt's foreign policy initiative was actually to lead his country out of the diplomatic dead end with which West Germany had been faced. Since its foundation in 1949 Bonn had upheld its claim as the sole representative of the German people and clung to the so-called Hallstein Doctrine. It said that West Germany rejected diplomatic ties with any country that simultaneously acknowledged the German Democratic Republic. This stiff policy line did not work out as Bonn had reckoned, but rather ended up isolating West Germany in the international community. Bonn had not been enough aware that, as the world order of the Cold War stabilized over time, the reality of the division was taken for granted by other countries. It was revealed most evidently when the Berlin Wall was built in 1961. With it, the East wanted to cement the status quo by force, and the West, filing only verbal protests, effectively gave a tacit nod. West Germany's intransigence could even be troublesome for both the USA and the Soviet Union. In fact, the scenario could not be entirely ruled out that the superpowers would make a deal at the expense of the troublemaker.² Bonn was thus faced with a stalemate and seriously needed a breakthrough.³ Brandt's answer was *Ostpolitik*. Consequently, it was primarily a strategy to open up new horizons for German foreign policy, which, given the state of affairs at the time, inevitably included reconciliation

¹ Masataka Kōsaka, 'Nihon gaikō no benshō', T. Aruga et al. (ed.), *Nihon no gaikō*, Tokyo: Tokyo UP, 1989; Hideo Ōtake, *Adenauer to Yoshida Shigeru*, Tokyo: Chūō Kōron, 1986.

² Susumu Takahashi, 'Seiō no detanto: tōhō seisaku shiron', K. Kendō et al. (eds.), *Sengo demokurashi no henyō*, Tokyo: Iwanami, 1991, p. 20.

³ Wolf D. Gruner, *Die deutsche Frage in Europa 1800-2002*, Munich: Piper, 1993, pp. 309-319.

with neighboring countries. Brandt reversed policy priorities diametrically. The Hallstein Doctrine pursued reunification as the first and foremost aim because only restoring the status pro ante would bring the abnormal state of the divided Europe to an end. But Brandt first accepted the reality of the division. For him it did not make sense to cling to reunification, which had ceased to be a meaningful goal. Instead, in his view, only by starting from the status quo and then gradually easing the tension between the blocs by practical steps would the division be overcome someday.⁴

Almost at the same time as *Ostpolitik*, Asia's international constellation changed dramatically, requiring Japan to take a new diplomatic initiative. After the war Japan had little freedom of action as its foreign policy had been dictated by the US, particularly when it came to relations with the communist bloc. Under American pressure, for example, premier Yoshida grudgingly chose Taipei, not Beijing—as he originally had wanted—as Japan's peace partner on the Chinese side in 1952. A change came with the surprising China visit by President Richard Nixon in 1972. The US-Chinese rapprochement widened the horizon for Japanese foreign policy at a stroke. Tokyo followed suit at once and brought about the normalization of relationship with Beijing in the same year. The simultaneity makes our search for a Japanese Brandt all the more legitimate. Two prime ministers should be the focus of our investigation: Tanaka Kakuei and Fukuda Takeo. Though both LDP politicians were bitter opponents in domestic politics and fierce rivals in the race for the premiership, they had the common desire of providing Japan with a new profile on the international scene. In fact, it was Tanaka who broke the ice in 1972 with his China visit and a joint statement with the Chinese hosts, and Fukuda who followed it up with the conclusion of a peace treaty in 1978. However, neither policymaker is usually regarded as equal to Brandt. What is the difference?

To begin with, we should take into account the so-called Rapallo complex in the alliance policy. When a country tries to embark on an independent policy line, one of the most crucial pre-conditions is to secure the trust of its allies. This is critically important particularly for Germany, which tends to fall between two rival power blocks owing to its geographical location. At first glance, the position may be quite advantageous geopolitically because the country in the middle is coveted by both sides. Actually, however, the central country is easily exposed to suspicion from both blocs, which can eventually result in instability in the region.⁵ This problem, often referred to as the Rapallo complex in diplomatic history, was further compounded after WWII by the latent dynamics toward a reunification of Germany. Brandt was well aware of this danger. He reiterated Germany's commitment to the Atlantic alliance and assured West-

⁴ Masamori Sase, *Nishi Doitsu no tōhō seisaku*, Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyūsho, 1973.

⁵ Gregor Schöllgen, *Die Macht in der Mitte Europas: Stationen deutscher Außenpolitik von Friedrich dem Großen bis zur Gegenwart*, Munich: C.H. Beck, 1992, pp. 46f.

ern allies that the overtures toward the East were not an attempt at *Schaukelpolitik*, or swing policy.⁶ The Western allies, who were at first fairly uneasy about independent German action, were eventually convinced. In the talks about Berlin's status among the four Allied powers that ran parallel to *Ostpolitik*, for example, the Western governments unanimously backed Bonn's position in the face of Russian opposition until conclusion of the Berlin Agreement in September 1971. It can therefore be argued that Brandt's new initiatives were made possible on the basis of Western policy towards integration beginning in the Adenauer era.

The circumstances of Japan were not the same as Germany's. For example, Germany had dealings with both the US and Continental Europe—France in particular—when it came to managing their alliances. France sometimes behaved intransigently within the Western block, and that was reflected in German domestic politics through infighting between Atlanticists and Gaullists in the last years of the Erhard administration. But for Japan “the West” meant one nation, and one nation only: the United States. That being said, it was also a big challenge for the Japanese to avoid a Rapallo situation. In fact, there was some suspicion on the part of the US of its ally's loyalty. At least until the 1960s the White House could not rule out the possibility altogether that Tokyo might take advantage of the US-Soviet confrontation or approach mainland China on its own.⁷ The post-war Japanese government therefore strived to ensure Washington's goodwill. A good example was Satō Eisaku. The premier, who stayed in office from 1964 to 1972, never shrank from supporting US Vietnam policy despite massive criticism at home. Furthermore, Satō stood by the US to the bitter end in its unilateral action to defend Taiwan's seat in the UN from Beijing's claim. His efforts paid off. In 1971 the US returned Okinawa, which had remained under American administration since war's end, to Japan. With it, the veteran politician scored the biggest success of his premiership. In contrast, it is questionable whether Tanaka was ever successful in securing the trust of his hegemonic ally.⁸ Washington obviously suspected him of supporting the strong pro-Chinese undercurrents that had run through the LDP since 1945. Prior to his visit to China, Tanaka first met President Nixon for approval. Yet even that did not wipe out the skepticism entirely. The US government was concerned that Tokyo might hastily make excessively large concessions to Beijing, particularly on the Taiwan issue.⁹ Mistrust continued to smolder

⁶ Peter Bender, *Neue Ostpolitik: Vom Mauerbau bis zum Moskauer Vertrag*, Munich: dtv, 1986, p. 161.

⁷ Osamu Ishii, ‘Nich-bei “pātonāshipu” heno dōtei 1952-1969’, C. Hosoya (ed.), *Nich-bei kankei tsūshi*, Tokyo: Tokyo UP, 1995, p. 183.

⁸ Makoto Iokibe, ‘Kokusai kankyō to Nihon no sentaku’, T. Aruga et al. (ed.), *Nihon no gaikō*, Tokyo: Tokyo UP, 1989, p. 39.

⁹ Naotaka Ikeda, *Nichibei kankei to ‘futatsu no Chūgoku’*: Ikeda, Satō, Tanaka naikaku ki, Tokyo: Bokutakusha, 2004, pp. 412ff.

as Tanaka made approaches to Moscow after his China visit.¹⁰ Pro-Arab diplomacy after the oil shock in 1973, by which Japan tried to secure its supply of oil from the Middle East, made matters worse. It looked as if Japan would abandon the accord of Western industrialized nations in favor of its own interests. The US-Japanese relationship thus cooled during Tanaka's term in office. Perhaps the premier might have done well to have been more tactful in his alliance policy, like his mentor Satō, even though he had no firm foothold within the LDP for his foreign policy.¹¹ In any event, Tanaka's diplomacy experienced a severe setback precisely where he tried to develop his own independent initiatives. When he made a tour in South East Asia in 1974, he was welcomed by anti-Japanese protests in Jakarta and other cities, which showed how deep the people's resentment was against Japanese economic expansion there.

As pointed out above, West Germany differed from Japan in its dealings with the West in that Bonn had two "Westes". The same is true in reverse for the East. While the West Germans had only one East in the shape of the Soviet Union, the Japanese had two: the Soviets and the Chinese. This difference was of grave consequence for the foreign policy of both countries. By the early 1970s, when Japan was about to seek a new role on the international stage, the relations between the two communist countries had already reached the nadir. This enormously restricted Japan's freedom of action. If Tokyo came closer to one, a harsh reaction from the other was unavoidable. Each wanted to win over Japan to get the upper hand over the other. Tokyo therefore had to perform a highly demanding balancing act so as not to be entangled in the antagonism between the two. That was why, for example, it took six long years for Japan to go from a normalized relationship with China to the formal conclusion of a treaty. During the negotiations Beijing insisted on inserting an "anti-hegemony clause" with a strongly anti-Soviet connotation into the treaty text, which was unacceptable to Tokyo.¹² For West Germany, the situation was quite simple. No one doubted that the Soviets had the final say in the Eastern bloc, which had become even clearer following the failed Prague Spring of 1968. From the beginning Brandt understood that the Soviet Union held the key to a successful *Ostpolitik* and therefore chose to talk to the Soviets first. In the subsequent negotiations with the Poles and the East Germans, Bonn could even count on Moscow's help. When the talks resulted in a standoff, the communist superpower, who attached much weight to understanding with the West¹³, often pushed its satellite nations for compromises. The power configuration in Europe was thus basically determined by the single dimension of West and East. But in Asia, the power game was multidimensional. In addition,

¹⁰ Akihiko Tanaka, *Nicchū kankei, 1945-1990*, Tokyo: Tokyo UP, 1991, p. 88.

¹¹ Kenkichirō Iwanaga, *Sengo Nihon no seitō to gaikō*, Tokyo: Tokyo UP, 1985, pp. 175f.

¹² Yū Ikei, *Nihon gaikō shi gaisetsu*, Tokyo: Keiō Tsūshin, 1982, pp. 308.

¹³ Heinrich August Winkler, *Der lange Weg nach Westen* (Vol. 2), Munich: C.H. Beck, 2000, p. 286.

the logic of international reconciliation was different in Asia. As we saw, Brandt was credited with reversing the priorities of West German foreign policy. Accepting the status quo and promoting détente were given preference over the demand for reunification. As Bonn thus took back its support for restoration of the status pro ante, its East European neighbors felt the threat of West German revanchism, as they liked to say, less acutely, laying the groundwork for reconciliation. Meanwhile, there was no room for such a policy turnabout for Japan. Except for the dispute over the Kuril Islands with the Russians, calling the post-war borders into question was never on its agenda.

One of the focal points in the Asian complex power configuration was Southeast Asia. It was meaningful that both Japanese foreign strategists' undertakings were linked to the region. Southeast Asia was one of the important targets of Tanaka's initiative even though he faltered there, and Fukuda's efforts centered on the region as well.

Fukuda made a tour in Southeast Asian countries in summer 1977. In his last station in Manila, he made public a set of principles for his foreign policy.¹⁴ His vision, which was called the Fukuda doctrine, is regarded as one of the milestones in Japan's post-war foreign relations. With it, the country articulately declared for the first time since war's end its aspiration to play an independent, constructive role in international affairs. Specifically, the doctrine aimed to push Indochina and the ASEAN into finding a way to co-exist peacefully, with Japan prepared to take the initiative in support of that aim by means of its munificent economic aid. What prompted Fukuda's move was the growing influence of Vietnam. Hanoi, backed up by the Soviet Union, seemed about to rise to the status of regional hegemonic power after it had its reunification in 1976. This alarmed its ASEAN neighbors. They, on the one hand, sought to strengthen the unity of the organization, and turned to China as a counterbalance on the other. The increasingly confrontational mood in Southeast Asia troubled Japan deeply. Tokyo was particularly concerned that the region, whose peace and stability was vitally important for Japan—both in political and economic terms—might become a proxy battle in the Chinese-Soviet rivalry. Meanwhile, the US could not be counted to act as a stabilizing power. Washington had weakened its commitment to the region after the fiasco of the Vietnam War. That was why Japan tried to step in on its own. Fukuda did not have to worry about a possible Rapallo situation. Naturally, he made the obligatory visit to the White House for approval beforehand. More importantly, the Carter administration, far from being suspicious of a Japan's initiative, expected the junior ally from the outset to step up engagement in Asia to fill the power vacuum in the region.¹⁵

¹⁴ Toshio Sudō, "Aidea" to taigai seissaku kettei ron: Fukuda dokutorin wo meguru Nihon no seisaku kettei katei, *Kikan Kokusai seiji* 108 (1995); Yasutomo Tanaka, 'Posuto Betonamu no Tōnan Ajia anteika saku to shitenō Fukuda dokutorin: Gaimushō Ajia kyoku no seisaku keisei puroseshu ni chakumoku shite', *Ajia kenkyū* 45-1 (1999).

¹⁵ Hidekazu Wakatsuki, 'Fukuda dokutorin: posuto reisen gaikō no "yokō enshū"', *Kikan kokusai seiji* 125, (2000), pp. 205f.

Fukuda and his aides were surely in high spirits as they saw the overdue opportunity finally coming for the economic giant to exert a commensurate political influence. His undertaking did not succeed in the end.¹⁶ The crisis worsened rapidly before the Japanese initiative took effect. In winter 1978 Vietnam invaded Cambodia, sending shock waves across the region. ASEAN, alarmed by the possibility of an imminent domino effect, strengthened its stance against the communist country. Tensions further intensified when a border conflict took place between China and Vietnam a few months later. Washington was alarmed by the Soviets' expansionist ambition, who seemed on the offensive worldwide. All this meant that the very situation was emerging that Fukuda wanted to prevent with his doctrine. At this juncture, Japan could not help but take sides. For Tokyo, joining forces with the US, China and ASEAN was a natural choice. The Fukuda Doctrine was thus put on ice. It took ten years till Japan could once again conceive of a constructive political role for itself in Southeast Asia.¹⁷

Fukuda's failure basically derived from the specific Asian power structure, which was, unlike Europe, a multi-dimensional constellation. Furthermore, the geopolitical conditions were, quite unfortunately for a Japanese Brandt, aggravated by unfavorable trends of the times. In the late 1970s the international political climate was deteriorating seriously, decisively exacerbated by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. In the midst of heightened tension between East and West, which was often called a new Cold War, Fukuda could hardly find a suitable setting for his vision, a marked difference from Brandt. While the Japanese premier had to swim against the tide, the German chancellor, several years earlier, was blessed with advantageous conditions. He enjoyed a mutually reinforcing relation between his *Ostpolitik* and détente and its environment because the former strengthened the latter and vice versa.

Today, 65 years have passed since the world war's end, and more than 30 years since the time of Tanaka and Fukuda. The international environment has changed a great deal, along with many of the determinant factors of Japanese foreign policy. I think, nonetheless, that there is much to learn from the past, and greatly hope that this conference has proven to be a constructive opportunity to do so.

¹⁶ Seki Tomoda, *Nyūmon Nihon gaikō: Nicchū seijōka igo*, Tokyo: Chūō Kōron, 1988, pp. 61ff.

¹⁷ Seki Tomoda, 'Nihon no Tōnan Ajia gaikō to seijiteki yakuwari no mosaku: Fukuda dokutorin kara Hashimoto inishiachibu made', S. Saitō et al. (eds.), *Higashi Ajia no chiiiki tōgō to Nihon*, Tokyo: Ajia UP, 2001, p. 82.

战后日本的勃兰特在哪里？——战后亚洲与欧洲和解国际环境之比较

竹中亨教授 Prof. Takenaka Toru

本次会议的目标是对比欧洲的情况，思考二战后亚洲的国际和解过程。组织者认为，亚洲的和解不同于欧洲，亚洲即使到二到战结束65年后的今天也没取得显著进展。产生这种差异的首要原因是，战后日本和德国为自己在各地区造成的灾难负责所采取的行动截然不同。因此，会议讨论的重点正是造成这些差异的原因。我们都知道，西德的威利·勃兰特大大推动了欧洲和解进程，这要归功于20世纪70年代早期他推出的划时代的新东方政策极大缓解了东西方间的紧张局势。而在战后的日本，却没有一个对外决策者可以和他相提并论。这不能简单地解释为偶然，日本本来也能产生像勃兰特这样的政治家。两个战败国都面临外交难题，实现和邻国关系正常化，设法回到国际社会。事实上，他们的正常化速度是相似的。例如，1955年9月，西德恢复了和苏联的关系，一年后，鸠山一郎首相访问莫斯科，发表了日苏联合声明。勃兰特在西德解决了这个难题，那么为什么日本没有出现这样的人物呢？从这个角度看，这个问题可折射出两国不同的外交政策。因此，我想把这个问题表述为：战后日本的勃兰特在哪里？

当然，原因不会是单一的。决定因素有很多，我重点讲述的是日本和西德的国际环境。两国各处于什么样的国际环境？这种环境是如何促进或阻碍了两国在国际舞台上的行动？奇怪的是，尽管这个问题很重要，却几乎没受到任何关注。史学家们确实在日德比较研究领域做了大量工作，因为大家通常认为两国自19世纪以后都走了相似的历史道路。但是他们的研究主要针对二战前，战后几乎没有涉及。尤其在政治和外交方面，几乎没有什么文献，只有M. Kōsaka和H. Ōtake对日本和德国的战后领导首相吉田茂和康拉德·阿登纳进行了比较研究。¹ 我的报告自然无法完全填补研究中的空白，只能做一个概述，但是，鉴于这种研究情况，即使这份报告比较粗略，我也希望能够先提供一个概要，以推动这方面的研究。

众所周知，德国的新东方政策主张摒弃始于阿登纳政府对东欧集团的敌视政策，承认欧洲分裂，改善与苏东国家及民主德国的关系。1970年，勃兰特和苏联签订了《莫斯科条约》，承认战后欧洲各国边界现状。四个月后，西德与波兰签署条约，承认充满争议的奥德—尼斯河边界。最终，

¹ Masataka Kōsaka, 'Nihon gaikō no benshō', T. Aruga et al. (ed.), *Nihon no gaikō*, Tokyo: Tokyo UP, 1989; Hideo Ōtake, *Adenaua to Yoshida Shigeru*, Tokyo: Chūō Kōron, 1986.

西德和东德开展多次对话,直至1972年双方签署了《基础条约》,此前一直不承认民主德国的联邦德国才有效承认了东德的国家地位。新东方政策通过直接面对纳粹造成的巨大历史负担,为实现德国与邻国的和解奠定了基础,并为欧洲的稳定做出巨大贡献。勃兰特在华沙犹太人死难纪念碑前跪拜道歉常常被看作是其政策的象征。然而,不管他的行为的影响有多么深远,仅仅从和解的角度看东方政策是不全面的。勃兰特的外交政策实际是想让西德摆脱其面临的外交困境。联邦德国从1949年成立伊始,就坚持认为自己才是德国的唯一代表,推行所谓的哈尔斯坦主义,即西德拒绝和任何一个承认民主德国的国家建立或保持外交关系。这种僵化的政策路线并没有像联邦德国期望的那样发挥作用,反而让西德在国际社会渐渐陷于孤立。西德并没有充分认识到,随着时间的推移,冷战期间国际秩序趋于稳定,其他国家已经承认了两个德国的现实。1961年柏林墙的建立就是一个最突出的说明。东德试图通过这种方式强制性地稳定现状,西德则只给予了口头抗议,这实际上就是一种默许。西德的强硬态度甚至对美国 and 苏联都是一个麻烦。事实上,不能完全排除超级大国以牺牲麻烦制造者的利益为代价达成某种协议。² 联邦德国因此面临僵局,急需突破。³ 勃兰特的回应就是新东方政策,因此,从根本上说,这其实是开启德国外交政策新局面的策略。鉴于当时的国家形势,外交政策不可避免地要涉及西德与邻国和解的问题。勃兰特设置了与阿登纳时期截然相反的政策重点。阿登纳时期的哈尔斯坦主义把德国统一当作首要目标,因为只有恢复德国的统一状态才能结束欧洲分裂的非正常状态。而勃兰特首先承认了德国的分裂。在他看来,坚持统一已经不再有意义,相反,只有从认可分裂开始,通过实际行动逐渐缓解东西两大集团间的紧张关系,才能在以后结束德国的分裂状态。⁴

几乎在德国实行新东方政策的同时,亚洲国际局势发生了巨大变化,要求日本采取新的外交政策。战后的日本几乎没有行动自由,因为其外交政策一直受美国支配,尤其在处理与共产主义集团的关系上。迫于美国压力,例如吉田首相1952年不得不选择台湾,而非中国大陆(他的初衷)作为其中国方面的和平伙伴。1972年尼克松访华给国际关系带来新的变化,中美关系的缓和拓宽了日本外交政策的范围。随后,日本立即追随美国,于同年实现与中国关系正常化。这种同时性提高了我们寻找日本勃兰特的合理性。我们研究重点应该放在两位首相身上:福田赳夫和田中角荣。虽然两

² Susumu Takahashi, 'Seiō no detanto: tōhō seisaku shiron', K. Kendō et al. (eds.), *Sengo demokurashi no henyō*, Tokyo: Iwanami, 1991, p. 20.

³ Wolf D. Gruner, *Die deutsche Frage in Europa 1800-2002*, Munich: Piper, 1993, pp. 309-319.

⁴ Masamori Sase, *Nishi Doitsu no tōhō seisaku*, Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyūsho, 1973.

位自民党政治家在国内外政治中是死对头,在竞选首相时水火不容,但都有一个共同愿望,那就是让日本在国际舞台上有一个崭新的形象。事实上,是田中于1972年访问中国并与中国签署联合声明,打破了中日关系的僵局。福田紧随其后,于1978年与中国缔结《中日友好和平条约》。然而,通常没有人认为这两位决策者是日本的勃兰特。为什么会产生这种差别呢?

首先,我们应该考虑联盟政策中的所谓拉帕洛情结。如果一个国家试图走自主政策路线,最重要的前提之一就是要确保同盟的信任。这对德国尤为重要,因为德国的地理位置正处在两大敌对势力集团之间。从地缘政治的角度来看,德国地理位置应该是十分优越的,因为两个集团都想争取位于中间的国家。而实际上中间国家很容易受到两个势力集团的怀疑,所以最终可能会给该地区造成不稳定。⁵ 这个问题在外交史中常常被称为拉帕洛情结,而二战后德国趋向统一的潜在动向使这一问题进一步复杂化。勃兰特深知这种危险,他重申了对大西洋联盟的承诺,并让西方盟友相信,对东方采取这种态度并不是要实行“摇摆政策”。⁶ 西方盟友起初对德国独立的外交行动感到非常不安,但是最终也被说服了。例如,执行新东方政策同时,美英法苏四个二战同盟国在讨论西柏林的地位时,虽然面对苏联的反对,但西方国家还是一致支持联邦德国的立场,直到1971年9月签署《西柏林协定》。因此可以说,始于阿登纳时代的西方国家推行的一体化政策相当于为勃兰特的新动议提供了可能性。

日本的情况和德国不同。德国在维护联盟关系方面,要和美国、欧洲大陆、特别是法国有往来。法国在西方集团内偶尔的不妥协也对德国国内政策产生了影响,民主德国总理艾哈德当政最后几年大西洋主义者和戴高乐主义者的内讧就能体现这一点。但是,对日本来说,“西方”是一个国家,且只有一个:美国。因此,日本也面临避免拉帕洛形势的巨大挑战。事实上,美国对其盟友的忠诚度是有些怀疑的。至少直到20世纪60年代,白宫不能完全排除日本利用美苏对抗或自行发展与中国大陆关系的可能性。⁷ 因此,战后日本政府努力确保美国的友善。佐藤荣作就是一个很好的例子。他于1964年到1972年任日本首相,在这期间他始终坚定支持美国的越南政策,尽管在国内备受批评。而且,佐藤荣作不顾中国的要求,和美国一起单边捍卫台湾在联合国的席位。他的努力得到了回报。1971年,美国把冲绳归还日本,冲绳自二战结束就一直归美国政府管辖。这让这位老政

⁵ Gregor Schöllgen, *Die Macht in der Mitte Europas: Stationen deutscher Außenpolitik von Friedrich dem Großen bis zur Gegenwart*, Munich: C.H. Beck, 1992, pp. 46f.

⁶ Peter Bender, *Neue Ostpolitik: Vom Mauerbau bis zum Moskauer Vertrag*, Munich: dtv, 1986, p. 161.

⁷ Osamu Ishii, 'Nich-bei "pātonāshippu" heno dōtei 1952-1969', C. Hosoya (ed.), *Nich-bei kankei tsūshi*, Tokyo: Tokyo UP, 1995, p. 183.



治家获得了他首相生涯中最大的成功。相反,田中是否成功确保了霸权盟友的信任是存有争议的。⁸ 华盛顿方面显然怀疑他支持强大的亲中暗流,这股暗流自1945年以来就一直在自民党内存在。访问中国前,田中首先拜访了尼克松请求他的批准。但是,即便如此,也没完全消除美国的怀疑。美国政府担心,日本可能会仓促对中国做出巨大妥协,尤其在台湾问题上。⁹ 继访问中国后,田中又前往莫斯科,不信任的气氛继续蔓延。¹⁰ 1973年石油危机后,日本为确保中东的石油供应,采取了亲阿拉伯外交政策,这让形势进一步恶化。看起来,日本似乎要放弃跟西方工业国家的和谐一致,转而追求自己的利益。因此,田中就任首相期间,日美关系一度冷淡。如果田中在同盟政策中处理的更加巧妙,就像他的导师佐藤那样,那么他会获得更大的成功,即使他的外交政策在自民党中并没有获得稳定的支持。¹¹ 无论如何,田中在试图发展自己的独立动议中经历了外交重创。1974年他访问东南亚国家的时候,在雅加达等城市遭遇反日抗议活动,从这可以看出,人们非常不欢迎日本在东南亚进行经济扩张。

如前所述,西德在处理与西方国家关系中跟日本不同,因为有两个“西方”。反过来,对东方来说也是一样。西德只有一个东方,就是苏联,日本有两个:苏联和中国。这个区别对两国的外交政策产生了重要影响。到20世纪70年代早期,日本要在国际舞台上发挥新作用的时候,中苏两个共产主义国家的关系恰巧走入最低谷。这极大限制了日本的行动自由。如果跟其中一个国家的关系密切,另一个国家势必做出强烈反应。两个国家都想在与日本关系上占得上风。因此,日本必须高度权衡自己的行动,才能避免卷入两国的敌对形势。这就是为什么,比如,日本从实现和中国关系正常化到正式签订条约,花了长达六年的时间。谈判中,中国坚持添加“反霸权条款”,在条约文本中强烈折射出反苏含义,这是日本不能接受的。¹² 西德的情况却非常简单。苏联在东部集团拥有毫无争议的最终决定权,这一点在1968年捷克的布拉格之春运动失败后就更加明确了。从一开始,勃兰特就认为苏联对新东方政策的成功十分关键,因此首先选择与苏联对话。之后在与波兰以及东德的谈判中,西德甚至可以依靠苏联的帮

⁸ Makoto Iokibe, 'Kokusai kankyō to Nihon no sentaku', T. Aruga et al. (ed.), *Nihon no gaikō*, Tokyo: Tokyo UP, 1989, p. 39.

⁹ Naotaka Ikeda, *Nichibei kankei to 'futatsu no Chūgoku'*: Ikeda, Satō, Tanaka naikaku ki, Tokyo: Bokutakusha, 2004, pp. 412ff.

¹⁰ Akihiko Tanaka, *Nicchū kankei, 1945-1990*, Tokyo: Tokyo UP, 1991, p. 88.

¹¹ Kenkichirō Iwanaga, *Sengo Nihon no seitō to gaikō*, Tokyo: Tokyo UP, 1985, pp. 175f.

¹² Yū Ikei, *Nihon gaikō shi gaisetsu*, Tokyo: Keiō Tsūshin, 1982, pp. 308.

助。当谈判产生对峙时,这个重视和西方达成谅解¹³的共产主义超级大国经常促使其卫星国家做出让步。因此,欧洲格局基本由东西方单向决定。但是在亚洲,这种力量博弈是多维的。亚洲的国际和解逻辑也不同。我们看到,勃兰特为西德设置了与阿登纳截然相反的外交政策重点,即接受现状和促进关系缓和优于统一。由于西德不再坚持恢复先前状态,其东欧邻国对他们所谓的“西德复仇主义”的威胁感越来越少,为和解奠定了基础。同时,日本没有这种政策转折余地。因为除了与俄罗斯有千岛群岛争端,日本从来就没有质疑战后边界的问题。

亚洲复杂的力量格局的重点之一是东南亚。有意思的是,福田和田中两位首相的工作都和该地区联系密切。东南亚是田中措施的重要目标之一,虽然他在这里迟疑过,而福田的目标也是这个地区。

1977年福田出访东南亚国家。在最后一站马尼拉,他宣布了一套外交政策原则。¹⁴这套被称为福田主义的观点成为日本战后外交关系的里程碑。自此,日本在战后第一次明确宣布,日本要在国际事务中发挥自主的建设性作用。这套思想主要是为了推动印度支那和东盟找到和平共存的途径,日本通过优厚的经济援助来促进这一目标的实现。福田之所以提出这个动议,是因为越南的影响在不断扩大。在苏联的支持下,越南从1976年统一后,似乎要取得区域霸权。它的发展让东盟邻国感到不安。他们一方面努力加强该组织的团结,另一方面又借中国的力量实现制衡。东南亚日益高涨的对抗气氛深深困扰着日本。日本特别关注该地区,因为它的和平与稳定对于日本的政治经济极为重要,而且有可能成为中苏对抗的代理战。同时,不可能指望美国成为一个稳定力量。越南战争惨败后,美国已经减少了对该地区的承诺。这就是日本试图自行涉入的原因。福田不必担心可能会出现拉帕洛形势。当然,他还是必须事先访问白宫以获得批准。更重要的是,卡特政府不但不怀疑日本的措施,反而希望这个初级盟友加强对亚洲事务的参与,以填补其在该地区的权力真空。¹⁵

福田及其领导班子非常高兴,因为他们终于等到了这一重要机会,可以让日本这个经济巨人发挥相应的政治影响。但是,他的努力最终并

¹³ Heinrich August Winkler, *Der lange Weg nach Westen* (Vol. 2), Munich: C.H. Beck, 2000, p. 286.

¹⁴ Toshio Sudō, “‘Aidea’ to taigai seissaku kettei ron: Fukuda doktorin wo meguru Nihon no seissaku kettei katei”, *Kikan Kokusai seiji* 108 (1995); Yasutomo Tanaka, ‘Posuto Betonamu no Tōnan Ajia anteika saku to shitenō Fukuda doktorin: Gaimushō Ajia kyoku no seissaku keisei purosesu ni chakumoku shite’, *Ajia kenkyū* 45-1 (1999).

¹⁵ Hidekazu Wakatsuki, ‘Fukuda doktorin: posuto reisen gaikō no “yokō enshū”’, *Kikan kokusai seiji* 125, (2000), pp. 205f.



没成功。¹⁶ 日本的措施生效之前,危机就已经迅速恶化。1978年冬,越南入侵柬埔寨,给该地区造成严重冲击。东盟对迫在眉睫的战争冲突的骨牌效应感到震惊的同时,更加坚定了反对共产主义国家的立场。几个月后,中国越南发生边界冲突,紧张局势进一步加剧。苏联似乎对全球虎视眈眈的扩张主义野心惊动了美国。这些都意味着,福田想要用福田主义来避免的事态正在发展当中。在这个关键时候,日本帮不上忙,但必须表明立场。如果与美国站在一起,自然要选择中国和东盟。福田主义因此被搁置。直到10年以后,日本才又等到时机可以在东南亚发挥建设性政治作用。¹⁷

福田的失败主要源于亚洲的权力结构和欧洲不同,它的格局是多维的。而且,地缘政治条件非常不利于产生日本的勃兰特,当时的不利趋势又进一步加剧了这种不利形势。20世纪70年代后期,国际政治气候严重恶化,1979年苏联入侵阿富汗进一步恶化了这种局势。在东西方关系十分紧张的时期——常被称作“新冷战”,福田很难找到有利的环境实现其想法,这和勃兰特有着显著区别。日本首相要逆流而上,而勃兰特早在几年前就拥有了得天独厚的条件。他的新东方政策和推动关系缓和加强及其环境,前者加强了后者,反之亦然。

今天,战争已经结束了65年,田中和福田时代也已经过去了30多年。国际环境已经发生了巨大变化,日本外交政策的很多决定因素也发生了巨大变化。尽管如此,我认为,我们仍要汲取很多历史教训,并且非常希望本次会议在推动和解方面能发挥积极作用。

¹⁶ Seki Tomoda, *Nyūmon Nihon gaikō: Nicchū seijōka igo*, Tokyo: Chūō Kōron, 1988, pp. 61ff.

¹⁷ Seki Tomoda, 'Nihon no Tōnan Ajia gaikō to seijiteki yakuwari no mosaku: Fukuda dokutorin kara Hashimoto inishichibu made', S. Saitō et al. (eds.), *Higashi Ajia no chiiki tōgō to Nihon*, Tokyo: Ajia UP, 2001, p. 82.

■ Is Reconciliation Feasible at All?

Prof. Cha Ha Soon

With the end of World War II, Asian-African colonies regained their sovereignty, but the moral debt which former imperialistic powers owed them was not substantially repaid. One of the main reasons is that their political leaders still refuse to acknowledge wrongdoing during colonial rule. I believe that the default on moral debt is the main obstacle to reconciliation between East Asian nations. Imperialistic aggression is a historical reality which cannot possibly be erased or changed. Only straightforwardness can serve as the basis for true friendship and genuine reconciliation between once hostile nations. A structural change in consciousness is absolutely required. It is evident that “history is too powerful a force in our consciousness”.¹ In order to determine the whole truth about past misdeeds, and to diminish the burden of historic crime, the governments and leading politicians responsible must acknowledge them, and be ready to open the relevant documents and archives fully and publicly to the world.

What choices must be made to achieve coexistence? What must we do for true reconciliation, collective solidarity and eventual peace? The age of imperialism wherein nations aspired to attain hegemony and expansion is now over. It is time for the human community to search together for the solutions to common problems. The lessons we learn from history should contribute to a better future. The past provides us wisdom for the present and hope for a better future. Reflections upon the past should be made not because of a meaningless obsession with times gone by, but for the acquisition of precious lessons for the future. Without remorse and repentance for the colonial rule by former imperialist nations, there will be no true reconciliation. Particularly, the elite and the powerful must understand the historical reality that has been explored through a professional historical methodology using objective critical standards. History plays “a crucial role in the formation and maintenance of collective identities”.² In this, historians and history teachers have an important and profound social role to play.

I. Significance of the mainstream establishment

There is a spectrum in the attitude of political leaders toward their own countries’ transgression. Different stances are taken in Britain, Germany, Russia and Japan. A good example of straightforward regret is found in German

¹ John Tosh, *The Pursuit of History*, Longman, 1984, p. 8.

² Georg G. Iggers, ‘The Uses and Misuses of History: The Responsibility of the Historian, Past and Present’, *Making Sense of Global History*, Sølvi Sogner (ed.), Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2001, p. 311.

politics. In 1949 the West German government began to acknowledge wrongs committed during the Nazi era, compensating the victims of Nazism for their sufferings. In the 1960s Willy Brandt initiated the so-called *Ostpolitik* policy by normalizing relationships with neighboring nations despite the Cold War. In December 1970 he went to Poland to sign the Treaty of Warsaw, and visited a monument to the Nazi-era Warsaw Ghetto Uprising. To the great surprise of attending dignitaries and press photographers, Brandt, after laying down a wreath, knelt and remained in that position (Warsaw Genuflection; *Warschauer Kniefall*). He later recalled: "Under the weight of recent history, I did what people do when words fail them. In this way I commemorated millions of murdered people." This was a truly genuine gesture of humility and penance. His act was a vital step in bridging the rifts that World War II created between Germany and Eastern Europe.

There is another analogy. Poland was trampled by two totalitarian states during World War II. After Hitler attacked Poland on September 1, 1939, German armies overran Poland in three weeks, the Soviets moving in almost simultaneously to claim their share of the spoils. "Both eliminated all intellectuals and potential leaders", and in April 1940 the Soviets massacred "4,400 Polish officers who fell into their hands in the Forest of Katyn".³ The discrepancy in perceptions of this incident has long been a hindrance to reconciliation between Poland and Russia.

It was in the late 1980s, however, that the ice began to break. In 1989, Russian scholars revealed that Stalin had indeed ordered the massacre; in 1990, Mikhail Gorbachev conceded that the Soviet secret police had executed the Poles, and confirmed the massacre as well as two other burial sites. Finally, in 1991 and 1992, Boris Yeltsin released a cache of top-secret documents related to the massacre, transferring them to the new Polish President Lech Wałęsa.

But by the late 1990s, the situation again turned sour. In 1998 Russia raised the issue of deaths of Russian prisoners of war in Polish camps during the period 1919–1924. Additionally, a number of Russian politicians continued to deny all Soviet guilt for Katyn, called the released documents fakes, and insisted that the original Soviet version of events—Polish citizens were shot by Germans in 1941—was the correct one.

With the new century, the pendulum swung back again. In early 2005 the Russian Federation concluded a decade-long investigation of the massacre, and confirmed the deaths of Polish citizens at the hands of the Soviets. In 2008, Russian courts consented to hear a case about the declassification of documents and the judicial rehabilitation of the victims. In an interview, Vladimir Putin called Katyn a political crime. But it was a more recent tragedy that inadvertently became a catalyst for a complete review of the case: On April

³ Michael Howard, 'Europe in the Age of the Two World Wars', Michael Howard / William Roger Louis (eds.), *The Oxford History of the Twenty Century*, New York: Oxford University Press: 1998, pp. 111-112.

10, 2010, a plane carrying Polish President Lech Kaczyński and his retinue crashed. The plane's passengers, none of whom survived, were on their way to Russia to attend the ceremony marking the 70th anniversary of the Katyn massacre. The disaster had a profound impact on the international community as well as the Russian leadership. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev attended the funeral and also acknowledged that the Katyn incident was a Stalinist crime. Within a month of the plane crash, he instructed that the relevant documents should be opened to the public. This decision on the Russian side to reveal the historical truth promoted a mood of reconciliation between the two countries.

Now, we have to bear in mind that Brandt's gesture and Russian leaders' integrity did not result in infamy or damage of any kind to their countries and peoples. Their words and actions did no harm to their political career, nor did they do harm to their nations' standing in the international community. Rather, they burnished their reputation as a statesman, and reputations of their nations as responsible countries worthy of international respect.

In its treatment of the past, Japan is a sharp contrast. Japanese leaders never sincerely reflected on history, thus fostering antagonism and resentment in neighboring nations. Their reluctance to admit past wrongdoing can be traced back to postwar American foreign policy. The US occupation of Japan served, "almost by default, to define a new structure of East Asian international relations".⁴ As soon as the Showa Emperor announced the end of the war in his historic speech, the US was prepared to exempt Japan from war guilt. The Japanese sovereign reportedly had decided to apologize formally to the SCAP (Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers), General Douglas MacArthur, for Japan's actions during World War II, and to assume sole responsibility for every political and military decision made in the conduct of the war. When the emperor arrived at the US occupations General Headquarters, however, MacArthur refused to admit or acknowledge him. In addition, he confirmed that the emperor's abdication would not be necessary.

Thus, Japanese leaders as well as the mainstream establishment were not given cause for second thoughts on their history of misconduct, when "Japanese officials below the top leadership levels were not purged, and the bureaucratic structure was kept intact by the occupation authorities".⁵ Douglas MacArthur and his staff played a primary role in giving immunity to all members of the imperial family implicated in the war, and to bacteriological research units in exchange for germ warfare data based on human experimentation. The San Francisco Treaty (ratified on September 8, 1951) declared that "the state of war between Japan and each of the Allied Powers is terminated" (Art. 1), but did not press for acknowledgment that Japan was guilty of aggression and war. Events in Korea and Japan were thus closely connected, and in the early

⁴ Akira Iriye, 'East Asia', M. Howard / W. R. Louis (ed.), *The Oxford History of the Twenty Century*, p. 206.

⁵ Iriye, 'East Asia', p. 206.

1950s there was established what later became known as the “San Francisco system” to guard against the Soviet Union’s influence in East Asia.⁶

Keeping these factors in view, Japanese leaders were not prepared to accept critical historical analysis, instead preferring to glorify the past for expediency’s sake. This anachronistic perception of history has affected the compilation of textbooks, the orientation of public opinion, and prevented the general public from correctly understanding history. Thus, the mainstream establishment’s interpretations “penetrate everywhere through school textbooks, the press and television”.⁷

Japanese leaders expressed remorse, within the boundaries of a double standard. They acknowledged Japan’s past wrongdoing on the one hand, but on the other they justified its militaristic history. For example: in 1957 Prime Minister Kishi (1896–1987) apologized to the people of Burma and Australia, Korea and China “with deep regret” and “with a desire to atone, if only partially, for the pain suffered”. In June 1965, signing the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea, Foreign Minister Shiina (1898-1979) confessed: “In our two countries’ long history there have been unfortunate times, it is truly regrettable and we are deeply remorseful.” From the 1970s up to now, the Japanese leaders have not acknowledged that in the past, Japan, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations, and nor have they shown a readiness to face sincerely the facts of history. To the contrary, the Japanese authorities have invariably glorified the imperialistic past and classified related official documents concerning comfort women, forced labor, territorial incursions, and colonial extortion. Political leaders in positions of responsibility disguised the forced annexation of Korea under a legal pretext. In November 1965, for example, Prime Minister Sato (1901-1975) said repeatedly in the Japanese Diet that he believed the Korea-Japan annexation treaty was concluded on an equal footing and in free will. The full disclosure of the related archives would clarify the past reality and due responsibility therewith.

Political leaders are the actors who hold sway over national and international issues. How they perceive past historical reality works to a greater extent to shape the formation of national consciousness, and popular understanding of the international scene. Whether historical problems result in national benefits or create international crises depends on their perception of history. It is still more important to emphasize that political leaders play an important role in making national decisions and in leading the public opinion. A universally valid perception is a prerequisite for them to engage in reconciliation with neighbors in support of such shared values as liberal democracy and human rights.

⁶ Iryiye, ‘East Asia’, pp. 208-209.

⁷ Tosh, *The Pursuit of History*, p. 8.

II. Toward an East-Asian community of historians

Another key to reconciliation is historians themselves. Historians should deconstruct myth-making about the past, a practice which is fundamentally incompatible with learning from the past: "We have seen over and over again how historical myths have affected political behavior".⁸ Or as the historian Tosh commented: "So the historian has a significant negative function in undermining myths which simplify or distort popular interpretations of the past. In this role he has been likened to the eye-surgeon, specializing in removing cataracts".⁹ In addition to this negative function, the historian positively explores the myths of other societies. He needs to understand the relationship of his own society with other societies in the context of a wider civilization and all civilizations.¹⁰ The historian's ability to step outside his or her self-centered assumptions and into the shoes of other countries which inherit different historical traditions is indispensable to the understanding of other cultures.

Historical study in the age of nationalism contributed to the formation of national identity. This is exactly what historians did in the case of the Prussian school. "Historians went into the archives not so much to be guided by the sources as to find support for their arguments which preceded their research."¹¹ The Germans were not alone in the instrumentalization of scholarship. In rapidly modernizing countries such as Japan, national history gained an ascendant status in the educational curriculum, and education in history was under strict government control. "Indeed history is probably a stronger force than language in the molding of national consciousness. This was certainly so during the nineteenth century when the growth of nationalism reached its climax on the European continent at the same time as history was assuming a pivotal position in education and research."¹² In a word, "a powerful alliance was forged between historical scholarship and officially approved nationalism". Loyalty to the nation tended to be a supreme value, and it was encouraged through history education.

But all of this has changed. Hyper-nationalism is definitely on the wane. Because the world has become far more integrated and demographically mixed than ever before, and the traditional idea of national border is not as distinctive as before, the whole concept of national identity has to be revised. "The point is that of all the baggage inherited from nineteenth century political thought, it is the notion of a unified, coherent, homogeneous national identity that is now undergoing the most rethinking, and this change is being felt in every sphere

⁸ Iggers, 'The Uses and Misuses of History', p. 317.

⁹ Tosh, *The Pursuit of History*, p. 17.

¹⁰ Arthur Marwick, *The Nature of History*, Macmillan, 1970, p. 13.

¹¹ Iggers, 'The Uses and Misuses of History', p. 315.

¹² Tosh, *The Pursuit of History*, p. 3.

of society and politics.”¹³ But we need “a special exercise of precision and prudence to distinguish between a natural, proper, legitimate sense of nationality and a pathological, tyrannical, even murderous nationalism”.¹⁴ Michael Oakeshott advised historians to abandon their pursuit of ideologies or myths in order to forge a national identity.¹⁵

Since the end of the twentieth century, a transnational and global approach has tended to prevail in the historical discipline. The shift to transnationalism is not new. Nineteenth century thinkers such as Ernest Renan emphasized the existence of common culture of humanity before a nation, looking forward to the appearance of a European community (Etats-Unis d'Europe). As European integration began to make progress in the 1950s, a change of historical perception followed. UNESCO led the way to the resolution of tension surrounding historiography. Important steps on the long path to international understanding included the 1951 “Franco-German Agreement on Controversial Issues in European History” and the 1975 “Recommendations for History and Geography Textbooks in the Federal Republic of Germany and the People's Republic of Poland”. In 1975 the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research (GEI) was established to contribute to the reconciliation and peace education by organizing bilateral or multilateral conferences for textbooks with neighboring nations, particularly with former enemies. More than a half century of perseverance has brought about a series of dialogues between historians seeking a balanced paradigm for history education.

The European example hints at the orientation we should take in East Asia. Genuine reconciliation is based on two principles: the abandonment of centrality and the acknowledgment of equality. There is no center or periphery. Hegemony is not admissible, and superiority, whether political or cultural, is meaningless. All nations are a peer group, existing on an equal basis; in fact, a nation is a center in and of itself. Every country has to acknowledge its counterpart as equal and equivalent, not only in terms of sovereignty, but also in terms of history. No country's rights surpass that of another. Substitution of one's position for another's is the principle of mutual respect. In Hobbes's words, the breach of this principle is what we call pride. He went on to say: “Whatsoever right any man requireth to retain, he allows every other man to retain the same.”¹⁶ This may as well apply to the nations aspiring for reconciliation, which hinges on the principle of equality and reciprocity between “you”

¹³ Edward W. Said, *Humanism and Democratic Criticism*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p. 24.

¹⁴ Gertrude Himmelfarb, ‘Is National History Obsolete?’, *The New History and the Old*, London: Belknap Press, 1987, p. 141.

¹⁵ Michael Oakeshott, ‘Historical Change’, *On History and Other Essays*, New Jersey: Barnes and Noble Book, 1983, p. 100.

¹⁶ Thomas Hobbes, ‘De Corpore Politico, or the Elements of Law’, *Hobbes' Tripos, The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Vol. IV*, Sir William Molesworth (ed.), London, 1890, (Second Reprint: Scientia Verlag Aalen, 1966), p. 104.

and “I”. Both of us are incomplete data sets, separate and independent entities that can approach a few steps closer, interact, and encounter.¹⁷ The true relationship between “you” and “I” has its being in the act of sharing a common universe of discourse.¹⁸ Every nation, regardless of population, resource, economy, and political influence, is an equal partner. That is, without “I” there is no “you”, and without “you” no “I”.

History by nature is “an ongoing dialogue”.¹⁹ It is a dialogue not only between present and past, but also between perspectives. But, it is not history that thinks and makes judgments, but individual human beings, particularly professionally trained historians.²⁰ Therefore, historians should play a central role in historical dialogue. Every dialogue is open and reciprocal, but has to be executed with a global perspective. We see in history that the most outstanding historians “extended their research and their subject matters beyond national boundaries”.²¹ Transnational cooperation between historians can minimize prejudices produced by nationalistic values and regional superiority complexes. Their historical understanding can build up a consensus through joint research efforts and an active exchange of views. It is true that “historical dialogue is not only spontaneous, but has developed rules and organized forms in order to create propitious conditions for discussion among historians”.²² Therefore, it should be institutionalized at the international level; that is, a transnational community of historians in East Asia. Collective efforts for this goal can be achieved in three stages: 1. The national committees of the CISH (International Committee of Historical Sciences) in East Asian countries are instrumental for a larger organization; 2. regional conferences to be held periodically on the principle of reciprocity; 3. the multinational organization of East Asian historians as a whole should, finally, be given structure.

Historians, along with other intellectuals, must make use of their knowledge and mobilize their systematic capacity for reconciliation and stability in East Asia. An international community of responsible historians in East Asia has to be one which has a global vision. It should be an intellectual alliance pressing for collective cooperation.

Concluding remarks

East Asia has enjoyed a common cultural background throughout its long history. Nevertheless, each country differs in its process of historical develop-

¹⁷ Ernst Cassirer, *The Logic of the Humanities* (1942), Clarence Smith Howe (trans.). New Haven: Yale UP, 1961, pp. 109-110.

¹⁸ Cassirer, p. 112.

¹⁹ Iggers, ‘The Uses and Misuses of History’, p. 316.

²⁰ Michael Howard, *The Lessons of History*, Yale University Press, 1991, p. 198.

²¹ Karl Dietrich Erdmann, *Toward a Global Community of Historians*, New York: Berghahn Books, 2005, p. 3.

²² Erdmann, *Toward a Global Community*, Author’s Preface, xiii.

ment. However, it is obvious that East Asia as a whole is moving towards common prosperity and sustainable stability. The problems of historical perception do not begin, nor end, with simple questions like who invaded whom, or what the reasons were for that invasion. The perception gaps can only be closed through profound consideration of why the values of freedom, independence, sovereignty, and human rights were trampled so brutally. Some Japanese still stubbornly adhere to a shallow understanding of their national past, and their commitment to the principles of human dignity and rights has not been sufficiently definite. Japanese perception of imperialistic aggression and colonial rule in East Asia has been ambivalent, showing no signs of radical transformation. The question of perception is also linked to a resurgence of conservatism in Japan.

The year 2010 is an apt time for reconciliation. It is not only the 65th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, but also the 100th anniversary of the Japanese annexation of Korea. On this occasion, the Japanese emperor as a sovereign must, on the behalf of the Japanese nation, make a public statement that his nation ought to be liable for every political and military decision made by the Japanese government during World War II, and for the past misconduct during its colonial rule. If a nation prides itself on its ability to recognize teachable moments, it must reflect on what happened in history, and let the lessons of history, be they good or bad, be known to the world by explaining the follies of the past.

We are searching for a new path by which to understand human society and the world at large. For this, historians have a most serious responsibility. They exercise imagination and judgment not only to recreate our past, but to understand the divergent structures of other societies. In this respect, as the renowned British historian Michael Howard pointed out, "We must distinguish between how history is studied by the professional historians and what history is taught to the laity".²³ "If we are properly to educate the laity it is not enough to awaken an interest in the past to provide them with an agreeable leisure occupation. It is not enough to provide for them scholarly exercise in the handling of evidence on which they can sharpen their wits. We have to teach them how to step outside their own cultural skins and enter the minds of others."²⁴ Of course, we need time and patience. Reconciliation between Germany and Poland started in the 1950s, and it is not until very recently that a genuine and long-term reconciliation became possible. This is the result of the cooperative efforts of a half century. Reconciliation and stability in East Asia can be our future, should we choose to bring it about. To do so, we need perseverance, continuing mutual understanding and enduring cooperative efforts among concerned nations.

²³ Howard, *The Lessons of History*, p. 16.

²⁴ Howard, *The Lessons of History*, p. 18.

和解究竟是否可能？

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二战结束后，亚非殖民地重新获得主权，然而，帝国主义列强并没有清偿其道义债。其中一个重要的原因，就是这些国家的政治领导并不承认其国家在殖民主义统治时期所犯的错误。我认为，从这点来说，不履行道义债是阻碍东亚各国和解的主要因素。帝国主义侵略是历史事实，是不可抹杀和改变的。曾经敌对的民族，要想获得真正的友谊和和解，只能坦诚相见，并且必须在思想意识上有根本的转变。显然，“在我们的思想意识中，历史的力量是非常强大的”。¹ 为确定历史错误的全部真相，减轻历史罪行的负担，负责任的政府和领导人必须认错，并向世人彻底公开相关档案资料。

怎样才能实现共存呢？我们必须怎样做才能实现真正的和解、团结以及最终和平？当前，各国争相实现霸权和扩张的帝国主义时代已经结束，人类一起解决共同问题的时代已经到来。我们应汲取历史教训造福未来。过去给了我们智慧，也给了我们争取美好明天的希望。我们应反省过去，不仅仅为了坚持、或愚蠢地纠缠于过去，而是为了明天能吸取宝贵的经验教训。帝国主义列强如果不能为自己的殖民统治自责忏悔，就不能实现真正的和解。精英和权贵们尤其必须了解那些已经通过专业方法和客观批判标准发现了的历史事实。历史“在形成和维护集体认同中发挥着十分重要的作用”。² 因此，历史学家和历史教师也应发挥重要而深远的社会作用。

1. 当权机构的重要作用

各国政治领导对自己国家的罪行，看法不一。英国、德国、俄罗斯和日本就选择了不同的立场。比如，德国政府选择了坦诚忏悔。西德政府从1949年起为纳粹时代赎罪，补偿纳粹受害人。20世纪60年代，德国总理维利·勃兰特启动了所谓的新东方政策，以实现冷战时期与邻国关系的正常化。1970年12月，他前往波兰，签署了《华沙条约》，还参观了纳粹时代华沙犹太区起义纪念碑。让在场的高级官员和媒体记者大为吃惊的是，维利·勃兰特放完花圈后，竟跪拜许久（华沙跪拜）。他后来回忆说：“在近代

¹ John Tosh, *The Pursuit of History*, Longman, 1984, p. 8.

² Georg G. Iggers, 'The Uses and Misuses of History: The Responsibility of the Historian, Past and Present', *Making Sense of Global History*, Solvi Sogner (ed.), Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2001, p. 311.



史的压力下,我做了人们无法用言语表达时所做的事情,我在用这种方式纪念那些上百万被杀害的人们。”这是真正的谦卑和忏悔。他的做法为消除二战给德国和东欧国家留下的隔阂迈出了关键性的一步。

再来看另一个例子。二战期间,波兰惨遭两个极权国家的蹂躏。1939年9月1日,希特勒突袭波兰,德国部队三周内席卷波兰,几乎同一时间,苏联侵入波兰,要求得到属于自己的那份战利品。“两个国家都对所有知识分子和潜在领导人进行了清洗”,苏联还于1940年4月在卡廷森林屠杀了“4400名落在他们手里的波兰军官”。³波兰和俄罗斯对这一事件观点不一,这在很长一段时间里一直阻碍着两国的和解。

但是,20世纪80年代后期这种僵局被打破了。1989年,俄罗斯学者透露,斯大林确实下过屠杀令;1990年,米哈伊尔·戈尔巴乔夫承认,苏联秘密警察曾处死过波兰人,确认了屠杀事件及另外两个埋葬点。1991年和1992年,鲍里斯·叶利钦公布了部分绝密文件并移交波兰新总统莱赫·瓦文萨(Lech Wałęsa)。

但是,到了20世纪90年代后期,形势再度变得尖锐起来。1998年,俄罗斯提出了俄罗斯战俘死在波兰战俘营(1919-1924)的问题。另外,一些俄罗斯政客继续否认苏联在卡廷犯下的所有罪行,称公布文件为伪造,并坚持认为原苏联版本是正确的,即,是德国人在1941年枪杀了波兰公民。

到了新世纪,形势又发生了逆转。2005年初,俄罗斯结束了长达十年的屠杀调查,确认了波兰公民的死亡。2008年,俄罗斯法院同意审理文件解密案和司法恢复受害者名誉案。在一次采访中,弗拉基米尔·普京称卡廷惨案就是政治犯罪。其实,不久前的那场悲剧才真正使人们对卡廷惨案有了新的认识。2010年4月10日,波兰总统莱赫·卡钦斯基(Lech Kaczyński)及其陪同人员乘坐的飞机坠毁,机上乘客全部遇难,他们原计划参加卡廷惨案70周年纪念活动。这场灾难影响了整个国际社会及俄罗斯领导层。俄罗斯总统梅德韦杰夫参加了葬礼,承认卡廷惨案是斯大林主义罪行。4月下旬,他下令对外公布相关文件。俄罗斯披露历史真相的这一决定推动了两国间的和解气氛。

我们要记住,勃兰特的姿态和俄罗斯领导人的诚恳绝不会给其国家和人民带来任何耻辱和伤害。他们的言行不会破坏其政治生涯,也不会损害其国家在国际社会的地位。相反,作为政治家,他们赢得了更高的声誉,他们的国家作为负责任的国家也赢得了国际社会的尊重。

³ Michael Howard, 'Europe in the Age of the Two World Wars', Michael Howard/William Roger Louis (eds.), *The Oxford History of the Twenty Century*, New York: Oxford University Press: 1998, pp. 111-112.

日本对待史实的态度截然相反。当权的日本领导人从来没有认真反省过历史,这让邻国感到反感和愤慨。他们不愿意承认历史错误,这一点可追溯至战后美国的对外政策。美国占领日本“几乎默认是为了确立东亚国际关系新框架”。⁴昭和天皇发表历史性演讲,宣告战争结束后,美国马上就准备好免除日本的战争罪。据报道,日本天皇原本要为日本在二战中的行为正式向最高盟军司令麦克阿瑟将军道歉,并为战争中每个政治军事决定独自承担责任。但是,天皇到达总司令部后,麦克阿瑟却对此事不予理睬。而且他还确认,天皇没必要退位。

因此,既然当时“在占领国美国的庇护下,除了最高层,日本的其他官员并没有被整肃,原来的官僚结构也保留不变”,那么日本领导人及当权机构也就没必要反思他们在历史上的错误行为。⁵在豁免与战争有牵连的所有皇室成员这件事上,麦克阿瑟将军及其工作人员起了主要作用,此外,他们也帮助豁免细菌研究单位,其目的就是为了交换基于人类试验的细菌战数据。《旧金山和约》(1951年9月8日)宣布“日本和各国同盟国间战争状态结束”(第一条),但是并没有极力指出日本犯了侵略罪和战争罪。朝鲜半岛与日本的事件被紧密联系起来,20世纪50年代初美国又建立了所谓的“旧金山体制”,以防范苏联对东亚的影响。⁶

正因如此,日本领导人不愿接受批判分析的历史观点,而是出于避免麻烦的理由仅着眼于他们过去的辉煌。这种对待历史的不当态度影响到了教科书的编纂,影响了舆论导向,让公众无法正确了解历史。因此,当权机构的解释“通过学校教科书、媒体和电视渗透到每一个地方”。⁷

日本领导人多变的悔悟遵循的是双重标准。一方面,他们承认日本过去犯下的错误,另一方面又为他们的军国主义历史开脱。仅举几例说明。1957年岸信介首相(1896-1987)向缅甸、澳大利亚、韩国和中国人民道歉,表示“深为遗憾”,“即使是部分地,也愿为这些国家的人们所遭受的痛苦赎罪”。1965年6月外交部长椎名悦三郎(1898-1979)在签署《日韩基本关系条约》时承认:“在我们两国悠久的历史中有一段不幸的过去,这实在令人遗憾,我们对此深刻反省。”从20世纪70年代到现在,日本领导人没有承认,日本过去的殖民统治和侵略给许多国家的人们,尤其是亚洲各国人民,造成了巨大伤害和痛苦,也没有表示愿意诚恳面对历史事实。此外,日本政府总是美化日本帝国主义历史,并把与慰安妇、强征劳工、领土入侵和殖民勒索相关的官方文件视为机密。当权的政治领导人以法律为借口,

⁴ Akira Iriye, 'East Asia', M. Howard / W. R. Louis (ed.), *The Oxford History of the Twenty Century*, p. 206.

⁵ Iriye, 'East Asia', p. 206.

⁶ Iriye, 'East Asia', pp. 208-209.

⁷ Tosh, *The Pursuit of History*, p. 8.



掩盖吞并朝鲜半岛的事实。例如,1965年11月佐藤荣作首相(1901-1975)在日本国会上再三表示,他相信,这份《日韩合并条约》是在平等自愿的基础上签订的。相关档案资料的完全披露会澄清过去的事实以及应承担的相应责任。

政治领导人就是国际国内事务的操控者。他们对史实的看法在更大程度上影响民族意识的形成,影响大众对国际事务的理解。历史问题能带来民族利益还是造成国际危机,取决于政治领导人的历史观点。更要强调的是,政治领导人在国家决策和舆论引导方面也发挥着重要作用。在实现与邻国和解、支持自由民主和人权等共同价值观方面,政治领导人需要采取普遍有效的观点。

2. 历史学家的东亚共同体倾向

达成和解的另一关键因素是历史学家本身。历史学家应打破历史神话制造,因为对历史进行神话制造这与吸取历史教训完全相悖。“我们已经一再看到历史神话对政治行为的影响。”⁸ 历史学家托什(Tosh)评论说:“在逐渐消除历史神话对简化或扭曲大众对历史的理解方面,历史学家作用显著。从这点来说,历史学家就好比眼科医生,专门去除白内障。”⁹ 除了这种揭露性的作用以外,历史学家还要积极揭露其它社会神话,要在更广泛的文明背景下理解自己所在的社会和其他社会的关系,以及和其他所有文明的关系。¹⁰ 他应该能够走出以自我为中心的假设,站在那些传承不同历史传统的国家的角度思考问题,这对于理解其它文化是必不可少的。

民族主义时代的历史研究推动了民族认同的形成。这就是当时历史学家的工作,就像普鲁士学校所做的工作一样。“历史学家查找档案资料,更多的不是为了寻找原始资料,而是为了给自己没有经过研究就得出的论点寻找论证支持。”¹¹ 将学识工具化,并不是只有德国人在这么做。在日本等正在进行现代化的国家,国家历史在教育课程中占有非常重要的位置,历史教育是在政府的管理下实施的。“的确,在塑造民族意识的过程中,历史的力量比语言来的更为强大。尤其在19世纪,欧洲大陆的民族主义发展到了极致,与此同时历史在教育研究中也占有举足轻重的作用。”¹² 总而

⁸ Iggers, 'The Uses and Misuses of History', p. 317.

⁹ Tosh, *The Pursuit of History*, p. 17.

¹⁰ Arthur Marwick, *The Nature of History*, Macmillan, 1970, p. 13.

¹¹ Iggers, 'The Uses and Misuses of History', p. 315.

¹² Tosh, *The Pursuit of History*, p. 3.

言之,“历史学识和官方批准的民族主义形成了强大的联盟”。忠于国家成了最高价值,并通过历史教育得以鼓励。

但是,一切都发生了变化,极端民族主义显然正在衰落。因为,这个世界已经出现了前所未有的融合,人口混合比以往任何时候更甚,国界的传统观点不再突出,民族认同必须彻底改变。“在19世纪政治思想遗留下的旧观念中,一个统一连贯的同质国家观,正经历最深刻的反思,在社会政治的各个角落都在发生这种变化。”¹³ 但我们需要“准确及慎重地将自然、正确、合理的民族认同与病态、残暴、甚至凶残的民族主义区别开来”。¹⁴ 历史学家迈克尔·奥克肖特(Michael Oakeshott)认为,历史学家不要为了建立民族认同而去迎合一种意识形态或制造历史神话。¹⁵

二十世纪末期以来,历史学科逐渐普遍采用跨国的、全球性研究方法代替以前的方式。跨国主义并不是新事物。十九世纪思想家,如欧内斯特·勒南(Ernest Renan)等强调了跨国家的、共同的人类文化的存在,并期待建立一个欧洲共同体(欧洲盟国)。20世纪50年代,随着欧洲一体化的起步,历史观也随之发生了变化。联合国教科文组织牵头解决跟史料编纂有关的紧张局势。在实现国际理解的漫长旅途上,迈出的重要步伐包括1951年《德法关于欧洲历史争议问题的协定》,1975年《联邦德国与波兰人民共和国历史和地理教科书建议书》。1975年,格奥尔格·埃克特国际教科书研究所(GEI)成立,通过组织邻国间,尤其是原宿敌国家的双边或多边教科书会议,推动了和解与和平教育的发展。经过半个多世纪的不懈努力,终于几近成功地促进了历史学家就历史教育的平衡模式展开一系列对话。

欧洲的例子提示了我们,对东亚问题应该选择什么方向。真正的和解应该建立在两个原则的基础上:一个是摒弃中心论,一个是承认平等。既没有中心,也没有外围。不论政治上还是文化上,都不允许有霸权和优越感。每个国家都是构成同伴团体的平等的一员;事实上,一个民族就是自己的一个中心。每个国家都要承认,别的国家不管在主权上,还是在历史问题上,都是平等的。一个国家的权利不会比另一个国家更多。相互尊重的原则就是站在对方的立场上思考问题。用霍布斯(Hobbes)的话说,违反这个原则就是我们所说的傲慢。他还说到:“每个人在要求自己的权力的

¹³ Edward W. Said, *Humanism and Democratic Criticism*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p. 24.

¹⁴ Gertrude Himmelfarb, 'Is National History Obsolete?', *The New History and the Old*, London: Belknap Press, 1987, p. 141.

¹⁵ Michael Oakeshott, 'Historical Change', *On History and Other Essays*, New Jersey: Barnes and Noble Book, 1983, p. 100.



同时,也要允许别人享有相同的权力。”¹⁶ 这一点可能也适用于所有期望和解的国家,这个和解取决于“你”“我”之间的平等互惠。我们都是不完整的、单独的、相互独立的个体,可以走的更近一些,相互影响和接触。¹⁷ “你”“我”之间的真正关系存在于分享共同的话语世界。¹⁸ 每个民族,不管人口多少,资源多少,经济好坏,不管政治影响如何,都是平等的伙伴。换句话说,没有“我”就没有“你”,反之亦然。

从本质上说,历史就是“不断进行的对话”。¹⁹ 不仅是现在和过去的对话,也是不同观点之间的对话。但是,在这方面做出思考和判断的不是历史,而是人类个体,尤其是受过专业训练的历史学家。²⁰ 因此,历史学家应发挥其在历史对话中的核心作用。所有对话都是公开的、互惠的,而且必须站在全球高度。我们注意到,历史上最杰出的历史学家“所做的研究和课题都是超越国界的”。²¹ 历史学家跨国合作能最大限度地减少因民族主义价值观和地域优越感而带来的偏见。通过共同研究和积极交流,他们对历史的理解会推动共识的形成。的确,“历史对话不仅是自发的,而且为方便历史学家们讨论,还发展了自己的规则和组织形式”。²² 因此,应该在国际层面将它制度化,也就是说,要建立东亚历史学家跨国团体。通过各国的共同努力,经历三个阶段可以实现该目标:1)通过国际历史科学委员会的东亚各国家委员会推动建立更大的组织;2)在互惠的基础上,定期召开区域会议;3)最终应建立以东亚历史学家为整体的跨国组织。

历史学家和其他知识分子一道,必须利用其知识,充分利用他们的影响力,争取东亚地区的和解与稳定。东亚负责任的历史学家国际共同体应该是一个有国际视角的团体,是一个共同合作的学识联盟。

结束语

东亚各国在漫长的历史发展过程中,享有共同的文化背景,但是,每个国家的历史发展过程各异。总体来看,东亚整体会朝着共同繁荣和持续

¹⁶ Thomas Hobbes, 'De Corpore Politico, or the Elements of Law', *Hobbes' Tripos, The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Vol. IV*, Sir William Molesworth (ed.), London, 1890, (Second Reprint: Scientia Verlag Aalen, 1966), p. 104.

¹⁷ Ernst Cassirer, *The Logic of the Humanities* (1942), Clarence Smith Howe (trans.), New Haven: Yale UP, 1961, pp. 109-110.

¹⁸ Cassirer, p. 112.

¹⁹ Iggers, 'The Uses and Misuses of History', p. 316.

²⁰ Michael Howard, *The Lessons of History*, Yale University Press, 1991, p. 198.

²¹ Karl Dietrich Erdmann, *Toward a Global Community of Historians*, New York: Berghahn Books, 2005, p. 3.

²² Erdmann, *Toward a Global Community*, Author's Preface, xiii.

稳定的方向发展。历史观问题不仅是谁侵略谁这类简单的问题,或者侵略原因等更复杂的一些问题。要想消除观点上的差距,就要深刻思考为什么自由、独立、主权和人权会遭到如此残暴的践踏。部分日本人仍固执己见,肤浅的理解自己国家的历史,他们对人类尊严和人权原则的承诺还远远不够。日本人对帝国主义侵略和东亚殖民统治的看法非常含糊,没有任何根本性的转变。观念问题也和日本新保守主义复辟有关系。

2010年是推动和解的良机,因为2010年不仅是二战结束65周年,还是日本吞并朝鲜半岛100周年。这个时候,日本天皇作为国家元首和国家代表,必须公开发表声明,他的国家应该为日本政府在二战期间所作出的每一个政治军事决定负责,对其殖民统治时期的每一个错误行为负责。如果一个国家以其能发现受教时刻而自豪,那它就必须反省历史,不管好坏,都要向世人解释其历史行为的愚蠢,让世人知道这个教训。

我们正在寻找一种新的方法,来理解这个世界和人类社会。为此,历史学家的责任最为重大。他们的设想和判断,不仅仅为了再现我们的历史,还为了理解其它社会的不同结构。就像英国著名历史学家迈克尔·霍华德(Michael Howard)指出的,“我们必须识别专业历史学家研究历史的方法和历史向大众传达的信息”。²³ “如果我们想正确教育大众,仅仅唤起他们对历史的兴趣以获得一份闲适是不够的。让他们参加学术活动,通过处理历史证据增长智慧也是不够的。我们要做的,是要让他们知道,怎样跳出自己的文化,站在其它文化角度思考问题。”²⁴ 当然,我们需要时间和耐心。德国和波兰为达成和解,从20世纪50年代就开始努力,直到最近几年才实现真正的和解。这是两国经过半个多世纪的不懈努力和合作后才取得的成果。促进东亚的和解和稳定是我们今后的选择。我们需要不懈努力,需要有关国家继续相互理解和不断合作。

²³ Howard, *The Lessons of History*, p. 16.

²⁴ Howard, *The Lessons of History*, p. 18.



From Security Configurations to Sustainable Peace:

Moving beyond the Confrontational Legacies and Reconciliation Challenges of the Second World War in East Asia

Milburn Line

The various presenters have given us insights into the need for reconciliation more than half a century after the atrocities we still remember today. I hope to plant the seeds of how we may move from the prevailing security architecture inherited from the Second World War, transcending reconciliation challenges, towards a sustainable peace in East Asia. I will draw on the experiences of Germany and Japan, and my own country, the United States, and hope to convince you that the tools of peace and conflict studies, just beginning to be employed, may help us construct a more harmonious, less confrontational future.

The Second World War shaped the international security architecture in place for 65 years now, and important grievances have not all been successfully addressed by this system. Moving beyond the shadow of the war requires revisiting those grievances and incorporating some of the lessons learned from, and opportunities presented by peace studies and its related fields of study and practice.

“Reconciliation” has many meanings, including re-establishing cordial relationships; accepting, settling, resolving or balancing differences; and reaching a consistent understanding of divergent perspectives. The tools of peacebuilding, including conflict prevention and transformation; dialogue, truth-telling and people-to-people diplomacy efforts; and the concept of social cohesion, have much to tell us regarding the prospects for achieving reconciliation.

While the military and human devastation following the war now seems like a distant reality, the legacy of atrocities and the claims of victims and their descendants create fertile opportunity for misunderstanding and conflict today. The treatment of wartime history and atrocities have been different in both Germany and Japan, and so have the ensuing geopolitical realities of Europe and East Asia that have impacted the potential for reconciliation.

Germany and Japan

The United Nations and associated Bretton Woods system developed by the victors of the Second World War did accomplish one of their principal goals, preventing a third world war, but there is still an obvious need to

increase the capacity of the international system to address conflict at other levels, as illustrated by the remarkable growth of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations over the last several decades. The system is in need of modernization, especially at the United Nations, where ultimate decision-making is conditioned by a Security Council with permanent members with veto power consisting of the five powers that emerged from a war in the middle of the last century, which may therefore not be able to adequately define and accomplish an expanded peacebuilding agenda in this century.

At first glance, the de-nazification process and German economic development following the war resulted in integration and reconciliation. Japan's constitutional tutelage by the US appears to have produced a different outcome that did not lead to integration and reconciliation with neighboring countries that suffered from imperial aggression. Beyond these generalities, the realities of each situation are more complex. While the international architecture functioned to prevent a Cold War showdown, the alignment of allies on each side and internal politics within and between those countries shaped the realities of post-war reconciliation.

Geo-political alliances, regional realities, and strategies that impacted reconciliation

In Europe the evolution of integration into a European Union from an initial European Coal and Steel Commission of six countries in 1951 and the Treaty of Rome in 1957, as well as Franco-German efforts to transcend historical enmity, are all well documented. For our purposes, it should be noted that despite being a continent physically divided by Cold War confrontation, no further wars took place in Europe in the period after the Second World War almost up to the Treaty of Maastricht, which founded the European Union in 1993. (The exception being the wars of the dissolution of former Yugoslavia from 1991-1995, which I will comment on later.) The Morgenthau plan just following the war envisioned a de-industrialized "pastoral" Germany stripped of any military capabilities. The collapse of the Soviet Union and its Eastern bloc in the 1980s facilitated integration and alleviated the pressures of strategic Cold War alliances inherited after the Second World War.

In Asia, the Korean War (1950-1953) exacerbated tensions and positioned the US and South Korea face to face with China and North Korea, with Japan allied with the US/South Korea configuration. In fact, the war in Korea was one of the reasons the US decided to rearm West Germany as a Cold War bulwark in Europe. With German reunification in 1990 we tend to forget these details. But the legacy of Cold War alliances in East Asia has endured from the 1950s to this very day, and has made, and continues to make, both integration and reconciliation efforts difficult.



Internal political and social dynamics

The internal political and social realities of post-war Germany and Japan also were quite different. Both Germany and Japan experienced extensive de-militarization processes, including judicial accountability exercises that concluded in the conviction and execution of criminals indicted for atrocities before and during the Second World War.

In West Germany, the need for support in the Cold War alliance caused the occupying powers to abandon the punitive Morgenthau plan and begin to support stronger development and industrial capacities under the Marshall Plan, which led to decades of record growth: a *Wirtschaftswunder* or “economic miracle.” Economic development and relative political stability under Konrad Adenauer up until the 1960s, plus a determined effort to condemn its Nazi past that emerged from opposition parties in the 1960s¹, including landmark trials known as the Auschwitz Process from 1963-1965, formed the basis for what we now consider to be the path of German leadership towards reconciliation and integration. Denying the existence of the Holocaust is a crime² and trials of Nazi concentration camp guards continue in Germany to this very day.³

The internal politics of Japan evolved differently, in part due to the aforementioned regional alliances resulting from the Korean War, in part due to the internal repercussions of US occupation, which have led to the instrumental use of history for political purposes.⁴ Unlike the multiple divisions of Germany by occupying powers, the US moved to occupy the principal Japanese islands and ensure, through the US Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, creation of a peaceful US ally. Vigorous US influence continued throughout the post-war period, including covert use of US funds⁵ to support the conservative Liberal Democratic Party, which ruled almost continually for more than half a century until its defeat in 2007 elections.

During this period, the LDP developed patronage networks that included the infamous Yasukuni shrine, that have become more present in Japanese society through revisionist efforts following the lost decade of economic stagnation in the 1990s.⁶ The LDP's longevity as the source of political authority in

¹ Thomas Berger, ‘Dealing with Difficult Pasts: Japan’s “History Problem” from a Theoretical and Comparative Perspective’, *East Asia’s Haunted Present: Historical Memories and the Resurgence of Nationalism*, 2008, p. 24.

² *Ibid*, p. 18.

³ Suspected Nazi Indicted in Germany’, *New York Times*, July 28, 2010.

⁴ Berger, *op cit*, pp. 20-21.

⁵ Tim Weiner, ‘CIA Spent Millions to Support Japanese Right in ‘50s and ‘60s’, *New York Times*, Oct. 9, 1994.

⁶ Tsuyoshi Hasegawa / Kazuhiko Togo, *East Asia’s Haunted Present: Historical Memories and the Resurgence of Nationalism*, Praeger Security International, 2008, p. 2.

Japan also inhibited the growth of pluralistic institutions and civil society that would promote broader reflection on conflict resolution and reconciliation. This has often led to the de facto empowerment of deniers of imperial aggression and intimidation of Japanese voices that would reflect on, and indeed apologize for crimes committed in China during the Second World War.⁷

The argument for the prevalence of local political dynamics' impact on possibilities for reconciliation, whether German opposition calling for historical reflection in the 1960s, or Japanese political patronage structures impeding reflections, is also the point of many Japanese critics of Chinese handling of the reconciliation agenda. Some Japanese believe the need for an apology is superseded by the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1978.⁸ Other sources note that "many members of the Japanese foreign policy establishment genuinely appear to believe that the main problem is that the Chinese and South Korean governments have cynically used Japanese historical issues to boost their domestic support", and cite as examples Chinese concerns about Japan's increasing "militarization", even when military spending has decreased⁹, as well as the patriotic education campaign implemented in China in the 1990s.

Today, 65 years later, though a series of apologies have been issued by various Japanese administrations, reconciliation with both China and South Korea has not been achieved, to some degree due to the internal politics in Japan which have compromised the apologies issued. An apology by Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu in 1991 was criticized by Japanese conservatives as "self-flagellation". An apology was issued in 1993 for comfort women enslaved in Korea, but it was not ratified by the Diet. Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi apologized to South Korean President Kim Dae-jung in 1998 for colonizing Korea. But Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine did much to undo any reconciliation from previous apologies.¹⁰

So how can we move towards reconciliation? I think the key is continued engagement between constituencies and implementing the tools we have learned from peacebuilding and its related fields. But first I think there are important lessons to be learned from the experience of my own country.

⁷ Iris Chang, *The Rape of Nanking, The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II*, Basic Books, 1997, pp. 199-214.

⁸ Takashi Inoguchi, *Japanese Politics, An Introduction*, Melbourne: Transpacific Press, 2005, p. 125.

⁹ David Straub, 'The United States and Reconciliation in East Asia', *East Asia's Haunted Present*, p. 216.

¹⁰ Berger, *op cit*, pp. 32-33.



Role of the United States

The United States played an active role in the geopolitical positioning in both Europe and Asia, as evidenced in the previous discussion. The US pursued what it perceived as its national security interests in the context of the Cold War, including support for the redevelopment of West Germany and the entrenchment of the LDP in Japan, with very different impacts on the possibilities for reconciliation. Over the half century of the Cold War US foreign policy was dominated by the concept of political realism or *realpolitik*, which posits that the international system is anarchic and prioritizes individual countries' quest for relative power over moral or social concerns.

In Japan, the US emphasized what it considered strategic interests over issues that would have facilitated reconciliation. The US chose not to prosecute the imperial hierarchy or the infamous biological warfare Unit 731 at the close of the war, complicating possibilities for reconciliation by not documenting responsibilities for atrocities. Furthermore, the US has had difficulty with its own legacies and reconciliation challenges in Japan, including the firebombing of Tokyo and atomic bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.¹¹

US experience during the Cold War has produced a slow, painful learning process in which we, or some of us, are beginning to realize the value of having a larger view and longer time frame than is common under the rubric of *realpolitik*. The short-term priorities espoused under "realism" often led to long-term problems in the international arena. Machiavelli, one of the sources of political realism, is focused on a prince, one finite lifetime, which, it should be clear, is not a sufficient frame of analysis for building peaceful national or international partnerships over time. How many countries that were trapped and manipulated in Cold War power struggles have become failed or failing states with devastating humanitarian impacts? The list includes Afghanistan, Congo, Guatemala, Iran, Iraq, Nicaragua, Somalia and others. Peace and conflict studies give us a lens for developing more fruitful long-term partnerships, a topic I will return to later on.

We have also begun to realize the double-edged nature of projecting military strength: once you have capabilities and extended interests there is a subsequent, if not imperial, tendency to have to exercise and defend them. Today the United States is engaged in two wars and security enforcement efforts around the globe and in its seaways.

These realizations form some of the most important ongoing debates in the US regarding foreign policy, and a clear trend for the future is not yet apparent. I am pleased to report that our institute is part of a concerted effort through the Alliance for Peacebuilding to get peacebuilding language in the US Foreign Assistance Act, which will frame our efforts in terms of the democratic and human rights values we hold most dear and must work to fulfill, as well

¹¹ Straub, *op cit*, pp. 208-215.

as emphasize sustainable development as an important element of conflict prevention.¹²

Implications for East Asia

So what can we learn from the different experiences of Germany and Japan regarding the potential for reconciliation in East Asia? The internal politics of each place evolved distinctly, and both Germany and Japan today are diverse societies which have both deniers of past atrocities and healthy contingents of peace activists. Both do have small populations of skinheads and deniers of imperialist aggression—though the post-war internal political and social realities diverged between overt experiences of public rejection, as in the Auschwitz process in Germany and the political patronage exemplified by visits of politicians to the Yasukuni shrine in Japan. Reconciliation challenges, even when addressed, continue to resurrect themselves depending on local and regional political and economic dynamics, as when renewed discourse on German victimization emerged in Germany when confronted by nationalist political administrations in Poland and the Czech Republic in recent years.¹³ North Korea recently called for reparations from Japan.¹⁴ Unreconciled grievances, instrumentalized in the ongoing regional rivalries (especially in East Asia), continue to present a security concern.¹⁵

A short digression is important to illustrate the threat to security of persisting, unreconciled grievances, from the experience of a related place where I lived and worked for 3.5 years. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, following the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the narrative of historical grievance, projected back over a period of many centuries, became a crucible for renewing extreme violence. The comparison is important: Yugoslavia, to some extent a creation of the Second World War, was also deeply impacted by Cold War fragmentation. Marshal Tito consolidated its diverse ethnic constituencies into a political federation and contained ethnic nationalism for 40 years. As in Germany and Japan, efforts were made by the victorious powers of the Second World War to eliminate ethno-nationalist (fascist) politics and discourse. This appeared to have been successfully achieved while power remained centralized under Tito. Following his death in 1980, and the economic collapse of Eastern Europe during the following decade, ethno-nationalist politics re-emerged citing historical grievances tracing backwards from the Second World War all the way to battles that marked the beginning of the Ottoman Empire in Europe in 1389. The usage of these grievance narratives by nationalist leaders to consolidate a power base that would continue on beyond the Yugoslav Federation led to

¹² Foreign Assistance Act Reform on Advocacy sub-page of www.allianceforpeacebuilding.org.

¹³ Berger, *op cit*, p. 34.

¹⁴ Cable News Network (CNN), August 22, 2010.

¹⁵ Straub, *op cit*, p. 207.

civil wars that cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of civilians.¹⁶ Yugoslavia is an important example of how grievance narratives, if not reconciled, can be renewed and inspire fresh and even greater violence.

Another simple inference from the former Yugoslavia example indicates that nationalist tendencies were usually constrained by a central power structure controlled by those that defeated them.¹⁷ German fascists, Japanese imperialists and Serbian, Croatian and Muslim nationalists in Yugoslavia were all kept in check by the victorious forces of the Second World War for a forty year period after the war. Nationalist discourse often reappears once that centralized authority is removed and economic indicators have trended downward. The example of the former Yugoslavia is clear. Revisionist histories also gathered momentum in a declining economic environment in Japan.

Why have they not returned in Germany? They have reappeared, as in the aforementioned skinheads and anti-immigrant mobilizations during economic downturns. But the combination of a generalized rejection of Germany's Nazi past amongst most Germans, the transcendence of Cold War polarization through German reunification and the demonstrated benefits of integration with the rest of Europe have overwhelmingly prevailed, along with the development of institutions to mediate conflict and guarantee rights and the rule of law that have been sufficient to contain, marginalize and prosecute those with extreme views.

This balance is the key to social cohesion, stability and harmonious efficiency within a society, and is one of the key outcomes offered by the various initiatives encompassed in the emerging field of peace and conflict studies. Peace and conflict studies, and their application in Japan, China, the US, Europe and the world, offer important ways forward for dealing with legacies of both extremism and grievance, and the regional security threats they continue to pose.

A peace architecture is a security architecture

By developing peace studies and peacebuilding initiatives in Japan, China and the US, even at the level of foreign policy, as in the argument for transcending political realism, we can begin to move beyond both the historical grievances from the Second World War and the outdated, fragile security architecture that is its legacy. A peace architecture is ultimately a security architecture. Peace studies do not simply consider idealistic goals but are dedicated to the practices and methodologies of truth-telling and accountability, to conflict detection, assessment and management, and to social cohesion and people-to-people engagement. As Lisa Schirch notes, "A peacebuilding framework prevents, reduces, transforms and helps people to recover from violence in all

¹⁶ Alan Little / Laura Silber, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*, Penguin, 1997.

¹⁷ This function is theoretically the responsibility of a democratic state that institutionalizes rights and enforces laws.

forms while at the same time empowering people to foster relationships at all levels to create structural justice. [...] Peacebuilding is a process of constructing or reconstructing state structures to foster peace and human security.”¹⁸

Our joint challenge is to create a biology of peace; not the social Darwinism and biological determinism that have justified exploitation and conflict¹⁹, but a hard science where we learn to reconcile historical grievances, manage conflict, engage national minorities and historically marginalized populations in participatory development and facilitate collective action to address international and domestic problems.

New evidence suggests cultural factors impact biological evolution.²⁰ The capacity of humanity to evolve beyond inter-species violence may determine our survival, and peacebuilding tools may be the key.

One of the prevailing frustrations today is the perceived lack of recognition of past errors committed that is the underpinning of reconciliation. The horrors of Nanjing should never be forgotten, and we should continue to engage both the Japanese and the world in truth-telling, a key reconciliation methodology²¹ and one we have employed at the IPJ at the University of San Diego in a Global Women's Court of Accountability²², as well as dialogue efforts to ensure that “never again” becomes an enduring reality for our children. We must also remember that grievance narratives have great potential to fester and create latent problems, even wars, as in the case of the former Yugoslavia.

John Paul Lederach says that “there is a sense in which the whole of peacebuilding could be summed up as finding and building voice”.²³ Continuing to support the voices for reconciliation for atrocities committed over 65 years ago is still important in establishing the foundation that will transcend the security arrangements we have inherited from that period.

This work has progressed, in academic fora like this one and through the work of important scholars from Japan, China, Korea, the US, UK and beyond.

¹⁸ Lisa Schirch, ‘Linking Human Rights and Conflict Transformation, A Peacebuilding Framework’, *Human Rights & Conflict, Exploring the Links between Rights, Law and Peacebuilding*, United States Institute of Peace, 2006, pp. 64, 71.

¹⁹ Paul Crook, *Darwinism, War and History: The Debate Over the Biology of War From the “Origin of the Species” to the First World War*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 28.

²⁰ Nicholas Wade, ‘Human Culture, An Evolutionary Force’, *New York Times*, March 2, 2010.

²¹ Priscilla Hayner, *Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocities*, Routledge, 2001, pp. 107-133.

²² ‘Global Women's Court of Accountability: A Hearing on the Violation of Women's Rights’, Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice, University of San Diego, November 17-18, 2005.

²³ John Paul Lederach, *The Moral Imagination*, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 169.

Joint history textbook projects have produced a trilateral Modern History of the Three East Asian Countries (2005) with scholars engaged from China (17 scholars), the Republic of Korea (23) and Japan (13).²⁴ Professors Kazuhiko Kimijima and Shigemitsu at Tokyo Gakugei University and Cheong Je-Cheong at the University of Seoul have published a joint history of Japan and Korea. Professor Hiroshi Mitani of the University of Tokyo, Komaba, is organizing a subsequent three volume project that will include China as well in an effort to create common regional history texts.²⁵ Professor Zheng Wang of Seton Hall University will publish an important book this fall titled “Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations”.²⁶

Engagement should also go beyond academic reconciliation efforts. Youth in China, Japan and the US today have little to do with the issues that created the Second World War, even if younger generations of Chinese and South Koreans feel more hostility towards Japan than their elders.²⁷ We should be connecting them in as many ways as possible in order to create the international understanding and solidarity that will allow populations to reject conflict as a means to fulfilling national ambitions. Our institute sponsors a youth and world affairs program called WorldLink that very much wants to partner with youth in China, Japan and around the world.

Citizen mobilization against historic crimes, like the Auschwitz process in Germany, or the civil rights movement in the United States, are important acts of recognition and accountability absolutely necessary to reconciliation and social cohesion. Current citizen movements against structural violence caused by environmental degradation or social exclusion can be divisive but, depending on government responses, may ultimately strengthen the institutions that mediate conflict we hope to build for the future.

The world has become increasingly aware that diverse polities—and Japan, China and the US are diverse polities both ethnically and politically—need mechanisms to mediate political and social differences. Peace and conflict studies, and their tools and methodologies, have much to contribute to the construction of institutions to address these challenges. The United Nations has only recently, in 2005, instituted a Peacebuilding Commission, and its initial capacity has been limited to working only on a few select cases in Africa.

Social cohesion both within and between states can be achieved through the engagement and empowering of peace initiatives, methodologies, and institutes like ours at the University of San Diego and the efforts that have begun

²⁴ Zheng Wang, ‘Old Wounds, New Narratives: Joint History Textbook Writing and Peacebuilding in East Asia’, *History & Memory*, Vol. 21, No. 1, (2009), pp. 102, 106.

²⁵ Hiroshi Mitani, ‘The History Textbook Issue in Japan and East Asia: Institutional Framework, Controversies, and International Efforts for Common Histories’, *East Asia’s Haunted Present*, *op. cit.*, pp. 88- 92.

²⁶ Forthcoming, Columbia University Press.

²⁷ Straub, *op cit*, p. 208.

at Nanjing University.²⁸ This conference is an important opportunity to reflect on the unreconciled atrocities committed during the Second World War and to ensure that we are defining and working towards a peace architecture that will transcend these legacies.

The US has learned powerful and painful lessons regarding imperial projection. As China assumes a more active role in international affairs we must work together, all of us across the world who are committed to peace, to ensure that we are integrated not just in terms of markets, but in a vision of a peaceful international order where conflict can be prevented or mediated, and grievances do not go unreconciled for generations.

Our commitment, amongst people in Japan, China and the US and beyond, towards a culture of peace and an evolution towards peacebuilding capacities means investing in peace education, including conflict resolution and citizenship training, international engagement and solidarity, and building the institutions necessary for ensuring justice and equity both domestically and internationally. This is our challenge today. It is also our best option for a peaceful future.

²⁸ Liu Cheng, 'Afterword: Aspirations for Peace Studies in China', Alan Hunter (ed.), *Peace Studies in the Chinese Century*, Ashgate Publishing, 2006.

从安全策略到持久和平：克服东亚二战对抗的遗留问题与和解的挑战

梅尔伯恩·莱因 Milburn Line

各位参与会议的报告人使我们深刻了解了在至今仍让人们铭记于心的暴行发生后半个多世纪之时进行和解的必要性。我希望通过这篇报告能够给大家一些启示,例如,如何走出当前的二战安全体系,超越和解的挑战,走向东亚持久和平。我将引用德国、日本以及我自己国家——美国的经历,使大家相信,我们刚启动的和平与冲突研究将有助于建立一个更加和谐、更少冲突的未来。

二战塑造了65年来的国际安全体系,但对于一些强烈的怨愤,该体系并没有完全成功应对。要想走出战争阴影,就要重新反思这些怨愤,并与我们所吸取到的教训以及和平研究及其相关的研究与实践领域带来的机遇相结合。

“和解”有多重含义,包括重建友好关系,接受、解决、化解或平衡分歧,就不同的观点达成一致理解等等。预防和转化冲突、进行对话、说明事实和民间外交等和平建设工具与社会凝聚观念都告诉我们,和解是可以实现的。

现在看来,战争造成的军事和人类破坏似乎已成为一个遥远的事实,但暴行遗留问题、受害人及其后代的索赔在今天却仍不断引起误解和冲突。由于德日两国对战争历史和暴行的处理方式不同,因此,由此形成的欧洲和东亚地缘政治现实给和解带来了不同的影响。

德国和日本

二战战胜国建立的联合国及其制定的布雷顿森林体系确实实现了他们的一个主要目标,即防止发生第三次世界大战。但是,这一国际体系显然还需要被扩充,以使其能够应对更多方面的冲突——联合国维和行动部队在过去几十年的显著发展就说明了这一点。该体系需要现代化,尤其是联合国。联合国安全理事会拥有最终决定权,有否决权的5个常任理事国产生于二十世纪中期的一场战争(二战期间),因此,可能无法在二十一世纪充分制定和实现一个更大的和平建设议程。

乍看起来,二战后非纳粹化运动和德国经济发展促成了融合与和解,而美国对日本的宪政托管似乎产生了不同的结果,日本没有取得与遭受帝国主义侵略的邻国的融合与和解。但是,除了这些概括性的归纳以外,具体

到各个国家,情况更复杂。当时的国际体系旨在防止冷战矛盾激化,但是,盟国各自结成北约与华约同盟的这种国际体系再加上这些国家的国内政治和国际政治共同造就了战后的和解形势。

影响和解的地缘政治同盟、区域现实以及战略

在欧洲,包括1951年建立欧洲六国煤钢共同体,1957年签署《罗马条约》,法德两国努力克服历史敌对状态等欧盟一体化进程都有详细的文件记载。我们应该看到,尽管冷战对峙分割了欧洲大陆,但是在二战结束后一直到1993年签署奠定了欧盟成立基础的《马斯特里赫特条约》,欧洲没有再发生过战争(1991-1995年发生的前南斯拉夫解体是个例外,我将在下文说明。)。战后摩根索计划设想的是一个田园般的德国,一个无任何军事能力的非工业化德国。但是,二十世纪八十年代苏联及其东欧集团的解体加速了欧洲一体化,同时缓解了二战遗留的战略性冷战同盟的紧张局势。

在亚洲,朝鲜战争(1950-1953)加剧了亚洲的紧张局势,导致美韩和中朝对峙以及日本和美国、韩国结盟的局面。事实上,朝鲜战争是美国决定重新武装西德,将其作为在欧洲的冷战堡垒的原因之一。随着1990年德国重新统一,我们几乎忽略了这些细节。但是,东亚冷战同盟的遗留问题却从20世纪50年代延续至今,并持续阻碍着一体化与和解进程。

国内政治和社会动态

战后,德日两国的国内政治和社会现实差别也很大。两国都开展了广泛的非军事化运动,包括司法问责活动,对二战前及二战期间的战犯罪罪并判处死刑。

在西德,由于冷战同盟需要支持,因此,各占领国纷纷放弃了实施惩罚性的摩根索计划,转而支持马歇尔计划,支持更强大的发展,提高工业能力。这些行为迎来了前所未有的发展局面:实现了西德的“经济奇迹”。在康拉德·阿登纳的领导下持续到20世纪60年代的经济发展和政治上的相对稳定,以及20世纪60年代政府内外的反对派坚定谴责纳粹历史¹,包括著名的1963-65年奥斯维辛审判,为现在我们所认为的德国带头走上和解与一体化道路奠定了基础。否认大屠杀的存在就是犯罪²,并且对德国纳粹集中营警卫的审判直到今天还在继续³。

¹ Thomas Berger, 'Dealing with Difficult Pasts: Japan's "History Problem" from a Theoretical and Comparative Perspective', *East Asia's Haunted Present: Historical Memories and the Resurgence of Nationalism*, 2008, p. 24.

² *Ibid.*, p. 18.

³ 'Suspected Nazi Indicted in Germany', *New York Times*, July 28, 2010.



日本国内政治发展与德国不同,一方面,前面提到的朝鲜战争造成了区域同盟,另一方面,美国占领造成内部影响,导致历史成了政治工具。⁴与德国被占领国分割不同,美国先占领了日本的主要岛屿,然后通过《日本投降后美国对日初期政策》建立了一个和平的美国盟友。美国的强大影响持续了整个战后阶段,包括秘密使用资金⁵支持持续执政半个多世纪的保守的自由民主党,直到2007年其在大选中失败。

在此期间,自由民主党发展了庇护结构,其中包括臭名昭著的靖国神社。在20世纪90年代经济停滞十年之后,在修正主义者的推动下,这种庇护结构更加深植于日本社会之中。⁶自由民主党作为日本的政治权威,其长期执政阻碍了多元化结构和公民社会的发展,抑制了人们更加广泛地反思冲突解决方式与和解。这常常给予那些否认帝国主义侵略的人以事实上的权力,使那些想为二战期间日本在中国犯下的罪行反省并真正道歉的日本人不敢站出来。⁷

不论是20世纪60年代德国政府内外的反对派呼吁反省历史,还是日本政治庇护结构阻碍反省,都表明地方政治动态影响和解进程,同时也是许多日本评论家对于中国在和解议程方面处理方式的普遍观点。有些日本人认为,1978年签署的《中日和平友好条约》可以代替道歉。⁸另外一些人认为,“许多日本外交政策机构人士似乎深信,主要问题出在,中韩两国政府冷嘲热讽地故意利用日本历史问题提高国内支持率”。还举例说,即使日本的军费减少了⁹,但中国仍很关注日本不断提高的“军事化水平”。另外,中国在20世纪90年代还进行了爱国教育运动。

65年后的今天,尽管日本各届政府做出了一系列道歉,但日本并没有实现与中国和韩国的和解,这在一定程度上是因为日本国内政治活动常常与之前所做出的道歉相悖。1991年,日本首相海部俊树提出道歉,结果被日本保守派批为“自虐”。1993年曾有日本政治家提出向韩国被奴役的慰安妇道歉,但国会没有批准。1998年,日本首相小渊惠三就殖民朝鲜向韩

⁴ Berger, *op cit*, pp. 20-21.

⁵ Tim Weiner, 'CIA Spent Millions to Support Japanese Right in '50s and '60s', *New York Times*, Oct. 9, 1994.

⁶ Tsuyoshi Hasegawa / Kazuhiko Togo, *East Asia's Haunted Present: Historical Memories and the Resurgence of Nationalism*, Praeger Security International, 2008, p. 2.

⁷ Iris Chang, *The Rape of Nanking, The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II*, Basic Books, 1997, pp. 199-214.

⁸ Takashi Inoguchi, *Japanese Politics, An Introduction*, Melbourne: Transpacific Press, 2005, p. 125.

⁹ David Straub, 'The United States and Reconciliation in East Asia', *East Asia's Haunted Present*, p. 216.

国总统金大中道歉,但此后日本首相小泉纯一郎却一再参拜靖国神社,严重破坏了解和成果。¹⁰

我们如何迈向和解?我想,各方继续交往并使用我们从和平建设理论及其相关领域所学来的方法,是关键所在。但首先,我认为我自己的国家就有一些可以吸取的重要的经验教训。

美国的作用

从上文中可以看出,美国在欧亚地缘政治定位中表现积极。在冷战背景下美国追求所谓的国家安全利益,包括支持西德重新发展,支持日本自由民主党,这对和解造成了截然不同的影响。在冷战的半个多世纪里,美国外交政策的主旨是政治现实主义或“现实政治”。这种观点认为,国际体系是无政府状态,因此,相对于道德或社会问题,更应注重个体国家追求相对权力。

在日本,美国强调战略利益更甚于促进和解。战争结束后,美国并没有起诉天皇皇室或臭名昭著的731细菌战部队,没有用文件记录并证明日本应对暴行承担责任,结果使和解问题复杂化。此外,美国在日本也面临着自己的历史遗留问题与和解问题的重重困难,例如,轰炸东京,在广岛和长崎投放原子弹。¹¹

美国在冷战时期的经历开启了一个缓慢而痛苦的学习过程,在这个过程中,我们或我们中有些人开始意识到,眼界应放得更宽更远,而不是局限于以现实政治为幌子的普通视野。现实主义下的许多短期重点往往给国际社会带来长期问题。马基雅维里(1469-1527)是政治现实主义的发起人之一,他的观点主要围绕着只有有限生命的君主,但是我们应当明确,随着时间的推移,这已经不能作为分析建立和平国家或和平国际伙伴关系的充分框架条件。有多少身陷冷战权力斗争并被操控的国家,最后解体或正在解体当中,并受到人道主义灾难的影响?阿富汗、刚果、危地马拉、伊朗、伊拉克、尼加拉瓜、索马里等国家都是例子。和平与冲突研究使我们了解到,要发展更有成果的长期伙伴关系,我将在下文讨论这个问题。

另外,我们也开始意识到突出军事实力是一把双刃剑:一旦拥有军事能力和扩大化的利益,结果就有可能利用并捍卫这些能力与利益。今天的美国正忙于进行两场战争并在全球及其航道中试图执行其安全利益。

这些认识构成了当前美国外交政策的一些最重要辩论,未来走向尚不明确。我很高兴地告诉大家,我们的研究所也在通过建设和平联盟努力争取在《美国对外援助法案》中加入关于和平建设的承诺。该法案不仅将

¹⁰ Berger, *op cit*, pp. 32-33.

¹¹ Straub, *op cit*, pp. 208-215.



展示我们在民主和人权核心价值观方面所做的努力——这是我们最重视而且必须努力实现的,而且还将强调可持续发展对预防冲突的重要作用。¹²

给东亚的启示

那么,在东亚和解的问题上,我们可以从德日两国的不同经历中学到什么?两国国内政治都有显著发展,今天的德国和日本都是多元化社会,都有人否认历史暴行,但也都有更多活跃的和平活动家。尽管两国战后国内政治和社会现实不同,一个是公众明显排斥民族极端主义和纳粹主义,如德国进行了奥斯维辛审判;一个是为民族极端主义提供政治庇护,如政要们参拜靖国神社,但是两国都存在一小撮民族极端主义者和否认帝国主义侵略的人。即使面对了这些和解上的挑战,这些问题也还会受地方和地区政治经济动态的影响而再度出现。就像最近几年,面对波兰和捷克共和国国内民族主义者执政的情况,德国国内再次出现德国是受害者的讨论。¹³前不久,北朝鲜还要求日本进行赔偿。¹⁴这些尚未和解的怨愤,再次被利用到当前的地区对抗中,尤其是东亚地区,因而会持续带来安全问题。¹⁵

根据我在有关地方工作生活三年半的经验,一个简短的例子就很可能说明,一直未和解的怨愤将造成安全威胁。南斯拉夫解体后,波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那那些甚至可以追溯到几百年前的历史苦难史,成为新的极端暴力事件的导火索。进行这样的比较是很重要的:南斯拉夫从某种程度上说是二战的产物,深受冷战分裂的影响。其领导人铁托元帅将一个多民族国家联合成一个联邦共和国,抑制民族主义达40年。在德国和日本,二战战胜国努力清除种族民族主义者(法西斯主义者)的政治观点和言论。这一点在铁托集权时期似乎已成功实现。1980年铁托去世以及接下来十年东欧经济崩溃,使种族民族主义政治再次抬头,从二战一直回溯到1389年欧洲奥斯曼帝国的敌对历史旧账再次被翻了出来。民族主义领导者利用这些敌对历史故事,巩固其政权基础,而且该政权在南斯拉夫联邦共和国解体之后依然存在,由此导致的国内战争夺走了数十万平民的生命。¹⁶南斯拉夫是一个重要的例子,它告诉我们,敌对历史故事如果得不到和解,就会被重新翻出来导致更加严重的暴力事件。

¹² Foreign Assistance Act Reform on Advocacy sub-page of www.allianceforpeacebuilding.org.

¹³ Berger, *op cit*, p. 34.

¹⁴ Cable News Network (CNN), August 22, 2010.

¹⁵ Straub, *op cit*, p. 207.

¹⁶ Alan Little / Laura Silber, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*, Penguin, 1997.

前南斯拉夫事件让我们得出的另一个简单结论是,挫败民族主义的中央集权结构往往能抑制民族主义倾向。¹⁷ 战后40年间,二战战胜国成功压制了德国法西斯主义者、日本军国主义者和塞尔维亚、克罗地亚以及南斯拉夫穆斯林民族主义者。但是一旦中央集权丧失、经济滑坡,民族主义言论就会重新出现。前南斯拉夫就是一个鲜明的例子。日本经济下滑的时候,也曾出现历史修正主义势力壮大的情况。

但是,德国为什么不一样呢?在德国,这些势力也曾抬头,像上文提到的经济下滑过程中出现了民族极端主义者和反移民运动。但是,大多数德国人普遍排斥德国纳粹历史,而且德国统一让德国超越了冷战两极化,与欧洲的一体化又给德国带来了显而易见的利益,这些因素的作用更为强大。同时,德国还建立相关机构调和冲突,确保权利和法治,充分抑制、排斥和起诉那些有极端思想的人。

这种均衡是实现社会凝聚、社会稳定与和谐效率的关键。新兴的和平与冲突研究领域所做出的各项研究成果也证明了这一点。在日本、中国、美国、欧洲和全世界,和平与冲突研究及其应用为处理极端主义和敌对状态及其不断带来的地区安全隐患提供了重要途径。

和平体系就是安全体系

如果要超越政治现实主义,就应当在日本、中国和美国推动和平研究与和平建设,甚至在外交政策层面上。这样,我们才能开始超越二战遗留的历史问题以及过时又脆弱的安全体系。和平体系最终也是安全体系。和平研究不单单考虑理想主义的目标,还研究说明历史真相和承担责任的实践及方法;发现冲突、评估和管理以及研究社会凝聚力和人际交往。正如丽莎·斯科奇(Lisa Schirch)所说:“和平建设框架就是防止、减少、转化和帮助人们从各种暴力中走出来,同时使人们建设各种关系,实现结构正义……。和平建设过程就是一个建设或重建国家结构的过程,以实现和平与人类安全。”¹⁸

我们面临的共同挑战是创建一种“和平生物学”,这里的生物学不是指认为剥削和冲突是正当合理的社会达尔文主义和生物决定论¹⁹,而是一门我们可以从中学习历史和解、管理冲突、让国家少数民族和被历史边缘化的人们参与发展、促进集体行动以解决国际国内问题的硬科学。

¹⁷ 这一职能理论上是一个民主国家的责任,因为它要保证权利的制度化和执法。

¹⁸ Lisa Schirch, 'Linking Human Rights and Conflict Transformation, A Peace-building Framework', *Human Rights & Conflict, Exploring the Links between Rights, Law and Peacebuilding*, United States Institute of Peace, 2006, pp. 64, 71.

¹⁹ Paul Crook, *Darwinism, War and History: The Debate Over the Biology of War From the "Origin of the Species" to the First World War*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 28.

新的迹象显示,文化因素影响生物进化。²⁰ 人类超越物种间暴力进行进化的能力会决定我们的生存,和平建设工具可能就是关键。

现在经常出现的众多争议之一就是,有意识的不承认错误,而承认错误是构成和解的基础。我们应永远铭记南京大屠杀,继续让日本人和全世界澄清历史真相。这是一个重要的和解方法论²¹,也是我们在美国圣地亚哥大学克洛克和平与正义研究的世界妇女问责法院²²所采用的。同时还要积极开展对话,确保我们的孩子“再也不会”碰到这类事情。我们还必须牢记,敌对历史故事很可能会恶化并激发潜在的问题甚至导致战争,前南斯拉夫就是这样一个例子。

约翰·保罗·里德瑞奇(John Paul Lederach)说道:“整个和平建设工作可归结为发现和加强和解呼声的说法是有道理的。”²³虽然暴行已经过去了65年多,但是如果要建立超越从那个时代延续至今的安全措施的基础,继续支持和解的呼声仍十分重要。

通过本次研讨会这样的学术论坛,通过日本、中国、韩国、美国、英国等国重要学者的努力,这项工作不断取得进步。来自中国(17名)、韩国(23名)和日本(13名)的学者们加入了联合编纂历史教科书项目,三方共同编纂了《东亚三国近现代史》(2005)一书。²⁴东京学芸大学的Kazuhiko Kimijima教授和Shigemitsu教授,首尔大学的Cheong Je-Cheong教授出版了一本联合编写的日韩历史书。东京大学Komaba校园的Hiroshi Mitani教授正在组织一个编写包含中国在内的三卷史书项目,以创造共同的地区历史教科书。²⁵塞顿霍尔大学的王征教授(Wang Zheng)今年秋天将出版一本重要著作,名为:《勿忘国耻:中国政治和外交关系历史记忆》。²⁶

²⁰ Nicholas Wade, 'Human Culture, An Evolutionary Force', New York Times, March 2, 2010.

²¹ Priscilla Hayner, *Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocities*, Routledge, 2001, pp. 107-133.

²² 'Global Women's Court of Accountability: A Hearing on the Violation of Women's Rights', Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice, University of San Diego, November 17-18, 2005.

²³ John Paul Lederach, *The Moral Imagination*, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 169.

²⁴ Zheng Wang, 'Old Wounds, New Narratives: Joint History Textbook Writing and Peacebuilding in East Asia', *History & Memory*, Vol. 21, No. 1, (2009), pp. 102, 106.

²⁵ Hiroshi Mitani, 'The History Textbook Issue in Japan and East Asia: Institutional Framework, Controversies, and International Efforts for Common Histories', *East Asia's Haunted Present*, op. cit., pp. 88-92.

²⁶ 即将出版, Columbia University Press.

除了学术上的努力,我们还应开展其它交流活动以推动和解。即使中韩两国的年轻人比他们的上一辈更仇视日本,但今天,中国、日本和美国的年轻人与二战导致的问题已经没有太大的关联。²⁷ 我们应尽可能使这些年轻人相互联系,以实现国际理解和团结,让人们不再通过冲突实现国家野心。我们研究所资助了一个名为“连接世界”(WorldLink)的青年与世界事务项目,非常需要中国、日本以及全世界的年轻人加入。

例如德国奥斯维辛审判这样的反对历史罪行的民间运动,或美国的民权运动,都是认罪和承担责任的重要举措,是实现和解和增强社会凝聚力的必由之路。当前针对环境恶化或社会边缘化造成的结构暴力而开展的民间运动会导致不和,但是最终可能也会使我们为调和冲突而建立的机构变得强大起来,虽然这一点也依赖政府的反应。

全世界逐渐认识到,对于不同政体——像日本、中国和美国不论从种族上还是政策上看都属于不同政体,需要建立各种机制来调解政治和社会差异。和平与冲突研究及其工具和方法论将大大推动相关机构的建设,以应对这些挑战。就在2005年,联合国设立了一个建设和平委员会,该机构首先处理的问题是仅限于非洲的一些特定事件。

通过交流、进行和平研究、采用各种方法,通过像我们在圣地亚哥大学的研究所以及南京大学开展的工作,能够增强各国国内及国际间的社会凝聚力。²⁸ 本次研讨会是我们反思尚未和解的二战暴行,以及确保我们制定超越这些遗留问题的和平体系的重要契机。

美国已经在帝国主义扩张方面得到了很多惨痛的教训。随着中国更加积极地参与国际事务,全世界所有致力于和平的人们必须联合起来,以确保我们的合作不仅仅是为了市场,还为了建立一个能够预防或调和各种冲突,让怨愤不再代代相传而不得和解的和平的国际秩序。

包括日本、中国和美国等国家的人们一起致力于建立和平文化,发展和平建设能力,意味着要投资和平教育,包括冲突解决方案和公民权力与义务培训、国际交往和团结、建立必要的机构、确保国际国内的公平和正义等等。这是我们今天面临的挑战,也是我们建设和平未来的最佳选择。

²⁷ Straub, *op cit*, p. 208.

²⁸ Liu Cheng, 'Afterword: Aspirations for Peace Studies in China', Alan Hunter (ed.), *Peace Studies in the Chinese Century*, Ashgate Publishing, 2006.



**Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
World History Forum, September 4-5, 2010**

**Historical Reflections and the Process of Reconciliation
in East Asia and Europe after WWII**

Agenda of the Conference:

Saturday, September 4th

9:00 – 9:45

Opening Ceremony, presided by Zhang Shunhong, Director of Institute of World History, CASS

Addresses of Honored Guests:

Wu Yin, Vice-President of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

Zhang Haipeng, President of Association of Chinese Historians

Ulla Bekel, Director Hanns Seidel Foundation, Beijing Office

Huang Ping, Director of the Institute of American Studies, CASS

Li Wei, Director of the Institute of Japanese Studies, CASS

9:45 – 12:00

Panel I: Chinese Studies of the Anti-Japanese War and Present Chinese-Japanese Relations

Presided by: Zhang Shunhong, Director of Institute of World History, CASS

Bu Ping, Executive President of Chinese Anti-Japanese War Research Society; Director of the Institute of Modern History, CASS: *Chinese Studies of the Anti-Japanese War and the Dialogue Space About Historical Problems between China and Japan.*

Tang Chongnan, President of China Association of Japanese History, Professor of the Institute of World History, CASS: *Japan's Understanding of Historical Issues and the Prospect of East Asian Reconciliation*

Yoda Yoshiie, Honorary Professor of Waseda University, Japan: *On the Question of Current Mutual Understanding between China and Japan*

14:00 – 16:00

Panel II: Reflection and Reconciliation in East Asia after WWII (1)

Presided by: Jin Chenggao, President of Chinese Society of Korean History,
Professor of Yanbian University, China

Li Shi'an, President of Chinese Society of Modern World History,
Professor of Renmin University, China

Ho Jong Ho, Chairman of Korean Historical Society, DPRK: *Japan Should Give up Colonialist Posture, Rethink Its Historical Sin, and Choose the Road of Apology and Compensation*

Jang Chun Chol, Department-Director of the Institute of Law, Korean Academy of Social Sciences, DPRK: *Japanese Bleaching Attitude to Their Historical Sin and Countermeasures of Its Victim Countries*

Cha Ha Soon, President of Korean National Committee of Historical Sciences, Professor of Sogang University, ROK: *Is Reconciliation Feasible at All?*

Xu Liping, Associate Professor of Institute of Asian and Pacific Studies, CASS: *Three Factors that Hamper Japanese Reflection on Its Invasion History to Southeast Asia in the Postwar Period*

Nguyen Huyquy, Former Director of China Study, Academy of Social Sciences of Vietnam: *Vietnamese-Japanese Relations against the Background of East Asian Historical Rethinking and Reconciliation after World War II*

Milbun Line, Executive Director of Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice, University of San Diego, USA: *From Security Configurations to Sustainable Peace: Moving beyond the Confrontational Legacies and Reconciliation Challenges of the Second World War in East Asia*

Open discussion

16:20 – 18:30

Panel II: Reflection and Reconciliation in East Asia after WWII (2)

Presided by: **Cha Ha Soon**, President of Korean National Committee of Historical Sciences, Professor of Sogang University, ROK

Arnd Bauerkämper, Professor of Free University Berlin, Germany

Li Wei, Director of Institute of Japanese Studies, CASS: *“Japan Belongs to Okinawa” – Okinawa in the Historical Memory and Realistic Politics*

Taniguchi Makoto, Former President of Iwate Prefectural University, Former Japanese Ambassador to the United Nations: *Regional Community’s History, Sense and East Asia’s Future*

Zhang Jingwei, Associate Professor of Institute of World History, CASS: *On the Question of Dual Characters of Japanese Intellectuals in the Modern Time*

Jin Chenggao, President of Chinese Society of Korean History, Professor of Yanbian University, China: *Japan’s Invasion History and the Construction of Harmonious Society in East Asia*

Toru Takenaka, Professor of Osaka University, Japan: *Where Was a Brandt in Postwar Japan? – The International Environment for Reconciliation in Asia in Comparison with that in Europe*

Song Zhiyong, Professor of Institute of Japanese Studies, Nankai University, China: *Japanese Perception of China and the Influence to Its Action (1931-1945)*

Meng Qinglong, Professor of the Institute of World History, CASS: *American Occupation Policy and the Historical Reflections in Japan*

Open discussion



Sunday, September 5th

9:00 – 10:40

Panel III: Reflection and Reconciliation in Postwar Europe (1)

Presided by: Olivier Wieviorka, Professor of Superior Normal School of Cachan, France

Wu Bikang, Professor of Institute of World History, CASS

Zhang Jianhua, Professor of Beijing Normal University, China: *Beyond "Reconciliation": The Evolution of Postwar Soviet Diplomatic Policy to Germany and Soviet-German Relationship*

Alexei Filitov, Professor of Institute of General History, Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia: *The USSR/ Russia and Germany: From Hostility to Partnership*

Włodzimierz Borodziej, Professor of Warsaw University, Poland: *Poles and Germans: From Hatred to Normality*

Antonie Dolezalova, Assistant Professor of University of Economics, Prague, Czech: *Czech Reconciliation with WWII: Looking for the Enemy*

Attila Pok, Vice-Director of the Institute of History, Hungary: *Forgetting or Remembering? Which is the Easier Road to Reconciliation? – The Case of World War II from a Central European Perspective*

11:00 – 12:30:

Panel III: Reflection and Reconciliation in Postwar Europe (2)

**Presided by: Qian Chengdan, President of China British History Association,
Professor of Beijing University**

**Alexei Filitov, Professor of Institute of General History,
Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia**

Meung-Hoan Noh, Professor of Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, ROK: *The European Integration and the Solution of the German Question as the Measurement of Past Redressing in Europe – Centered on their Implications for the Present East Asia*

Wu Bikang, Professor of Institute of World History, CASS: *Bishop Georg Bell and the Anglo-German Reconciliation*

Olivier Wieviorka, Professor of Superior Normal School of Cachan, France: *France and Germany: A Policy of Reconciliation*

Duanmu Mei, President of Chinese Association of French History, Professor of Institute of World History, CASS: *Primary Analysis on the Popular Factors in the Reconciliation between Nations*

Open discussion

14:00 – 16:00

Panel III: Reflection and Reconciliation in Postwar Europe (3)

Presided by: Gu Junli, President of Chinese Association of German Studies,
Professor of the Institute of European Studies, CASS

Nguyen Huyquy, Former Director of China Study,
Academy of Social Sciences of Vietnam

Di Wen, Professor of the Institute of World History, CASS: *Reflection on the Nazi Past in Germany: A Perspective of the Dualism of the German National Spirit*

Li Gongzhen, Professor of Wuhan University, China: *The Earliest Reflection on the Nazi Tyranny and the German History – The Exiled German Scholars of Social Sciences and Research on Nazi*

Arnd Bauerkämper, Professor of Free University Berlin, Germany: *National Remembrances and the Emergence of a European Memorial Culture – The Twisted Road to Reconciliation between the Germans and Their Neighbours After the Second World War*

Li Shi'an, President of Chinese Society of Modern World History, Professor of Renmin University, China: *The Different Attitudes of Germany and Japan to the War and Their Origins*

Simone Lässig, Director of German Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research: *Reconciliation, Educational Reforms and Politics of Memory after 1945: German and European Perspectives*

Jing Dexiang, Professor of Institute of World History, CASS: *Primary Research on the Causes of Difference between German and Japanese Reflections on History after WWII*

Open discussion

16:30 – 18:00

Concluding discussion: Experiences of Europe and Prospects of East Asia

Presided by: Tang Chongnan, President of China Association of Japanese History,
Professor of Institute of World History, CASS

Taniguchi Makoto, Former Japanese Ambassador to the United Nations

Statements by:

Qian Chengdan, President of China British History Association, Professor of Beijing University

Xu Lan, Vice-President of Chinese Association of History of WWII, Professor of Capital Normal University, China

Gu Junli, President of Chinese Association of German Studies, Professor of Institute of European Studies, CASS

Open discussion

18:00

Closing Ceremony, address by Zhang Shunhong, Director of Institute of World History, CASS



中国社会科学院世界史论坛, 2010年9月4-5日

二战后东亚与欧洲历史反思与和解进程比较 国际学术研讨会日程表

9月4日, 星期六

9点—9点45分:

开幕式, 中国社会科学院世界历史研究所所长张顺洪主持并致开幕词

嘉宾致词:

武 寅 (中国社会科学院副院长)

张海鹏 (中国史学会会长)

贝乌拉 (德国汉斯·赛德尔基金会北京办事处主任)

黄 平 (中国社会科学院美国研究所所长)

李 薇 (中国社会科学院日本研究所所长)

9点45分—12点:

主题报告: 中国的抗日战争研究与目前中日关系

中国社会科学院世界历史研究所所长张顺洪所长主持

步 平 (中国抗日战争研究会执行会长、中国社会科学院近代史研究所所长):

中国的抗日战争史研究与中日历史问题的对话空间

汤重南 (中国日本史学会会长、中国社会科学院世界历史所研究员):

日本历史认识问题与东亚和解的前景

依田喜家 (日本早稻田大学名誉教授):

关于目前中日之间的相互理解问题

14点—16点:

会议主题: 战后东亚的反思与和解 (1)

主持人: 金成镐 (中国朝鲜史研究会会长、延边大学教授)

李世安 (中国世界现代史研究会会长, 中国人民大学教授)

许宗浩 (朝鲜历史学会会长):

日本应该反思历史罪行, 选择谢罪赔偿之路

张春哲 (朝鲜社会科学院法律研究所室主任):



论日本对历史罪行的回避行为以及受害国对策

车河淳(韩国历史学会会长、西江大学教授):
和解究竟是否可能

许利平(中国社会科学院亚太研究所研究员):
战后制约日本对东南亚侵略历史反思的三方因素

阮辉贵(越南社会科学院中国研究所前所长):
二战后东亚历史反思与和解背景下的越日关系

莱因(美国圣地亚哥大学克洛克和平与正义研究所执行所长):
从安全策略到持久和平:克服东亚二战对抗的遗产与和解的挑战

讨论

16点20分—18点30分:

会议主题: 战后东亚的反思与和解(2)

主持人: 车河淳(韩国历史学会会长、西江大学教授)
鲍尔康泊(德国柏林自由大学教授)

李薇(中国社会科学院日本研究所所长):
“日本属于冲绳”——历史记忆与现实政治中的冲绳

谷口诚(日本前驻联合国大使):
地域共同体的历史、意义和亚洲的未来

张经纬(中国社会科学院世界历史所副研究员):
关于近代以来日本知识份子的两面性问题

金成镐(中国朝鲜史研究会会长、延边大学教授):
试论日本对外侵略历史与东亚和谐社会的构建问题

竹中亨(日本大阪大学教授):
战后日本的勃兰特在哪里?——战后东亚与欧洲和解国际环境的比较

宋志勇(南开大学日本研究院教授):
日本对华认识及对其行动的影响(1931-1945)

孟庆龙(中国社会科学院世界历史研究所研究员):
美国占领政策与日本的历史反思

讨论



9月5日, 星期日

9点-10点40分: 会议主题: 战后欧洲的反思与和解(1)

主持人: 维约卡(法国卡尚高等师范学校教授)

吴必康(中国社会科学院世界历史所研究员)

张建华(北京师范大学教授):

超越“和解”:战后苏联对德外交和关系的演进

费利托夫(俄罗斯科学院世界历史研究所研究员):

苏联/俄罗斯与德国:从敌视到伙伴关系

波罗泽基(波兰华沙大学教授):

波兰人与德国人:从仇恨到关系正常化

多乐扎洛娃(捷克经贸大学教授):

捷克与二战的和解:寻找敌人

波克(匈牙利科学院历史研究所副所长):

忘却还是铭记?何为和解之捷径?——二次大战的个案:中欧的视角

讨论

11点-12点30分: 会议主题: 战后欧洲的反思与和解(2)

主持人: 钱乘旦(中国英国史研究会会长、北京大学教授)

费利托夫(俄罗斯科学院世界历史所研究员)

卢明焕(韩国外国研究大学教授):

欧洲一体化与作为补救既往之举的对德问题解决方案:以其对当下东亚之意义为中心

吴必康(中国社会科学院世界历史研究所研究员):

乔治·贝尔主教与英德和解

维约卡(法国卡尚高等师范学校教授):

法国与德国:和解政策?

端木美(中国法国史研究会会长、中国社会科学院世界历史研究所研究员):

浅析民族和解进程中的民众因素

讨论

14点—16点:

会议主题: 战后欧洲的反思与和解 (3)

主持人: 顾俊礼 (中国德国学会会长、中国社会科学院欧洲所研究员)

阮辉贵 (越南社会科学院中国研究所前所长)

邸文 (中国社会科学院世界历史研究所研究员):

从德意志民族精神的双重性探讨德国对纳粹历史的反思

李工真 (武汉大学历史学院教授):

对纳粹暴政和德意志历史最早的反思——德国流亡社会科学家与纳粹主义研究

鲍尔康泊 (德国柏林自由大学教授):

国民记忆与欧洲记忆文化的诞生: 二战后德国人与其邻国人的曲折和解之路

李世安 (中国世界现代史研究会会长、中国人民大学教授):

德日两国对战争罪行的不同态度及其形成原因研究

蕾斯希 (德国不伦瑞克国际教科书研究所所长):

1945年之后的和解、教育改革与记忆政治: 德国与欧洲的视角

景德祥 (中国社会科学院世界历史所研究员):

二战后德国与日本历史反思差异原因之初探

讨论

16点30分—18点:

综合讨论: “欧洲的经验, 东亚的前景”

主持人: 汤重南 (中国日本史学会会长、中国社会科学院世界历史研究所研究员)

谷口诚 (日本前驻联合国大使)

特邀评论员发言:

钱乘旦 (中国英国史研究会会长、北京大学教授)

徐 蓝 (中国二战史研究会副会长、首都师范大学教授)

顾俊礼 (中国德国学会会长、中国社会科学院欧洲所研究员)

自由发言

18点: 闭幕式, 中国社会科学院世界历史研究所所长张顺洪致闭幕词





**Hanns
Seidel
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本丛书文章中的观点只代表作者
个人, 不一定代表汉斯·赛德尔基
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März 2011

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